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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The proposition that an economic system will function 
best when decisions are made in a decentralized manner has 
a long history in economic doctrine. Adam Smith's concept 
of the "invisible hand" involves just such a proposition. 
Walras' concept of tâtonnements embodies such a proposition 
stated in a mathematical form. Walras outlines an algorithmic 
process in which at each iteration decentralized decision­
makers respond to a set of prices which are in turn revised 
according to the amount of excess demand when those responses 
are aggregated. It was Walras' purpose to show that after 
successive iterations an equilibrium solution would be reached. 
Such an equilibrium will be associated with an optimum under 
the usual assumptions of convexity of preferences and produc­
tion processes (Arrow and Hurwicz, 1960, p. 35). 
The discussion of market socialism was concerned with 
the possibility of using a decentralized market mechanism 
to obtain an economic optimum in a socialist economy rather 
than a capitalist economy (Hayek, 1956; Lange and Taylor, 
1938). More recently, a number of different mathematical 
models have been formulated with the specific aim of effecting 
a certain degree of decentralization in the decision process. 
The models presented below are basically in this tradition. 
Some of these models have been concerned with the use of 
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transfer or internal prices in decentralizing decisions 
in business firms, e.g.. Arrow (1959) and Baumol and Fabian 
(1964). Others have been directed toward decentralizing 
planning decisions in a national economy, e.g., Malinvaud 
(1967), Komai and Liptak (1965), and Aoki (1970). To the 
extent that these models are presented in an abstract mathe­
matical form they may be considered generally applicable to 
different types and sizes of economic institutions (Arrow 
and Hurwicz, 1960, p. 34). In applying such models to a 
large public institution or to a national economy, however, 
there is the very basic difficulty of specifying a satis­
factory objective function or of circumventing the need 
for such a function. 
The preceding survey is not intended to be comprehensive. 
The literature on decentralization is vast, and a compre­
hensive survey would constitute a study in itself. Rather, 
it is intended that the brief introductory survey will help 
to identify the position of the models in this study relative 
to the literature on decentralization in general. Specific 
references directly related to each of the models presented 
in this study will be discussed below. 
Three related but essentially different types of 
resource allocation models are presented here. The first type 
is associated with a large economic system in which highly 
integrated sub units are linked together by a relatively small 
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number of constraints. It is assumed that the technological 
relations and resource constraints can be specified by the 
model and, more crucially, that a set of coefficients indi­
cating the relative value of each activity is available. 
This type of model will be analyzed in the framework of a 
decomposable linear program. The contribution to this first 
type of model includes extensions of the pricing and allocation 
rules with the intention of making the decentralized solution 
process more efficient. The theoretical considerations are 
discussed in Chapter II, and the computational results of 
an illustrative numerical model are presented in Chapter III. 
The second and third types of models "presented below 
are assumed to apply to situations in which the coefficients 
indicating the relative value of each activity are not readily 
available. Chapter IV contains a discussion of different 
alternatives which might be employed when a set of relative 
prices is not available so that the vector of outputs can be 
collapsed into a meaningful scalar value. One alternative 
presented is the possibility of specifying a vector of output 
goals and employing goal programming to obtain a solution 
which is optimal relative to the goals. A second alternative 
discussed is the possibility of computing output vectors 
which satisfy the less ambitious criterion of efficiency. A 
method is presented by which it is possible to compute all 
'efficient extreme points which are adjacent to a given 
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efficient extreme point. 
The second general type of model is introduced in 
Chapter V. It is specifically concerned with making resource 
allocation decisions in a university where relative prices 
for activities are difficult to obtain. The use of goal 
programming and efficient output computations are discussed 
and are applied to an illustrative numerical model. The 
possibility of effecting a multi-level decentralization 
through goal programming is also discussed. 
The third type of model is outlined in Chapter VI and 
is essentially theoretical in nature. It assumes a production 
system in a general equilibrium setting and is concerned with 
the relation between efficient production and a very specific 
type of noncompetitive price setting. In this context the 
relative prices are variables in the system. The possibility 
of decentralizing decisions when the noncompetitive price 
setting is present is discussed. 
Each of the models in the study is linear and can be 
written as a linear programming problem. Thus the usual 
assumption of constant returns to scale and divisibility 
must be made. A fairly complete comparison of marginal 
analysis and linear programming with respect to the theory of 
the firm is given in Naylor (1966) . An interesting theoretical 
study of the effects of indivisibilities can be found in 
Frank (19 69). The models are also essentially static and 
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deterministic. They could be expanded to include certain 
types of dynamic elements without basic difficulties. This 
could be accomplished by the well known procedure of defining 
products produced in different time periods to be different 
products and including constraints which effectively linik" 
the time periods together. Certain types of uncertainty 
could also be handled by known methods such as chance con­
strained programming or stochastic linear programming. 
By using only linear models which are static and deter­
ministic a number of important difficulties such as increasing 
returns to scale, more conplicated types of externalities, 
adjustments over time, and the treatment of stochastic elements 
have been avoided. Such difficulties are avoided only at a 
high cost to the richness of the model; however, the retention 
of linearity has the compensating advantage that computation 
is possible for relatively disaggregated models with many 
variables . Treating the types of difficulties listed sdaove 
in any very sophisticated manner requires the inclusion of 
many nonlinearities with the result that computation, where 
it is possible, is a very expensive process unless the model 
is highly aggregated. 
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CHAPTER II. TWO DECOMPOSITION PROCEDURES 
The Basic Models 
This chapter and the next will focus on optimal decision­
making in a large economic system in which highly integrated 
subcoitponents can be identified. The subcomponents are 
linked together by relatively few variables so that a 
satisfactory decentralized decision process greatly economizes 
the amount of information which the highest level decision­
makers need. 
We will assume that the system can be satisfactorily 
approximated by a linear model. The discussion will center 
around two different specific formulations of linear program­
ming models each of which can be decomposed into a group of 
smaller linear programming models appropriately linked to­
gether. 
Model (1) is the type discussed by Komai cind Liptak (1965) 
in their article on two level planning and by Sengupta (1970) 
in an article on the active approach; 
max Z cP xi, where c^ and x^ are n^xl vectors representing 
j=l respectively the direct returns and levels 
of activities of the subunit, (1) 
subject to 
^ 4 4 4 4 
E A/x^ ^ b, where A-" is the mxn-' matrix of activities of 
j=l the submit and b represents the 
vector of resources available. 
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x ^ ^ O ,  j  =  l t o n .  
In this case the resource vector b can be decomposed or allo-
cated such that Z ur < b and for each such decomposition 
there is em associated set of n subproblems with constraint 
sets: 
^ u^, x^ ^ 0 ^ where iP is an allocation of re­
sources to the ith subproblem. 
Model (2) is the type discussed by Dantzig and Wolfe (Dantzig, 
1959; Dantzig and Wolfe, 1961) in their articles on the de­
composition principle and by Charnes and Cooper (1961) as a 
class of coupled models; 
^ "i ' i i "i 
max ^ c-* x-^, where c-* and x-" are defined as in (1), (2) 
j=l 
subject to 
n • • • 
Z A X ^ by where the matrices and the vector b have 
j=l as many rows as there are central resources, 
x^ ^ b^, j = 1 to n, where the matrix D and the 
vector b3 have as many rows as there are 
resources specific to the jth subunit, 
x ^ ^ O ,  j  =  l t o n .  
In this case each decomposition or allocation of resources is 
associated with a set of n subproblems with constraint sets: 
8 
xP ^ bi 
xi ^ 0 . 
The basic difference between these two models in economic 
terms is that in (1) all resources are viewed as being central 
resources allocable to the subunit; while in (2) certain 
resources specified by b^ are viewed as an essential part 
of the sub unit and other resources specified by b are viewed 
as central allocable resources. Such elements specific to the 
jth subunit might result from an immovable resource such as 
a plant or from a natural resource associated with a particular 
subunit and its geographical location. While in general we 
will refer to elements of b and b^ as quantities of resources, 
it should be noted that (as well as representing quantities 
of goods) they may also represent the amount of services avail­
able during the period from a stock of fixed capital or may 
even represent a capacity level imposed on certain activities 
by institutional regulations. Institutionally imposed 
capacity levels on certain activities would be necessary if, 
for example, a corporation were forced to keep its sales of 
a product below a certain market share so as not to face an 
antitrust suit, or if a public utility were forced by law 
to maintain a certain level of specific services even if a 
9 
loss were incurred. The capacity level on certain activities 
might also refer to the maximum amount of a particular 
polluting material which is allowed without violating a 
certain clean air or water standard. In this case the re­
source being allocated would be the right to produce a 
certain quantity of the polluting material. The final 
shadow price for such a constraint would then be interpreted 
as the cost which should be levied against the subunits for 
each unit of the polluting material produced. 
It should be pointed out that while all the constraints 
are written as less than or equal to inequalities, no 
generality is lost. Minimum output requirements are repre­
sented by using negative bj^ values and negative a^j or d^j 
coefficients to represent output per unit of activity. Cases 
where the assumption of free disposal is not acceptable (i.e., 
equality constraints) can be represented by two inequality 
restrictions. 
Actually in mathematical terms the structure of model 
(2) can be considered a special case of model (1) (Komai and 
Liptak, 1965). All that is required is that the A matrix of 
(1) have the following structure: 
A°1 A°2 ... A°"" 
0 . . .  0  
22 
.nn 
(3) 
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Then let , j = 1 to n and let = 0^, i = j = 1 to n. 
Even though (2) can be treated as a special case of (1), model 
(1) is considered separately because the difficulty of finding 
a solution is closely related to the number of central 
resources. 
Linear models with matrix structures such as (3) are of 
general importance because they result not only from situa­
tions where a number of subunits are linked together in a 
single time period, but also in dynamic models where the 
linking is between time periods (Orchard-Hays, 1968, p. 
260). Even if the system being modeled is not such that 
subunits or time periods are identifiable it still may be 
possible to rearrange the matrix into the block-angular form 
(Weil, 1968; Weil cind Kattler, 1969). 
To facilitate the solution process the original models 
(1) and (2) are each decomposed into a central or restricted 
master problem and a group of n subproblems. The central 
problem obtained from (1) is (4): 
max Z E . pi^, where p^^ = c^ x^^ and 
^jk j=l keK^ is a scalar, 
(4) 
subject to E E . _< b, where q^^ = A^ x^^ 
j=l kEK^ 
1 0, all j,k . 
The jth subproblem corresponding to the central problem (4) 
11 
and an allocation of central resources is (5): 
-ÎI k • -i n k 
max (c"' -n Ar)xJ, where H is a vector of shadow 
prices from (4)^ 
subject to (5) 
AÎ xi < uik 
xi ^ 0. 
An optimal solution for the jth subproblem (5), given u^^ and 
k "lie 
H , will be designated as x-" and the optimal dual values 
will be designated as vi^. 
The central problem obtained from (2) is (6); 
max E I . ^i^ pi^, where pi^ = ci xi^ 
^jk j=l kcK/ 
subject to Z E . xi^ qi^ £ b, where gi^ = Ai xi^ (6) 
j=l keFX 
Z . xi^ = 1, j = 1 to n 
keK^ 
xi^ ^  0, all j,k . 
The shadow prices for the vector b and for the convexity 
k nk 
constraints of (6) are designated as n and y-^ respectively. 
The jth subproblem corresponding to the central problem (6) 
^ote that the n vector will always be non-negative 
since the constraints on central resources in (4) are all 
"less than" inequalities. 
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and an allocation of central resources is (7): 
T ' If ' 4 4 
max (c-^ -n A-')x-' 
xi 
subject to x^ _< u^^ (7) 
x^ <_ bi 
xi 2 0" 
An optimal solution for the jth subproblem (7) given u^^ and 
k . "ik 
n will be designated as x-^ and the optimal dual values for 
u^^ and b^ will be designated as v^^ and w^^ respectively. 
The Dantzig-Wolfe Decomposition 
Algorithm 
A quick summary of the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition 
algorithm can easily be accomplished using central problem (6) 
and subproblems (7), with the assumption that the allocation 
of central resources u^^ is so large as to never be con­
straining to any subproblems. Assume also that the original 
model (2) has an optimal solution. 
If a set of vectors q^^ and their associated scalars 
p^^ are available such that (6) has a feasible solution, then 
the algorithm proceeds in the following steps. 
*1 k 
step 1. Solve (6) obtaining optimal values and the 
k "1 k 
optimal dual values n and v • 
Step 2. Substitute H of step 1 into the n subproblems 
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2 nk (7) and obtain optimal solutions x*' , j = 1 to 
n and their associated = (c^ -n^ 
Step 3. Pick 6°^ = max (z^^-y^^). If 6°^ ^  0, then an 
j 
optimal solution to the original model (2) is 
given by x^ = Z . xP^, j = 1 to n. If 
ok keK 
6  > 0 ,  t h e n  f o r  j  s u c h  t h a t  z ^  - y ^  i s  a  
maximum compute x^^ and p^^ = c^ x^^ 
and use the resulting q^^ and p^^ to augment 
problem (6) . Then set k = k+1 and return to 
step 1. 
If the required initial feasible solution is not available 
for (6) then artificial vectors can be introduced and an initial 
feasible solution may be obtained by a phase 1 procedure 
following the steps just given (Dantzig, 1963, p. 454). 
The decomposition type algorithms are important purely 
as computational techniques for very large scale problems 
since they allow the large problem to be broken up into a 
number of smaller problems which can be solved sequentially. 
This facilitates the solution of problems too large for 
existing computer capacity but has more general implications 
for computational costs since marginal computational costs 
2 
The jth subproblem cannot be infeasible if the original 
problem has an optimal solution as assumed. If the jth sub-
problem is unbounded then a slight variation in the procedure 
is sufficient to solve the difficulty (Dantzig, 1963, p. 453), 
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are an increasing function of the problem size. It has been 
noted that for dynamic problems the number of rows and columns 
grows in proportion to the number of time periods involved 
while the computational effort grows about in proportion to 
the cube of the number of time periods involved (Dantzig, 
1970, p. 51). A similar statement would be true with respect 
to the number of subunits linked crossectionally as will 
be considered here. 
Since Dantzig and Wolfe first applied the decomposition 
principle to linear programming the principle has been 
applied to a number of specific nonlinear programming 
problems such as quadratic, convex, and geometric programming 
problems (Hass, 1969; Chames, Fiacco and Littlechild, 1966; 
Zangwill, 1967; Zener, 1964). While the decomposition 
algorithm for linear programming has not yet become an 
important method of computation in actual practice, it con­
tinues to receive much attention as is evident from the 
sections on large scale programming in Dantzig (1968) and 
Kuhn (1970). Orchard-Hays has stated that "...decomposition 
is the only really promising extension to mathematical pro­
gramming for large and complicated models" (Orchard-Hays, 
1968, p. 240). 
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Decomposition and Decentralized 
Decisions 
The intention here is to focus not on decomposition as 
a purely computational device so much as on the possibility 
of using decomposition to effect an optimal decentralized 
decision process within a large economic system. Such a 
system could be a large corporation composed of different 
plants, a national economy composed of different sectors, or, 
where prices for outputs are available, a public institution 
composed of different departments. From its very inception 
the importance of decomposition for decentralizing of deci­
sions has been apparent. Dantzig wrote a short dialogue in 
which decision-makers at two different levels used the de­
composition principle to solve a small transportation problem 
by sending only specific quantity and shadow price information 
to each other (Dantzig, 1963 , p. 456). Examples of references 
which discuss the use of the decomposition principle for de­
centralization of decision-making in national planning, multi-
plant firms, and multidepartment public institutions include 
(Malinvaud, 1967; Kornai, 1969; Gale, 1960, p. 85; Whinston, 
1964; 1966; Fox, McCamley, and Plessner, 1967). 
Noting the structure of (6) and (7) and the information 
which is communicated between the central and subproblems in 
the steps of the Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm, it is obvious 
that the information relevant to the solution is largely 
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decentralized. The decision-maker for the jth subunit needs to 
know the productive activities (i.e., the matrices and D^), 
the profit per unit of activity (i.e., the vector c^), and the 
specific resource levels or capacities (i.e., the vector 
b^) which constrain his jth subunit. The only information he 
needs concerning the other sub units is contained in the 
vectors of shadow prices, H , for the central resources, b. 
This sequence of price vectors is the only information 
which need be passed from the central to the subdecision-
maker during the solution process. After the optimal solution 
A Tf * 
has been obtained, the optimal weights, X-" 's, must also 
be sent to the subunit. 
The central decision-maker needs virtually no information 
about the production techniques of the subunits. He needs 
only to know the amounts of central resources available 
along with the specific proposals he receives from subunits. 
The proposed vectors of central resource use and/or production 
A Jr 
(i.e., the q-^ vectors) along with the amount of profit 
realizable from each proposal (i.e., the p^^ values) are 
the only pieces of information which need to flow from the 
subunits to the center to accomplish the desired solution. 
The solution is essentially obtained by charging (paying) 
the subunits for the quantities of central resources which 
Tr 
they use (produce) according to an imputed price, n . This 
inputed price is varied from proposal to proposal to reflect 
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the relative scarcity of the central resources and when the 
final central solution is obtained n provides an equilibrium 
imputed price for the system (Gale, 1960, p. 91). However, 
this equilibrium price vector alone is not necessarily suf­
ficient to insure that the subunit will be led to produce 
quantities consistent with the overall optimum. The break­
down occurs if some sub units have alternative suboptima 
for the equilibrium price vector (Chames, Glower, and Kortanek, 
1967, p. 299). To insure consistency, in this case, additional 
information such as the optimal weights, 's, or specific 
allocations of central resources must be transmitted to the 
sub unit. 
The major problem which is of concern here is that the 
original Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm has been found to converge 
quite slowly and to require too many major iterations to be 
effective as an actual decentralized planning mechanism 
(Beale, Hughes, and Small, 1965, p. 14; Kornai, 1969, p. 15 3). 
The following quote indicates the difficulty: "At each major 
iteration price imputations are computed by the central unit 
and a price vector is delegated separately to each division. 
However, not all divisions may take action with respect to 
these price vectors. It is possible for ninety-nine of one 
hundred divisions to be economically idle while for division 
one iterations will proceed through a long sequence of 
T T imputed prices , llg ,... . For an ordinary linear pro-
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gramming problem, solution techniques of the type described 
may involve thousands of iterations, which in terms of real 
life message time may be utterly impractical" (Chames, 
Glower, and Kortanek, 1967, p. 296). 
The reason for this can partially be traced to the fact 
that the imputed prices in iterations are likely to be 
extremely poor indicators of the relative scarcity of the 
central resources. Early imputed price vectors are likely 
to bear little resemblance to the final imputed price vector 
given by the dual of the central resource vector at the final 
optimal solution. Especially damaging is the fact that even 
the most important central resources will have zero shadow 
prices at different stages giving the sub unit no incentive 
to make proposals which economize in the use of that resource 
or proposals which would produce quantities of the resource 
for other firms. Given such unrealistic prices, without any 
constraints on central resources, the subunits are almost 
certain to return proposals which grossly over-use and over­
produce certain central resources while grossly under-using 
and under-producing others and as a result contribute little 
toward obtaining an optimal solution. 
The above propositions are supported by experience from 
a specific application of decomposition to a problem of 
planning a production and investment schedule for a group of 
oil fields. It was felt that the main reason for the slow 
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convergence of the original Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm could be 
traced to the fact that "the Il-values on the common rows 
oscillated wildly from one major iteration to another." 
And it was found that a considerable savings in the number 
of major iterations can be obtained if it is possible to 
"generate n-values at the start of the problem that are 
quite like the n-values at the final optimum" (Beale, Hughes 
and Small, 1965, pp. 14-15). 
The methods outlined below are proposed with the belief 
that they may prove to be more useful for decentralized 
economic planning than the original Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm 
and the existing similar methods. The goal is to obtain a 
solution with significantly fewer major iterations by a 
process that requires that somewhat more information be passed 
between the different levels at each major iteration and 
increases the number of rows in subproblems. 
The process combines a pricing mechanism with a resource 
allocation mechanism. It has been suggested that such a 
procedure would be closer to methods used in actual practice 
and would provide more useable theoretical conclusions 
(Malinvaud, 1967, p. 207). In the procedure outlined not only 
the shadow price vector, n, but also the vector of quantity 
allocations u^ will be passed from the center to the jth sub-
unit at each iteration. The purpose of the quantity alloca­
tions is to compensate for the poor price imputations which 
20 
must be used during early iterations, especially the zero 
values. Furthermore the quantity allocations make it 
possible to obtain vital dual price information which can be 
sent to the center along with the new quantity proposal and 
used by the center to make better reallocations at any later 
iteration. Economically the prices sent to the center 
can be viewed as the amount the subunit would bid for an 
additional unit of resource it uses as an input or the 
opportunity cost of the last unit of an output quota it must 
fulfill. 
In a planning model applied to the Hungarian economy 
with a structure identical to (2) except that the matrices 
were decomposed making a three level hierarchy, Kornai 
suggested using central resource shadow prices from the sub-
units for reallocating central resources in a heuristic manner 
(Komai, 1969, p. 156). Such shadow prices from a model 
structured like (2) have also been used in two decomposition 
algorithms which obtain a solution by making successive re­
allocations of the central resource vector but do not make 
use of shadow prices obtained from the center (Abadie and 
Sakarovitch, 1970). 
The subunits will vary in their profitability according 
to relative differences in the amount of return per unit of 
activity (i.e., c^ values) and due to their efficiency in the 
production and use of central resources (determined by the 
21 
elements of ). In the final solution subunits which are, 
in general, more profitable will be most important. They will 
use and produce the greatest portion of central resources. 
This would indicate that an iteration process which could 
identify the more profitable firms at an early stage should 
be able to arrive at a solution more efficiently by investing 
most of its effort in obtaining new revised proposals from 
those profitable firms. A criterion will be proposed by 
which the subunits can be identified according to profit­
ability or potential profitability at each major iteration 
so that different actions can be taken toward the subunits. 
Important properties of the Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm 
which are retained in the solution processes given here in­
clude the availability of a feasible solution at any itera­
tion and the fact that the objective function increases 
monotonically with each iteration. This means that while 
the effort of an additional iteration can be expected to 
yield an improvement in the solution, if the transactions 
cost of exchanging information, computing, and waiting 
for a solution exceeds the expected improvement, then the 
process can be terminated with a useable solution available. 
The importance of these properties for actual applications 
has been noted in the literature (Martos and Kornai, 1965, p. 
184). Furthermore it is possible to compute indices which 
aid in determining the potential for improvement from further 
22 
iterations and in special cases an upper bound for the objec­
tive function value can easily be obtained. Both types of 
information are important in deciding whether to terminate 
the iterations before a final optimum has been reached. 
Solution Process for Model (1) 
An outline of the proposed process for obtaining a solu­
tion to model (1) in a decentralized manner is given below, 
followed by a discussion of the mathematical and economic 
rationale for the process. After that an outline and 
discussion of the proposed solution process for model (2) will 
be given. 
Before presenting the precise steps of the process, a 
rough summary of the economic meaning of the steps will be 
given. In step 1 the central decision-makers take the 
proposed vectors of input and/or output quantities which 
have been obtained from the subunits and form a vector of 
total input cind/or output quantities for the whole system 
using a weighted sum of the proposal vectors. The weighted 
sum is formed in such a way that total direct returns to the 
system are maximized among those weighted sums which satisfy 
the total resource constraints for the system. The optimal 
weighted sum is obtained by a linear programming problem which 
also provides shadow price values for the resources. These 
shadow prices have the well known value of the marginal 
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product interpretation. They indicate the value of an addi­
tional unit of each resource or alternatively the loss which 
would be incurred by a one unit decrease in any resource.^ 
The new allocation vectors are determined in step 2. 
These allocation vectors indicate the maximum amount of input 
the subunit can use and/or the minimum amount of output it 
must produce. The objective is to make the allocations so 
that each resource will be used and/or produced most effi­
ciently. Thus the new allocation vectors are obtained by 
modifying those proposal vectors which are, at that stage, 
the most economic, i.e., proposals which break even when 
resources are valued according to the central shadow prices 
obtained in step 1. The specific breakeven proposals to 
be modified are determined by identifying maximum positive 
deviations between the price imputed to a specific resource 
by the subunit and the central shadow price for that re­
source. The maximum positive price deviation identifies 
the subunit which has a high potential for profitably using 
an additional allocation of the particular resource and using 
it more profitably than it would be used in the weighted sum 
solution of step 1. The new allocations then include a large 
^This interpretation may be valid only for a change in 
each resource less than a certain amount. The amount can be 
determined by a range analysis. If the optimal solution 
happens to be degenerate it may be that the interpretation 
will not hold even for a very small change in the resource 
level since any change could cause the optimal basis to become 
in feasible. 
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increase in the resource with the maximum price deviation 
and a small increase in other quantities of the proposal 
to allow the subunit some flexibility for reshuffling its 
input and output configuration. 
In step 3 the subunits form a new proposal such that 
the resource allocation which they received is satisfied and 
such that the value of production activities is a maximum given 
they are charged for inputs and credited for outputs according 
to the central shadow prices obtained in step 1. If a new 
proposal is found which is more profitable than the existing 
proposals it is sent to the center to be included in a new 
weighted sum solution for the whole system. The subunit 
linear programming problem provides a vector of dual variables 
corresponding to the new proposal vector. These dual variables 
indicate the value (cost) , over and above the central price 
at which the subunit was charged (credited), of each addi­
tional unit of the resource used (produced). Thus the sum 
of the central shadow price vector and the dual vector indi­
cate prices at which the subunit would demand additional 
units of input and/or supply additional units of output. 
This vector sum provides a sub unit price imputation for the 
quantities in the new proposal and is the vector used in 
step 2 for making new allocations. Step 4 merely indicates 
the conditions under which it is known that the system has 
reached an equilibrium cind an overall optimum. 
The specific steps of the process will now be given. At 
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the kth major iteration a set of vectors will be available 
4 
such that the central problem (4) has a feasible solution. 
The problem of obtaining an initial feasible central solution 
will be discussed below. The central problem must have a 
bounded optimal solution given the assumption that the 
4 To aid the reader, model (1), the related central problem 
(4), and jth subproblem (5) are repeated below; 
n 
E 
j=l 
*1 * "1 
max c-* x-* 
^ i i 
subject to Z < b 
3=1 -i (1) 
x^ ^ 0, j = 1 to n 
n 
max E E . likpik, where = cP'sik 
j^jk j=l keK/ 
subject to Z Z . xi^qi^ < b, where q^^ = (4) 
j=l keRJ 
2 0, all j,k 
i ' k ' 1 i k 
max (c-" -n Ar)xJ, where n is a vector of shadow prices 
jjj from (1) 
( 5 )  
subject to A^xi _< u.]^, where u^^ is the jth subunit's 
. allocation of resources at the kth 
x^ >_ 0 iteration. 
The optimal primal and dual vectors for (5) are x^^ and v^^ 
respectively. 
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original problem has an optimal solution. Then at the kth 
iteration, the following steps are taken. 
Step 1. Solve problem (4) obtaining the optimal primal 
values , keK^, j = 1 to n and the 
corresponding dual values 11^ , i = 1 to m. 
Step 2. Let Q = {qikjxik* 0} and V = {v^^|>0}. 
Then the proposals in Q when evaluated at 
k 
central price imputations n just break even, 
and V is the set of subunit imputed prices 
for the same proposals. For each resource 
n k find that q-" EQ such that the difference 
ik y 
between v^-^ and 11^ * is a maximum. If the 
maximum difference is positive then that jth 
subunit is given an allocation u^^ equal to 
0 < 6 < 1, except for the addition 
of a large positive increment to the ith 
element. Periodically, (i.e., not necessarily 
every iteration) all subunits not receiving 
an allocation from the above rule are allocated 
T It T k n k 
U"^ = q-^ such that q-" eQ, or if some unit has 
no q^^eQ then u^^ is allocated such that u^^>0 
"1 k T k 
and u^-^ _> max q-' . 
keK^ 
^The term jq^^l indicates a vector in which each element 
is the absolute value of the element in qi*. 
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Step 3. Sub units solve (5) for all allocations received 
using the central shadow prices H obtained 
in step 1. If (c^ -n^ > 0, then a new 
profitable proposal has been obtained and the 
central problem is augmented by 
"1 Jc "1 ' "1 k 
and p-* =c-' . The corresponding subunit 
price imputations are obtained by setting 
unless v\i^=q^i^=0 for some 
resource i, in which case Vj|^ is set equal to 
0. Then return to step 1. If no profitable 
proposals are obtained go to step 4. 
Step 4. Make an allocation such that u^^ > 0 and 
"i k "1 Ic 
u. > max q. , to all sub units not receiving 
keK^ 
such a strictly positive allocation from step 2, 
Then go to step 3. If no profitable proposals 
are obtained then an optimal solution for 1 is 
given by xP = E j = 1 to n. 
j keK 
Feasible Solutions for 
Model (1) 
Following the process just given, the solution to (4) in 
step 1 will always correspond to a feasible solution to (1), 
since by subsitution of q^^=A^x^^ and p^^=c^ x^^ we get 
? r . likci'xik = ? ci'{ : . 
j=l keK^ j=l keK^ 
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and 
b  >  ?  E  ,  * 3 =  :  A i (  E  .  x i k x i k )  .  
j=l keK^ j=l keK^ 
Since each and is non-negative ( Z . X^^xP^) , j = 1 to 
keK^ 
n, is non-negative and is a feasible solution to (1) with an 
objective function value equal to that of (4). This iirplies 
that a feasible solution for model (1) will be available even 
if the process is terminated before a final optimal solution 
for model (1) is obtained. 
Reallocation of Resources 
The importance of the set Q in step 2 is that it con­
tains those proposals made by the subunits which can be 
considered to be the most profitable, given the available 
knowledge at the kth iteration. The difficulty involved in 
making the division between more and less profitable sub-
units involves the fact that profitability is defined in 
relation to the total value of central resources used and/or 
produced, and the equilibrium price imputation for these 
central resources is known only after the final iteration. 
Ir 
However, the vector of dual variables n obtained from the 
kth central problem does give the price imputation of central 
resources if they were to be used according to that kth 
central problem solution. This is easily seen from the follow­
ing string of equalities, the left hand term being the value 
« 
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• k • 
of central resources using the price vector n , the right 
hand term being the objective function value of (1) at the kth 
iteration: 
n ^ ' b  =  E  z  .  = '  z  c i '  (  z  .  .  
j=l keK^ j=l keK^ 
The first equality follows from the duality relation; the 
nk 
second from Wie definition of . 
Since n is the price imputation of central resources 
when used in the best plan obtained at that stage of itera­
tion, the jth subunit will be said to be profitable or to 
T T Ic ' "1 Ic 
break even if for some keK-', p-" -n q-' =0 and said to be 
unprofitable if p^^-II^ q <0 for all keK^ , The direct return 
T k from the jkth proposal is given by p-" , and for the proposal 
to break even this must be as large as the net value of 
central resources used and/or produced. Any output of a 
"1 k 
central resource i will show up as a negative q-" , in the 
proposal; so the subunit is credited for the value of outputs 
in the proposal and charged for the value of inputs. Since 
ik k * ik p-" -n qJ is nothing more than the "c^-z j " value of the jkth 
column of problem (4) it is very simple to determine which 
proposals are unprofitable and which break even. Any proposal 
having a strictly positive will break even, and the set 
of such proposals is defined as Q in step 2. The proposals 
contained in Q will, of course, change from iteration to 
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iteration. 
Reallocation of Resources and the Use of Subunit 
Price Imputations 
The subunits which are to be given a new allocation of 
Ic 
central resources along with the price vector n and asked to 
make a new proposal are chosen from the subunits having a 
proposal contained in Q, while only at periodic iterations will 
all subunits, including those not having a proposal contained 
in Q/ be asked to submit a new proposal. Except for the 
periodic allocations to all subunits, the new allocations, u^^, 
will be basically modifications of the vectors contained 
in Q. 
"13c 
It is in choosing the q-" eQ to be modified that the im­
portance of the price information obtained from subunits 
enters the process. The set V is defined in step 2 to include 
the subunit price imputations for proposals contained in Q. 
The important thing to note is that for each vector of quanti-
T k ties q-' eQ there are available two different vectors of im-
k —"ik puted prices, n and v" . The first is the price imputation 
of central resources relative to the central problem; the 
second the price imputation of the quantities of central re-
ik 
sources q-' relative to the jth sub unit. If there are large 
differences between these imputed values for particular 
resources, then when the subunit is issued the new prices H 
it will have em incentive to change the original proposal, q . 
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To the extent that the new allocation vector and the techno­
logical structure of the subunits permit, the subunit will have 
an incentive to subsitute relatively less costly inputs for 
relatively more costly ones and relatively more valuable outputs 
for relatively less valuable ones. 
A major objective of decentralizing the decision process 
is to obtain a solution without forcing central decision-makers 
to have direct knowledge of the technological structure of the 
subunits. Thus they will not be in a position to know 
the degree to which substitution will be permitted by the 
technology. Making the new allocation, however, is a key 
decision which is made at the center. The allocation vector 
will never directly restrain a submit from using less of 
a resource than it is allocated or from producing more of a 
resource than the allocation vector requires. The converse, 
however, is not true. The allocation vector can restrain 
additional use of inputs and decreases in outputs. 
The rule for making new allocations is intended to 
identify those sub units which have a high potential for 
changing the relative mix of proposed quantities in such a 
way as to obtain new proposals which are profitable. The rule 
in step 2 proposes that this be accomplished by finding for 
each resource the highest subunit price imputation for those 
proposals contained in Q. If this highest subunit imputation 
exceeds the corresponding new central price then the subunit 
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which made the original proposal has the potential to profit­
ably increase its use or decrease its output of that resource. 
The addition of a large positive increment to the allocation 
of that particular resource permits the subunit to make such 
a change in a new proposal. The term "potential" is used be­
cause given the information available at the center it cannot 
be determined whether or not the technology of the subunit 
will be such that a profitable substitution of relative 
quantities can be accomplished. 
If a large proportion of the resources are produced by 
some of the subunits, then it would be reasonable to add to 
the rules in step 2 by also identifying proposals in Q having 
"1 If Jf 
the largest negative deviation between v^^-" and . This 
would imply a large incentive to decrease the use of or 
increase the output of that ith resource. In this case there 
would be no need to add a large positive increment in making 
the allocation. 
The addition of ô|q^^|, 0 < ô < 1 to the original 
"1 Jc proposal, q-" , also needs explanation. It essentially in­
sures that the original jkth solution will be feasible with 
additional slack to allow relatively small indirect adjust­
ments in the original proposal which may be necessary so that 
the subunit can take advantage of the large allocation of 
that particular resource which was valued so highly in the jkth 
solution. The specific value of 6 may be chosen arbitrarily. 
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Subunit Solutions and New 
Profitable Proposais 
Step 3 begins with submits solving (5) for all alloca-
k tions received, using the central shadow prices H . Note that 
because of the way in which the new allocations are made some 
submits may receive more than one allocation and must obtain 
a solution for each. 
Since each allocation to the submit is less restrictive 
than some previous proposal, the process assures that a 
feasible solution exists for each subunit under its new 
allocation. Making the usual assumption that any output 
requires a positive input of at least one of the central 
resources, the subunit problem will be bounded. It follows 
then that an optimal solution will always exist for the sub­
mit problems. 
The rule for deciding whether the submit's new proposal 
is profitable is a simple application of the "c.-Zj" cri-
*1 k terion of the simplex method. Given the definition of p-* and 
"i k q-' we have: 
= p3''-nV. (8) 
The right hand side of the equality is the "c^-z^" value 
which would be obtained for column q^^ if it were to be 
considered a nonbasic column of the kth central problem. 
"i ' k "i ik ik 
Thus (c-' -n Ar)xr >0 implies that the new proposal q-^ would 
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increase^ the value of the central problem in the next itera­
tion if it were included. A zero or negative value for the 
same quantity indicates that the new proposal would not by 
itself contribute to the central problem and thus is not 
included. 
Calculation and Meaning of Subunit 
Price Imputations 
Finally step 3 indicates how to compute submit price 
—"ik imputations, v-* , for each of the profitable proposals. 
The vector v^^ is simply the sum of the dual values, v^^, 
for (5) and the imputed prices from the center, n . The only 
*1 k "i k 
exception to this rule is when both v^-^ and q^-^ are zero 
for some resource i, in which case v^^^^ is set equal to zero 
k 
even if is strictly positive. 
The economic meaning of the elements of v^^ is quite 
• n k 
simple. If q^-^ is positive so that the ith resource is 
• "1 k 
an input, then 11^-^ is the price which was imposed by the 
nk 
center and v^-^ is the amount the subunit would be willing 
"1 k to pay, over and above , per additional unit of resource 
i. Therefore the sum v\i^ is the total price which the jth 
subunit would be willing to pay per additional unit of 
^If the current central problem solution is de­
generate, then, of course, an increase cannot be assured. 
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7 nk 
resource i. If <0, then the ith resource is produced 
*1 k • by subunit j. The subunit is paid per unit of product 
produced and represents the opportunity cost, over and 
ik  
above the return of to the subunit, of being forced 
to produce the last unit of resource i. In this case, the 
sum v^-^ represents the price which the firm would need to 
be paid to just cover the opportunity cost of the last 
unit. In the special case when v^-" is zero and none of the 
ith resource is used or produced by the subunit, v^^^ is set 
equal to zero since the resource has no value to the subunit 
even though the central price imputation for the ith resource 
is positive. 
Next we will indicate the sense in which it is meaningful 
to interpret and use the v^^ vectors as they are interpreted 
and used in the above discussion. First, we will show that 
n k the value imputed to the quantities in the vector q-^ using 
the prices in the vector v^^ is just sufficient to exhaust 
the direct return from that proposal, i.e., that v^^ q =P • 
For the jth problem (5) the Kuhn-Tucker conditions give us, 
I v i k ' a i - ( c i i x i k  _  ^  O )  
which can be rearranged as, 
7 
This decomposition of the price imputation into the sum 
of the parts, one imposed from the outside and one obtained 
from the system, is similar to the problem studied by Nikaidô 
(1964) in which the imputation imposed from outside was assumed 
to be a result of monopolistic power. 
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(vik+nk)'Aixik-ci'x]k = 0 
and given the definition of v^^, and p # the result 
follows; 
-jk'gjk = pjk ^ 
Note that it is exactly the three vectors of information in 
this expression which are passed to the central problem. 
—"ik 
The imputed price vector v-^ is not generally valid for 
quantity configurations differing from q^^ by significant 
amounts; however, since the process uses v^^ only in con­
junction with q^^ this is not a problem. A more crucial 
consideration for the process is that the price v^^ for the 
ith resource is not necessarily independent of the price 
level for other resources even at the quantity configuration 
If the new allocation is a modification of a'qi^eO, 
then the subunit can at least obtain a proposal that will 
break even, since the original proposal is still feasible and 
breaks even. But the allocation was specifically chosen so 
that the differences between the elements of the new price 
vector and the price vector associated with the original 
proposal were relatively large. If these price differences 
are large enough that the original proposal is not optimal 
then the subunit will be able to find a proposal which is 
strictly profitable as desired. 
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Final Optimality Conditions 
When none of the new proposals from step 3 are profitable 
then step 4 indicates that a strictly positive allocation 
should be made to all subunits not receiving a strictly 
positive allocation from step 2. To insure that the alloca­
tion will be feasible it can be made so that it is larger 
than a previous proposal. If a profitable solution is ob­
tained the process proceeds as before. If no profitable 
proposals are obtained then an optimal solution has been 
A "k 
obtained. It is shown below that , j=l to n, given in 
step 4 will be optimal for model (1). 
Expression (10) follows from the constraints of (4) and 
the definitions of and x^ : 
n 
b ^  E E .  X 
j=l keK^ 
jk'gjk = I AU . xjk'xik 
4 = 1 Tr j l keK 
- i n *  
E A^x^ (10) 
j=l 
Expression (11) obviously follows from (10): 
i i* E A-'x-' < b . 
j=l 
(11) 
ik* Since the values are an optimal solution to (4) we get 
(12) and (13): 
(b - E A^xi ) = 0, by duality, and (12) 
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E .  x ik*pik  =  E x ik*qik ,  (13)  
keK^ keK^ 
since 
> 0 -»• all j/k. 
"ik ik "1* 
Using the definitions of p , q / and x-' , (14) follows from 
(13) : 
(c^ -n'^ A^)x^ =0, j = 1 to n. (14) 
i * Given the allocation made in step 4 the vector x-' will 
be feasible in the jth problem (5). Then from (14) and the 
fact that no subunit could return a strictly profitable 
i* proposal, it follows that x-^ must also be optimal. The dual 
*1 Jc^ ' n 3c 
objective function will be v* u-" and it must also equal 
zero. But v^^ u^^=0 together with u^^>0 implies v^^ =0. 
Therefore from the constraints to the dual of the jth sub-
problem we get (15): 
v^^ A^=0 ^ c^ -n^ or A^ ^ c^ , j = 1 to n. (15) 
Finally we note that (11), (12), (14), and (15) are the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the original problem (1). The 
fact that the x-^ and n values satisfy these conditions is 
sufficient to prove that they provide an optimal solution 
to (1) as asserted. 
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Solution Process for Model (2) 
An outline of the proposed process for obtaining a solu­
tion to model (2) in a decentralized manner is given below, 
followed by a discussion of the mathematical and economic 
rationale for the steps. The rough summary of the economic 
meaning of the steps for solving model (1) also applies to 
the steps for model (2) with a few exceptions. The exceptions 
result from the fact that in model (2) certain resources are 
identified with specific subunits and impose restraints on 
those subunits. Thus in step 1 when the center forms an 
overall solution from the proposals available it must be con­
cerned that not only central resources restrictions are ful­
filled but also that the subunit specific resource restric­
tions are not violated. By forming the overall solution from 
weighted averages or convex combinations of each subunit's 
proposals, the center can be assured that the subunit specific 
constraints will not be violated. There is a dual variable 
associated with each convexity constraint in the central 
problem. For each subunit such a dual variable exists and, 
in economic terms, it is equal to the difference between 
the direct returns and the net imputed value of central 
resources in the weighted average solution for that submit. 
Thus in step 3 a new proposal is profitable if the difference 
between direct returns and the net imputed value of central 
resources in the new proposal is larger than the dual value 
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for the convexity constraint. 
As in the solution process for model (1), step 2 is con­
cerned with reallocation of central resources. The realloca­
tion vector is a modification of one of the proposals having 
a strictly positive weight in the central solution. The 
modification is made taking into account the difference 
between the subunit and central imputed prices for resources. 
Step 4, as before, indicates the conditions under which the 
central decision-makers can be assured that they have reached 
an overall optimum for (2) . 
8 
The steps for the solution of model (2), will now be 
8 
To aid the reader, model (2), the related central problem 
(6) , and jth subproblem (7) are repeated below; 
^ i ' i 
max I c-' x"* 
j=l 
subject to Z A^xr < b (2) 
j=l 
D^x^ ^ b^, j = 1 to n x^^O, j=lton 
max Z Z . where p^^=c^ x^^ 
^jk j=l keK^ 
subject to Z Z . ^ b, where q^^=A^x^^ (6) 
j=l keK^ 
Z . X^^ = 1, j = 1 to n X^^ > 0, all j ,k 
keK^ 
i ' V ' 4 -i 
max (c"^ -n A/jxr 
xi 
subject to A^xi £ u^^, D^xi ^ b^, x^ ^ 0. (7) 
The optimal primal vector for.(7) is x^^. The optimal dual 
vectors for (7) are vî and wik. 
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"1 k 
outlined. At the kth major iteration a set of q-^ vectors 
will be available such that the central problem (6) has a 
feasible solution. The central problem must have a bounded 
optimal solution given the assumption that the original problem 
has an optimal solution. Then at the kth iteration the fol­
lowing steps should be taken. 
Step 1. Solve problem (6) obtaining the optimal primal 
n k* "1 
values A-* , kcK/, j = 1 to n and the correspond-
3c n k ing dual values n cind , j = 1 to n. 
Step 2. Let Q = {q^^l and V = {v^'^ | >0 }. 
For each resource find that q^^eQ such that the 
difference between v^-" and IL is a maximum. 
If the maximum difference is positive then 
that jth subunit is given an allocation u^^ 
equal to q^^+<S|q L 0 < 6 < 1 except for 
the addition of a large positive increment to 
the ith element. Periodically (i.e., not 
necessarily every major iteration) all sub units 
not receiving an allocation from the above 
rule are allocated u^^ = q^^ such that q^^eQ. 
Step 3. Subunits solve (7) for allocations received using 
the central shadow prices n , obtained in step 1. 
If (c^ -n^ A^)x^^ > yi^\ then a new profitable 
proposal has been obtained and the central 
problem is augnented by = A^x^^ and 
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ik 4 • -ik 
p-^ = cr . The corresponding sub unit 
price imputations are obtained by setting 
unless = qj^ = 0 for some i, 
in which case is set equal to 0. Then 
return to step 1. If no profitable proposals 
are obtained go to step 4. 
Step 4. Allocate all subunits a vector u^^ large enough 
so as not to be constraining, then return to 
step 3. If no profitable proposals are obtained 
then an optimal solution for (2) is given by 
xi = E . x^^, j = i to n. 
JceK^ 
Feasible Solutions for Model (2) 
The basic difference in the structure of (1) discussed 
above and (2) is that (2) assumes a certain vector of re­
sources, b^, is specifically identified with the jth subunit. 
The first effect of this different structure appears in the 
additional constraints of problem (6) solved in step 1. 
These convexity constraints of (6) force the weights on 
the proposals of the jth subunit to sum to one. They are 
necessary to insure that the central solution to (6) will not 
violate the subunit constraints ^ b^. A solution to (6) 
will always correspond to a feasible solution to model (2) 
since by substitution of q^^=A^x^^ and pi^=ci x^^ we get: 
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h ^  I E . = Z Ai( Z . (16) 
j=l keK^ j=l keK^ 
n k T k 
which shows that E • X-" x-* , j = 1 to n, is feasible for 
keK^ 
the central constraints of model (2) , and (17) shows that the 
sub unit constraints of model (2) are also satisfied, 
D^xi^ _< b^, all j and k (17) 
^ X^^b^/ X^^ ^  0, all j and k 
I . xi^xik b^ Z . xik = b^(l), all j. 
keK^ keRJ 
In the special case when b^^O# the jth convexity con­
straint of (6) may be changed from an equality to a less than 
ik 
or equal constraint (i.e., Z . X-* < 1) . In that special 
keK^ 
case expression (17) would be rewritten as (18): 
Z . xi^xik ^ Z . X^^ _< b^, all j. (18) 
keK^ keK^ 
Reallocation of Resources 
The definition of the sets Q and V in step 2 are the 
same as in the former process; however, the economic inter­
pretations of the proposals contained in Q must be modified. 
The "Cj-zj" value for each proposal in the central problem is 
given by p^^-(Il'^ q^^+y ) and for X^^ >0 we know that this 
value will equal zero. Therefore it follows that (19) will 
hold for any proposal contained in Q; 
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p3k.„k-qjk ^  yik _ (19) 
The value of which is the dual variable for the jth 
convexity constraint can be interpreted economically as the 
difference between the direct returns of the jkth proposal 
contained in Q and the net value of central resources used, 
where the resources are priced at the current central im-
k puted prices II . From (19) it is obvious that the proposals 
in Q cannot be given a straightforward interpretation as 
being breakeven proposals as they were in the former procedure 
The set of proposals in Q were, however, chosen from all avail­
able proposals and used to form weighted average proposals 
which would maximize the central problem's objective function. 
It is for this reason that the proposals contained in Q are 
used in making new allocations. 
The rule in step 2 for making new allocations when there 
is a maximum difference between v^-^ and is the same as 
in the previous procedure and the explanation given there 
applies. As in the previous procedure it would be reason­
able to add to the rule in step 2 so that proposals in Q 
associated with large negative deviations between v^^-* and 
would also be used as the basis for new allocations at 
each iteration. Subunits not having proposals associated 
*1IC k 
with large absolute deviations between v^-' and indicc 
less potential for returning profitable new proposals and 
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thus it may be more efficient not to obtain new proposals 
from these subunits at every iteration. 
New Profitable Proposals 
The criterion for determining whether or not a new 
proposal is profitable differs from that of the previous 
procedure but is easily explained. As was noted above, the 
"Cj-Zj" value for the jkth proposal in the central problem 
*1 k k ' T Ic T k is given by p-" - (n q-^ +y-' ) and thus any "new proposal such 
that p-" - (n q-^ +y-' ) >0 would increase the value of the 
central problem in the next iteration and must be con­
sidered profitable. But given the definition of p^^ arid 
qi^, pi^-(n^ qi^+yi^)>0 implies (c^ -n^ q^^)x^^>y^^ which 
is the criterion given in step 3. Since the original jkth 
solution will remain feasible under the new allocation, the 
subunit will be able to obtain an objective function value 
"i k 
equal to y-* using that original solution. Any improvement 
upon the original solution will result in a profitable new 
proposal. If the allocations were not determined from q^^eQ 
the above statement would not hold in general. The procedure 
for obtaining v^^ values is identical to that in step 3 of the 
previous procedure and so no further discussion will be given 
here. 
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Final Optimality Conditions 
When none of the allocations from step 2 provide 
profitable new proposals in step 3, the rule in step 4 indi­
cates that all subunits should be given a new allocation 
large enough so as not to be constraining. If new profitable 
proposals are obtained from these allocations they are 
included in the central problem as usual. If no profitable 
proposals are obtained then an optimal solution has been 
obtained. Proof that the result is optimal follows by noting 
that when subunits are unconstrained in the use or production 
of central resources the process here is identical to the 
original Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm and therefore the same opti­
mality criterion applies. 
The optimal solution will be reached in a finite number 
of steps if the central problem (6) is nondegenerate at each 
iteration (or if appropriate perturbation methods are employed). 
This result follows from the fact that the Dantzig-Wolfe algo­
rithm terminates in a finite number of steps (Dantzig, 196 3, 
p. 452) and the fact that the solution process given above is 
identical to the Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm once step 4 has been 
reached. 
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Computing an Upper Bound 
Step 4 is also important for evaluating the opportunity 
cost of terminating the process before an optimal solution 
has been obtained. This is because after all submits have 
obtained solutions for which all central resource restraints 
are slack, it is possible to compute an upper bound for the 
final overall optimum. If the existing solution is near 
enough to the upper bound further iterations may not be worth­
while. The decision to terminate before reaching an optimal 
solution would be exercised if the cost of information 
involved in making additional major iterations were greater 
than the deviation between the existing solution and the upper 
bound. It should be noted that while the upper bound given 
below is guaranteed to be not less them the final optimal solu­
tion there is no guarantee that it will be close to the final 
solution, nor is there any guarantee that successive upper 
bounds will each get closer to the final optimal value. 
The theorem is due to Dantzig (1963, p. 452); however, 
the proof is approached in a different manner. If max z 
is the final optimal value for model (2), z^* the existing 
"ik 
central problem value, and x-" the solution for subunit j 
k 
corresponding to n , eind there are no constraining limits on 
central resources, then (20) follows: 
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max z < + 1 [(cP -n^ A^)x^^-y^^]. (20) 
j=l 
First note that when there are no constraining limits on 
central resources, then the dual constraints of the jth sub-
unit can be written as: 
w^^ + ^ c^ , j = 1 to n. (21) 
But (21) when taken for j = 1 to n is exactly the set of 
k "1 k 
constraints for the dual to (2). Therefore, n and w' , j = 1 
to n constitute a feasible solution to the dual of (2) and 
by a well known lemma (Gale, 1960, p. 10) the value of any 
feasible dual solution is always at least as large as the 
value of the optimal primal solution. Thus we have (22) which 
gives the required result: 
max z _< n^'b + Z b^'w^^ = n^'b + E (c^ ')x^^ (22) 
j=l j=l 
= n'b + E yi^ + E [(ci'-nk'Ai)xik-yik] 
j=l j=l 
= zk* + E [(ci'-nk'Ai)xik-yik]. 
j=l 
The first equality is due to the duality relation in the sub-
problems; the second results from adding and subtracting 
E y-" , and the third is due to the duality relation in the 
j=l 
central problem. 
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Convexity Constraints and Scale 
of Proposals 
The presence of the convexity constraints in (6) makes 
the scale of the proposals as well as the relative mix of 
central resources important. In the former procedure only 
the mix was important. Since the weights were not con­
strained (except of course to be non-negative) the central 
problem could use a particular proposal at any desired scale. 
Under this procedure, even when it is known that b^^O, the 
"ik 
weights must be constrained such that Z j _< 1 implying 
keK 
that proposals may be scaled down but not scaled up. The 
scaling problem is even more crucial if b^ is not non-negative 
"lie 
so the weights must be constrained such that E . X-' =1. 
keK J 
This forces the central problem to use, in its solution, 
proposals from the jth subunit even if all of the proposals 
from that subunit use central resources less profitably than 
proposals from other sub units. For this reason it is im­
portant that the central problem be augmented not only with 
proposals appropriately scaled upward from more efficient 
subunits but also with proposals appropriately scaled down­
ward from less efficient sub units. 
Alternatives for Steps 2 and 3 
Before continuing the discussion, alternatives to step 
2 and step 3 will be given and discussed. These alternative 
steps 2 and 3 decrease the amount of information obtained 
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and stored at the center by replacing a vector of price im­
putations with a scalar of imputed total value. The scalar 
r^^ provides an index indicating the degree to which profit­
able new proposals can be expected to involve, on the average, 
additions to or subtractions from the original proposal. 
The new allocations are very simply related to existing 
proposals, involving, at the most, proportional additions 
to each element. 
Alternative Step 2. Let Q = 0}. Then for each 
It ' I I 
compute = -—rr?—I? I . For each j take 
II |q]*l 
"1 k that r-" having the largest absolute value and 
n jc 
use the associated in making a new allocation 
such that ui^=qi^, if r^^<0 or u^^=q^^+ôr^^|q^^|, 
if ri^>0. 
Alternative Step 3. Subunits solve (7) for allocations 
received using the central shadow prices n ob­
tained in step 1. If (c^ -n^A^)x^^ > y^^ then a new 
profitable proposal has been obtained and the central 
problem is augmented by q^^=A^x^^ and p^^=c^ x^^. 
The corresponding total imputed value of central 
resources used and produced is given by 
ti^=(vi^+n^)'|qi^|. Then return to step 1. 
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If no profitable proposals are obtained go to step 4. 
Using alternative step 3, a single scalar number t*^ 
replaces the vector, v^^, of information indicating subunit 
imputed prices for the proposed quantities. This decrease 
in the amount of information to be communicated and stored 
will be significant unless the number of central resources 
is quite small. The value index t^^ is obtained by taking 
the inner product of the v^^ vector with the absolute value 
T 3c • 
of the vector of quantities q-" . This gives the total imputed 
value of central resources used and produced in the jkth 
proposal from the subunit's view point. 
The index t^^ is used in step 2 in making new allocations. 
Letting v-^ be defined as before we obtain the equality: 
T Jc 
and thus, the numerator of r-" can be interpreted either 
as the difference between the imputed total value of q^^ 
at subunit prices compared with central prices or as a sum 
of the deviations between the price imputations weighted by 
the corresponding quantities of resources in the proposal. 
The latter interpretation will be employed in explaining 
the use of r^^. 
If Vj^-* -n^ >0 and qj^-* >0, then the ith resource is used 
in the proposal and is imputed a larger value by the subunit 
than by the center. If and q^^<0 the resource 
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is produced and the opportunity cost of its production from 
the subunit's view point is greater than its imputed value 
at the center. In either case a positive deviation implies 
that, other things being the same, a new proposal should 
have a larger ith element. A negative deviation has the 
opposite interpretation, that use of the resource should be 
decreased or production of the resource increased. In either 
case this inplies a smaller ith element in a new proposal. 
Since the numerator of r^^ is a sum of these price devia­
tions weighted by the quantities involved, a large positive 
sum would indicate that the greatest potential for 
profitable changes involves increases in the values. A 
large negative sum would, of course, indicate the converse. 
To obtain r-" the sum of weighted price deviations is divided 
by Iqi^l which will always be non-negative^ and which is 
the total value imputed by the center to the quantities in 
the proposal. It can be considered a relevant measure of 
the scale of the proposal. The division normalizes r^^ for 
the scale of the proposal. 
• *1 k 
A large positive r-* indicates that the subunit has a 
potential to make relatively large profitable changes in the 
original proposal which will on the average involve addi-
.^In the unlikely case that |qi^| = 0 çne could divide 
by t^.J Note that in the special case when q3^>0 the value 
for Iqi I is easily obtained by taking the difference be­
tween pjk and y] . 
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tions to the original proposal elements. Therefore a new 
allocation must be made such that the additions will be feas­
ible. Alternative step 2 would make the additions be 
proportional to the original proposal and scaled according to 
the relative size of r^^. 
Similarly, a large negative r^^ indicates a potential 
for profitable changes which will, on the average, involve 
subtractions from the original proposal elements. Since the 
allocation vectors inpose only upper bounds, it is sufficient 
in this case to make the new allocation equal to the original 
proposal. 
Finally, a r^^ with a small absolute value may result 
either because the deviations between imputed subunit and 
central prices are relatively small or because they tend to 
cancel each other out. In the first instance we would say 
that the unit has a low potential for making profitable 
changes in the original proposal; in the second case that 
profitable changes could be expected to involve a reshuffling 
of the elements with some being increased, others decreased. 
In the final analysis the efficiency of using the index 
r-* cannot be determined without applying it to a number of 
large scale numerical problems and comparing the results 
with existing solution methods. This has not been done. 
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Initial Feasible Solutions 
The solution processes for both models (1) and (2) as­
sumed that a set of vectors was available such that the central 
problem had a feasible solution. The problem of obtaining 
such an initial feasible set may itself involve a significant 
amount of computation and information exchange. The economic 
problem is one of finding an initial plan that is at least 
internally consistent. 
If the initial allocations made to subunits are such 
n . 
that Z u^ < b and if these initial allocations all turn 
i=i 
out to be feasible for the subunits then the resulting 
proposals will provide a set of q-' such that a feasible 
solution will also exist for the relevant problem 
((4) or (6) depending upon which solution process is being 
initiated). In this case there is no difficulty since a 
consistent solution is immediately available. Even in this 
case, it may be efficient to obtain more than one proposal 
from each subunit by instructing the subunit to use various 
parameterized values for the price vector 11°, thus allowing 
the central problem a wider choice of proposals from which 
to form the initial solution. 
However, the initial allocations are not derived from 
existing proposals as are the allocations in step 2 of each 
procedure, and therefore there is no guarantee that all of 
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the initial allocations will be feasible. If a subunit 
does receive an infeasible initial allocation then it can 
solve a two step problem. First, by adding artificial 
variables to the central resource constraints as in (24), 
A^x^-Is^ ^ u^°, si ^ 0 (24) 
and minimizing a weighted sum of these variables, the subunit 
can find a vector of additions to just sufficient for 
feasibility. Second, the subunit can maximize the value 
of the standard objective function, subject to an additional 
constraint that the weighted sum of artificial variables 
not be larger than the value obtained in the first minimizing 
problem. Then, as usual, the new proposal will be 
When subunits are forced to add to their initial allo­
cations there is then no guarantee that the central problem 
will be able to form a feasible solution from the proposals 
which are returned. If necessary, the central problem can 
add a vector of artificial variables in the constraints and 
add large penalties in the objective function for positive 
values of the artificial variables. The artificial variables 
measure the amount of inconsistency in the central problem. 
They indicate for each central resource the total decrease in 
use and/or increase in production necessary to meet the 
constraints imposed on the central resources by the vector b. 
The large penalties associated with any artificial variable 
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in the optimal basis of the central problem will be reflected 
in a large shadow price for the corresponding central resource. 
J, 
This large value will have the desired effect of calling 
forth increased production or decreased use of each central 
resource for which there is a deficit in the existing central 
solution. Thus, from this point of the process on, the vector 
k 
n can be used as outlined in the four iteration steps. 
Furthermore, feasible proposals are available so that the allo­
cation rules in step 2 of each procedure can be used, 
eliminating any need for artificial variables in the subunits 
after the initial allocation. The iteration process will drive 
all the central problem artificial variables to zero and pro­
ceed on to an optimal solution. 
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CHAPTER III. NUMERICAL CALCULATIONS FOR 
A DECOMPOSITION MODEL 
In this chapter the calculations for a small illustrative 
decomposition model are presented and discussed. The solu­
tion process employed is that given in Chapter II for model 
(2). This model is intended to help clarify the solution 
process outlined in Chapter II by use of an explicit 
example. Furthermore it is instructive to note the inter­
action of the price and quantity variables in an actual 
example as the iterations proceed. 
The calculations presented here are not intended to pro­
vide a test of the efficiency of the solution process outlined 
in Chapter II. A test of the degree to which the process is 
able to decrease the number of major iterations would require 
that the process presented here be applied to a number of 
large scale problems and the results compared with those 
obtained by applying the original Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm. 
Such a test should be a next step; however, the necessary com­
puter routine for such large scale problems was not available. 
First, the characteristics of the numerical model will 
be indicated. Next, the method of obtaining the initial 
solution is outlined. This is followed by a presentation of 
the numerical values of the key variables throughout the 
iteration process. An upper bound is computed emd the final 
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optimal solution is presented. Finally the behavior of the 
dual variables is discussed. The chapter is concluded by 
an appraisal of decomposition and its use in economics. 
Characteristics of the Numerical Model 
The illustrative numerical model actually employed is 
given in Table 1. The model consists of 33 restrictions and 
37 activities; however, because of its structure it can be 
decomposed into a central problem like (6) and three subunit 
problems like (7). The central problem has six rows—one for 
each central resource and one convexity constraint for each 
subunit. The subunit problems are all relatively small 
with the largest having thirteen activities, eleven subunit-
specific rows, and three central restrictions rows. 
The zero values in the first two elements of the central 
resource vector b iiiply that there are none of these two re­
sources available at the center; however, the negative values 
in activity 9 of subunit 1 and in activity 7 of subunit 2 
imply that these activities can produce resources 1 and 2 
respectively. These two resources are used as inputs in 
every subunit by several activities and the constraints force 
production to be at least as large as use. The third central 
resource is available up to 220 units at the center. It is 
not produced by any of the subunita but is used by each in 
several different activities. 
Table 1.^ De co n^o s able model 
Row pi, 
No. j ® 
Subunit 1 Activities 
5.00 3.75 2.75 1.50 1.50 1.50 
I 
d " (0 -H 
M U 4J 4J 
C w 0) <U 
U 05 +> 
U 
C 
o 
1 
2 
3 
10 
3 
10 
3 
10 
3 
5.6 
-24 
7.4 7.4 
4 3 1 -2 
5 1 1 1 -1/3 -1/3 -1 
6 3000 1500 750 5500 3600 3600 11,000 
7 -35 -30 
8 3 3 3 -6.5 
9 1 0.5 —6 -4 
10 1 1 - 2  -4 
11 -10 0.5 
12 1 1 1 
13 1 
(0 
§ 
+J o 
•H «H 
à m 3 0) 
ca 05 
throughout Table 1, blank positions in the matrices represent zero elements. 
Table 1 (Continued) 
Row C 2.s Subunit 2 Activities 
No. ® 2.10 2.40 1.75 1.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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5.2 8.5 8.5 
S 14 1 1 -0.15 -0 .15 -1 
H H 1 / 
1000 2600 1500 1500 10,000 
-30 -25 
3 3 -7 
B ij 18 1 0.6 -8.5 —6.0 
5 m 19 1 1 -.15 -4.0 
w 20 -10 0.4 
21 1 1 1 
22 1 
Table 1 (Continued) 
C.^'s Subunit 3 Activities 
No. 1 5 .40 4 .75 3.00 2 .00 2 .00 2 .00 
• s i  1  4  4  4  
W >4 w 2 
-P 4J C 
C Ui O 
OJ 0) -H 
U « -P 
3  5 . 5  9 . 0  9 . 0  
m 23 3 2 
g  2 4  1 1 1  - 2  - 0 . 2 5 - 0 . 2 5  - 1  
co-H 25 3000 1750 500 5400 3000 3000 12,000 
+> 
4J u 26 -40 -35 
" 2  2  2  7  9  9  - 1 8  
3 - P  2 8  3  3  9  - 7 . 5  
g  3  2 9  3  1  0  . 7  - 7  - 5  
m a  3 0  1 1 - 2 - 4  
3 1  - 1 2  0 . 3  
3 2  1  
3 3  1  
Table 1 (Continued) 
Subunit Specific 
Restri ctions 
bi vectors 
Row 
Number 
Central 
Restrictions 
b vector 
Central 
Restrictions 
1 
2 
3 
4 < 0 
5 T 0 
6 T 40 ,000 
7 T -1,850 
8 T 0 
9 T 0 
10 T 0 
11 T 0 
12 ? 5.5 
13 2.0 
14 < 0 
15 T 20 ,000 
16 T -2,750 
17 T 0 
18 "< 0 
19 "< 0 
20 T 0 
21 < 8.5 
22 ? 1.0 
< 0 
< 0 
< 220 
Subunit 1 
Restrictions 
Subunit 2 
Restrictions 
Table 1 (Continued) 
Sub unit Specific 
Restrictions 
bi vectors 
Row 
Number 
Central 
Restrictions 
b vector 
Sub.unit 3 
Restrictions 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
0 
0 
45,000 
-2 ,250 
- 210 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7.5 
3.0 
The negative elements in the vectors imply that 
x^=0 will not be a feasible solution for any of the sub-
units or that each subunit is forced to operate at least 
some of its activities at a strictly positive level. 
Initiating the Process 
The solution process used in solving this illustrative 
problem is essentially that outlined in the original four 
steps for solving problems with subunit-specific constraints. 
The process was initiated by making two allocations to each of 
the subunits and obtaining a proposal for each allocation 
using central resource prices of zero, i.e., II=0. The 
numerical allocations used are given in Tables 3-5 as 
values for k equal to 00 and 0. Assuming that nothing was 
known about the central resource needs of the subunits, the 
allocations were made by taking the approximate average 
amount of central resource per subunit available in vector 
b and, in the first case, subtracting 20 units from each 
element and, in the second case, adding 20 units to each 
element. This was an arbitrary choice but did provide in 
the first case a total allocation less than b and in the 
second a total allocation greater than b. 
The allocation vectors for k=0 proved to be feasible 
for each of the subunits; however, the allocations for k=00 
were infeasible for each sub unit, forcing the subunits to 
Table 2. Central problem values and profitability criterion 
Major 
Iteration k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Central Prob. 
Value 
Upper bound 
32.2 82 50.277 53.512 60 .414 60.517 60.772 60.803 
Convexity 
Duals 
26.525 
.796 
-.555 
-17.889 
-9.822 
-34.711 
11.209 6.009 3.022 2.155 
y'" 4.961 -5.264 -17.692 13.162 6.402 2.382 1.252 
Subprob. 
Values 
213.000 
.796 
6.400 
-14.44 8 
-8. 397 
-33.227 
11.381 
-. 354 
6.440 
-.147 
3.022 
-13.648 
2.155 
-16.644 
z3k 6.5 74 -5.174 -12.451 13.782 7.640 2.414 1.252 
Table 3. Proposal, dual, and allocation values for subunit 1 
Major 
Iteration k 00 0 1 2 3 
Direct Returns P 10. 324 19.329 9.662 20.745 20.765 
Proposals 91 -20.000 20.000 -251.013 -152.173 21.000 
92 9.250 20.000 9.250 23.318 23.405 
^3 55.294 55.294 57.967 57.967 
55.294 
Included in yes yes yes yes yes 
Central Model 
Central Solu-., 1 2,3 2 3,4,5 4,5,6 
tions with X >0 
Subunit V, 0. 000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Duals 1 
^2 
1.167 .500 0.000 0.000 0.000 
^3 
0 .000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Central Duals 
^1 
0. 000 0.000 . 810 .038 .000 
^2 0.000 0.000 .000 .027 .003 
:3 0 .000 0.000 .000 . 336 .526 
Allocation 1 q°+.i|q°| qO+.05|q2| 
Derived from; 
Allocation Un -20.000 20.000 -18.000 22.000 -144 .564 
Vectors 1 
"2 -20,000 20.000 10 ,000. 10 ,000. 
10 ,000, 
^3 55.000 95.000 60.824 60.824 58,059 
21.286 
-144.564 
24.401 
59 .988 
yes 
.023 
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
.003 
.010 
.16 8 
q^+.05iq'^| 
-144.564 
10 ,000. 
60.865 
20.764 
82.229 
23.405 
55.294 
20.764 
78.018 
23.405 
55.294 
20.764 
78.018 
23.405 
55.294 
yes 
6,7 
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0  .000  
no 
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
no 
0 .000 
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
.004 
.004 
.264 
. 0 0 0  
.001 
.320 
. 0 0 0  
. 000  
.337 
10 ,000. 
10 ,000. 
10,000. 
10,000. 
10 ,000. 
10 ,000. 
10 ,000. 
10,000. 
10 ,000. 
Table 4. Proposal, dual, and allocation values for sub-
unit 2 
Major 
Iteration k 00 0 1 2 
Direct Returns P 8. 885 15.329 8. 885 13.260 
Proposals 9l 9.9 86 19.731 9.986 16.200 
92 -136.566 20.000 -136.566 -141.174 
^3 89.559 95.000 89.559 88.880 
Included in 
Central 
Model 
yes yes no yes 
Central Solu­
tions with 
x2k>o 
1,2 2,3,4,5,6,7 - 4,5,6,7 
Subunit 
Duals ^1 
1.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 
^2 0.0000 0.000 .-16 0.000 
^3 0.0000 .337 1.953 0.000 
Central 
Duals % 0.000 0.000 . 810 .000 
"2 0.000 0.000 .000 .003 
:3 0.000 0.000 .000 .526 
Allocation 
Derived from 
-
- gOO qO 
Allocation 
Ve ctors "l 
-20.000 20.000 9.9 86 19.731 
^2 -20.000 20.000 -136.566 20 .000 
*3 55.000 95.000 89.559 95.000 
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4  
1 3 . 2 6 8  
16.200 
- 8 5 . 9 9 2  
88 .880  
1 4 . 6 0 1  
1 8 . 6 4 7  
• 1 3 4 . 1 1 5  
9 6 . 6 0 7  
8 0 . 6 4  3  
1 3 3 . 0 0 0  
4 4 3 . 3 3 3  
2 9 7 . 5 8 3  
5 1 . 3 7 7  
8 1 . 5 2 9  
2  7 1 . 6  7 5  
2 0 2 . 1 1 8  
1 3 . 2 6 8  
16.200 
5 4 . 0 0 0  
80. 880 
yes yes yes yes no 
4 , 5 , 6 , 7  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 .  000  
0 . 0 0 0  
.018 
.080 
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
.000 
. 0 0 3  
. 5 2 6  
. 0 0 3  
.010 
.168 
. 0 0 4  
. 0 0 4  
. 2 6 4  
.000 
.001 
. 3 2 0  
. 0 0 0  
.000  
. 3 3 7  
q 
1 9 . 7 3 1  
20 .000  
9 5 . 0 0 0  
q'^+.05lq^l 
1 0 , 0 0 0 .  1 0  , 0 0 0 .  
• 1 3 4 . 1 1 5  1 0 , 0 0 0 .  
9 6 . 6 0 7  1 0 , 0 0 0 .  
10 ,000, 
10,000 
10,000 
10 ,000 
10,000 
10 ,000 
Table 5. Proposals, duals, and allocation values for sub 
unit 3 
Major 
Iteration k 00 0 1 2 
P 6.696 21.162 18.560 18.520 
91 2.143 20.000 14.796 .14.796 
92 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
S3 70.446 76.377 69.222 68.835 
Direct Returns 
Proposals 
Included in 
Central Model 
yes yes yes yes 
Central Solu--, 
tions with X >0 1 1 , 2  2 3 
Subunit Duals 
^1 1.063 .500 0 . 0 0 0  .425 
^2 0 . 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0  
"^ 3 0 . 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0  
Central Duals 
:i 0 . 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0  .810 .038 
^2 0 . 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0  . 0 0 0  .027 
:3 0 . 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0  . 0 0 0  .336 
Allocation 
Derived from; 
- -
q00+.i|q00 
Allocation Vectors 
^1 - 2 0 . 0 0 0  2 0 . 0 0 0  1 0 , 0 0 0 .  14.796 
"2 - 2 0 . 0 0 0  2 0 . 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0  
^3 55.000 95.000 77.491 69.222 
71 
2 5 . 5 7 3  
3 0 . 0 9  3  
0 . 0 0 0  
7 2 . 2  7 7  
2 6 . 6 9 8  
3 1 . 5 9  8  
0 . 0 0 0  
7 6 . 5 1 0  
3 4 . 1 9 9  
4 8 . 1 4 8  
0 . 0 0 0  
100.016 
2 5 . 5 7 8  
3 0 . 1 1 7  .  
0 . 0 0 0  
7 2 . 2  8 2  
2 5 . 5 7 8  
3 0  . 1 1 7  
0 
7 2  . 2 8 2  
yes 
4 , 5 , 6  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
. 4 9 9  
yes 
5  
. 2 2 4  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 .000  
yes 
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 .000  
yes 
7  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
no 
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
0 . 0 0 0  
. 0 0 0  
. 0 0 3  
. 5 2 6  
. 0 0 3  
.010 
.168 
. 0 0 4  
. 0 0 4  
. 2 6 4  
. 0 0 0  
.001 
. 3 2 0  
. 000  
. 000  
. 3 3 7  
q + . 0 5Iq I q + . 0 51q (  
1 0 , 0 0 0 .  3 1 . 5 9 8  1 0 , 0 0 0 .  1 0 , 0 0 0 .  1 0 , 0 0 0 ,  
0 . 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0  1 0 , 0 0 0 .  1 0 , 0 0 0 .  1 0 , 0 0 0 ,  
7 2 . 2 7 7  1 0  , 0 0 0 .  1 0  , 0 0 0 .  1 0  , 0 0 0 .  1 0  , 0 0 0  
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solve a two step problem using artificial vectors in the 
constraints as outlined in (24). The initial proposals are 
given in Tables 3-5 as the values corresponding to k=00 
and k=0. The degree to which the allocation vectors were 
not feasible is evident from the difference between elements 
of the proposal vector q^^^ and corresponding elements of 
the allocation vector u^^^. For example u^^^ set an output 
q u o t a  f o r  s u b  u n i t  1  o f  a t  l e a s t  2 0  u n i t s  o f  r e s o u r c e  2 ,  
but the proposal which was returned, q^^^, indicates that, 
while the allocation values for resources 1 and 3 could be 
met, the quota for resource 2 could not. Rather than the 
production of 20 units, the proposal called for the use of 
9.250 units of resource 2. The fact that the proposal vectors 
q^^ were all at least as small as the allocation vectors u^^ 
confirms that each of the allocations for k=0 was feasible. 
The dual values for central resources are recorded in the v^ 
rows of Tables 3-5. 
Major Iterations of the Process 
The major iteration, k=l, begins by placing the 
initial proposals in the central problem (6) and obtaining em 
optimal solution. For this example, the initial proposals 
were such that the central problem was feasible so that 
artificial vectors were not necessary. The optimal value of 
the central objective function at k=l is given in Table 2, 
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as z , along with the optimal dual values for the convexity 
constraints. Tables 3-5 each give the central resource 
shadow prices obtained from (6) at each iteration and also 
list the iterations in which each proposal appeared with a 
strictly positive weight in the central solution. For example, 
in the first iteration the set of proposals with a strictly 
• "1 k positive X"" (i.e., the set Q) is given by; 
Q= g^»). (25) 
Thus at iteration k=l, four of the six available proposals are 
used to obtain a central solution value of 32 .2 82 and such that 
central resource 1 has the only positive shadow price of .810. 
After the central solution has been obtained, a new allo­
cation must be made. The subunit price imputations, s, 
used in making new allocations are obtained from Tables 3-5 
by summing, for each subunit, the kth values for v^ and n^. 
Then the set of v^^ vectors corresponding to proposals con­
tained in Q is given by the set V and at the first iteration 
V is given by: 
V = v^"}. (26) 
The maximum subunit price imputations in V for central re­
sources 1 and 2 are found to be respectively v^^^^ = 1.063 
and = 1.167. All proposals impute a zero value to 
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central resource 3. The differences between the maximum 
subunit imputation and the central imputation for resources 
1 and 2 are both positive and are equal to .251 and 1.062 
respectively. Thus, subunit 3 is given a very large alloca­
tion of resource 1, and subunit 1 a very large allocation 
of resource 2. The other elements of the allocation vectors 
for subunits 1 and 3 are obtained by modifying the elements 
of proposals and q^^^. The modification involves adding 
to the original element an amount equal to .1 of the absolute 
value of that element. This .1 represents the 6 value of 
step 2 in the procedure given in Chapter II. The new alloca­
tion for sub unit 2 is chosen from the proposals for sub unit 
2 contained in Q which in this case leaves only one choice 
of q°°. 
Tables 6-8 show how the subunit objective function 
coefficients are affected by the central price vector n^. 
Only those coefficients which are affected by n are shown. 
Any activity which does not produce or consume any of the 
central resources will not be affected by the n values. 
The first major iteration is completed when each of the 
sub units has obtained optimal solutions relative to the new 
allocations and new central prices. The resulting optimal 
objective function values (where the values in Tables 6-8 are 
used as coefficients) are recorded in the rows of Table 2. 
These are the values which must be compared with the y^^ values 
1 ' k' 1 k 
Table 6. Elements from vector c -II A which are a function of n 
Iteration " ^ = « 9 11 12 
00 and 0 1.500 1.500 1.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 -6.601 -6.601 -6.601 19.442 0.000 0.000 
2 1.040 1.040 -.842 .910 -2.487 -2.487 
3 1.491 1.491 -1.455 0.000 -3.893 -3.893 
4 1.444 1.444 .505 .065 -1.241 -1.241 
5 1.446 1.446 -.030 .100 -1.950 -1.950 
6 1.497 1.497 -.297 0.000 -2.371 -2.371 
7 1.500 1.500 -.385 0.000 -2.490 -2.490 
2 ' k ' 2 k 
Table 7. Elements from vector (c -II A ) which are a function of II 
Major 
Iteration k Column 3 4 7 9 10 
and 0 1.750 1.750 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 -.680 -.680 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 1. 365 -.382 .407 -2. 857 -2.857 
3 1.719 -1.016 .046 -4.4 72 -4.472 
4 1.645 .773 .14 5 -1.425 -1.425 
5 1.697 . 326 .061 -2.240 -2.240 
6 1.741 .0 74 .014 -2.724 -2.724 
7 1.750 -.000 0.000 -2.861 -2.861 
3' k' 3 k 
Table 8. Elements from vector (c -n A ) which are a function of n 
IteraUon ^ Column 4 5 6 11 12 
00 and 0 2.000 2.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 
1 -1.240 -1.240 -1.240 0.000 0.000 
2 1.848 1.848 -.000 -3.025 -3.025 
3 2.000 2.000 -.893 -4.735 -4.735 
4 1.989 1.989 1.067 -1.509 -1.509 
5 1.983 1.983 .534 -2.372 -2.372 
6 2.000 2.000 .237 -2.884 -2.884 
7 2.000 2.000 .149 -3.029 -3.029 
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to determine whether or not the new proposal is profitable and 
therefore used to augment the .çentral problem for the next 
iteration. At the first iteration sub units 1 and 3 did return 
profitable proposals; sub unit 2 did not. 
The new proposals show that subunit 3 did propose a 
large increase in the use of central resource 1 relative to 
proposal The potential for such an increase had been 
evident from the subunit price imputations, and specific 
allowance had been made in the allocation vector. For sub-
unit 1 specific allowance had been made for a larqe increase 
in the use of resource 2; however, the new proposal contains 
a large increase in the production of resource 1 and no in­
crease in the use of resource 2, indicating that the negative 
difference between v^^^^ and was more important than the 
positive difference between V2^^^ and 
After the new profitable proposals are augmented to the 
central problem the second major iteration is initiated by 
obtaining an optimal solution to the central problem. Note 
that both of the proposals augmented to the central problem 
had strictly positive weights in the central solution at 
iteration k=2. The value of the central problem at iteration 
2 was 50.227 as compared with 32.282 at iteration 1. 
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Computing an Upper Bound 
The iteration process was continued up to the fifth 
iteration in the manner just described except that 6 was 
decreased from .1 to .05 for iterations 3 and 4. The results 
are recorded in Tables 2-8. The new proposals obtained from 
the fourth iteration resulted in only a very small increase 
in the central value of the fifth iteration. This seemed to 
be cin obvious place to obtain an upper bound for the final 
value. The allocations made at iteration 5 were all vectors 
with very large positive numbers so as to be unconstraining, 
since the upper bound formula is valid only under such an 
"ik 
allocation. Once the z-' values were obtained an upper bound 
of 71.913 was computed. The relevant calculations are given 
in expression (26) using the formula given in (20); 
S* ^ 4 ' 5'-i -iR -i^ 
max z _< z + E [c-" -n A^)x-^^-y^^] = 60.51728 (26) 
j=l 
+ (6 .44012-6. 00853)+ (-.14660+9. 87286) 
+ (7.63954-6.40187) = 71.913 . 
At this point the decision-maker could consider terminat­
ing the solution process. He has obtained a solution value 
of 60.517 and knows that additional iterations will obtain 
an optimal solution greater than the current solution but 
not greater than the upper bound of 71.913. The potential 
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gain must be compared with the information cost and waiting 
cost associated with further iterations. 
Final Optimal Solution 
In the example the process was continued until an optimal 
solution was obtained. The central solution at iteration 6 
again showed only a small increase, so unconstraining alloca­
tions were again made to each of the subunits and a new 
upper bound of 62 .292 was computed. At this point the deci­
sion-maker would know his current solution was less than 2 
units from the optimum. 
At iteration 7 none of the were strictly positive 
indicating that no profitable new proposals had been ob­
tained cuid satisfying the criterion for a final optimal solu­
tion. The value of the optimal solution is 60.803. The opti­
mal weights in the central problem at iteration 7 were; 
= 1, A^O* ^ .57897, ^ .42103, (27) 
and 
X = 0 for all other j and k. 
Using these weights and the formula in step 4 of Chapter 
II an optimal solution for the original problem can be ob­
tained. Using the weights in (27) the vectors of central 
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resources used and/or produced by each of the subunits is 
given in (2 8): 
-82.229 
23.405 (28) 
55.294 
19.731 
ql* = E 1 = (1) 
keK 
9* * Olr 
q = E , q^ = (.57897) 
keK 
2 0 . 0 0 0  
95.000 
' 16 .200" 18 .244 
+ (.42103) -85 .992 24 .626 
. 88 .880 92 .423 
q3* = z 3 
keK 
x3k*q3k ^ (1) 
30.117 
0 . 0 0 0  
72.282 
The vectors in (2 8) show an excess of production over use for 
the first two central resources. This excess supply is 
reflected in the final shadow prices of zero for the first 
two resources. Only resource 3 is used to the limit of 
availability, and it has a positive shadow price of .337. 
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Behavior and Interpretation of 
Dual Variables 
k • The elements in the n vectors fluctuate rather wildly 
throughout the iteration process as is to be expected. In 
fact, gives a positive shadow price to only the first 
resource which is a surplus resource in the final solution 
and gives a zero price to resource 3 which in the end is the 
only constraining resource. The effect of the II fluctua­
tions on the value of individual activities in the subunits 
can be observed in Tables 6-8. 
"1 k The Y values for the final central problem, in this 
case y^^ values, provide a measure of the net contribution 
of each subunit to the final solution. For example, y^^ = 
2.155 is equal to the difference between direct returns and 
the net value of central resources for the optimal solution 
of subunit 1. The calculations are shown in (29): 
p^^-n^'ql* = 20.764-.33654(55.294) = 2.155. (29) 
27 
The fact that y equals -16.643 implies that subunit 2 
makes a negative contribution to the final solution; the 
value of direct returns are not sufficient to cover the value 
of resource 3 used. Sub unit 2 is forced to operate (even 
though it is incurring a net loss) by the third subspecific 
constraint which places a lower bound on the weighted sum 
of the levels of activities 5 and 6. 
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An Appraisal of Decomposition 
In concluding this chapter a few general comments will 
be made concerning the importance of the decomposition 
principle for economics. First of all, it would seem that 
its promise as a computational method for really large scale 
models is of sufficient importance to warrant further study. 
However, we are most interested here in appraising its 
importance as a method for characterizing multilevel de­
centralized decision processes. For purposes of discussion 
it is important to distinguish between the attempt to charac­
terize a planning procedure where the models are explicitly 
employed to obtain an optimal plan and the attempt to 
characterize a real market adjustment process. The discussion 
of decomposition in Chapter II and this chapter has essential­
ly envisioned an explicit planning procedure; however, the 
possibility of employing a decomposition type algorithm to 
simulate and analyze a real market adjustment process is 
intriguing. Given that a model could.be constructed which 
essentially captured the production and exchange alternatives 
open to participants in a specific market economy, it is 
still not clear that the simplex type adjustment rule of 
the algorithm would adequately simulate an actual market 
adjustment process. For example, a gradient type adjustment 
rule might be more adequate. Furthermore, the decomposition 
algorithms discussed here are essentially tâtonnement adjust-
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ment processes in which no trading or production actually 
takes place until the final equilibrium has been reached. 
Adequate representation of actual market adjustments might 
require specification of a non-tâtonnement process in which 
trading and production take place with each new vector of 
prices, even though they are not equilibrium prices (Quirk 
and Saposnik, 1968, p. 191). Even given the possible dif­
ficulties just mentioned, the algorithm might be a useful 
method for gaining further insights into actual market 
adjustment processes. 
An important question concerns the relation of market 
prices and equilibrium shadow prices. The price systems are 
important elements of the effective decentralization in both 
an actual market and in the decision processes outlined above. 
A property of shadow prices which makes any close relation 
between them and market prices quite suspect is the fact that, 
for specific models, a zero shadow price is often obtained 
for a resource which would never have a zero price in the 
market. It can be argued, however, that "unrealistic" zero 
shadow prices are a result of a model which has failed to 
capture the degree of resource substitutibility present in 
the market rather than any inherent deficiency in the shadow 
price concept. An absolute surplus of a particular resource 
and the corresponding zero shadow price may result if, for 
exaitple, the model does not include activities which allow 
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resources to be transferred between subunits^ locations, or 
time periods, even though such transfers are possible alter­
natives in the economic system being modeled. A similar 
result can occur if the model fails to include all of the 
alternative input mixes possible for producing a particular 
output. If sufficient resource substitutibility is included 
in the model, zero shadow price values will not occur. 
Another difficulty encountered, especially when using 
linear models, is the possibility that the equilibrium shadow 
price vector will not be unique. In this case it is not at 
all clear which particular vector should be used for comparing 
with market prices. 
In the absence of the problem of nonuniqueness, and 
assuming that a model can be specified which embodies all the 
relevant economic alternatives, it does seem quite relevant 
to coup are equilibrium shadow prices with actual market. 
prices. If the shadow price corresponds to a constraint on 
the use of the resource then it is essentially a point on a 
derived demand function for that resource. If the market 
price is less than the shadow price it will be profitable to 
purchase additional units of the resource and vice versa. 
If the shadow price corresponds to a constraint imposing a 
minimum output of the resource, then it can be considered 
a point on the supply function and again comparison with the 
market price is relevant. 
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The most relevant question concerning the usefulness of 
decomposable models such as those outlined here for planning 
purposes would seem to involve a comparison of the expected 
gain from more nearly optimal decisions and the information 
cost of building and manipulating the necessary models. The 
major aim of the decomposable model allowing a decentraliza­
tion of decision-making is to decrease the information cost, 
but for a large scale organization the cost would still be 
considerable. It seems quite likely, however, that for 
some organizations the gains could be expected to exceed the 
in formation costs. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE VECTOR MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM 
In the preceding chapters we have taken as part of the 
data the price or value of resources used and goods produced. 
The possibility of formulating the problem of resource, allo­
cation and production decisions as that of maximizing a scalar 
value is entirely dependent upon the availability of such 
prices or measures of relative value. It is possible to 
collapse a vector of commodities into a meaningful scalar 
value only when the relative prices or rates at which one 
commodity should substitute for another are well established. 
For a decision-maker in a firm which produces only a small 
portion of the commodities of the larger economic system 
the assumption that prices are given as data is quite real­
istic. 
In the next two chapters we will deal with two models 
in which the price vector cannot be taken as given. The 
first model involves a public institution which does not 
necessarily follow a policy of profit or sales maximization and 
which may not sell its output in a well defined market or may 
not have an easily measurable output. In such a case one is 
faced with determining a "reasonable" price system through 
some type of estimation procedure or with making allocation 
and production decisions without the aid of prices. We 
will focus on a university as a specific example of such 
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a public institution. The second model involves a production 
model in a general equilibrium system which by its very 
nature must take prices as variables rather than as data. 
The discussion concerning this model will be theoretical 
in nature as opposed to the operational decision-making 
approach taken for the university planning model. 
In order to make resource allocation and production 
decisions which are in some sense optimal for the models 
considered in this chapter we are forced to consider certain 
aspects of consumption theory. Up to this point we have 
been able to discuss optimal resource and production deci­
sions independently of consumption considerations by assuming 
à given price system. 
The basic problem with which we must deal is that of 
determining how we should rank alternative possible bundles 
of commodities, or how we should choose from alternative 
bundles, that bundle or group of bundles which is in some 
sense "the best." The most common approach in consumption 
theory has been to begin by assuming for each consumer the 
existence of an ordinal utility function defined over the 
commodity space. Such a function, U (y) , will, for that con­
sumer represent a complete preference ordering of commodity 
1 2 
vectors or bundles such that for any two bundles, y and y , 
either U(y^)>U(y^), U(y^)=U{y^), or U(y^)<U(y^) implies 
1 2 1 
respectively that y is preferred to y , y is indifferent to 
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2 2 1 y / or y is preferred to y . The problem of determining 
"the best" commodity bundle for a particular consumer then 
reduces to that of finding a vector which maximizes the 
utility function. However, once we consider an economic 
production system in which the resulting commodity bundle 
affects the utility of a large number of consumers, as in 
the case of a public institution or a general equilibrium 
model, we are immediately faced with the most difficult 
problems of welfare economics. Choices must be made between 
different commodity bundles which will increase the utility 
of one group of consumers at the expense of another. 
Actually in mathematical terminology the problem is that of 
defining a vector optimum where the elements of the vector 
are levels of utility for individual consumers. Two approaches 
have been followed in attempting to solve or circumvent the 
problem. One approach has been to attempt to extend the 
utility function concept in such a way that a new function 
represents a complete preference ordering for the whole 
group of consumers. The problem of choosing an optimal 
vector then reduces to maximizing this new function subject 
to production and resource constraints. The other approach 
has been to essentially retreat from the problem and be 
satisfied with the less ambitious concept of a partial order­
ing present in the concepts of Paretian optimum and effi­
cient production. The first approach has a long history 
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which can be traced at least to a paper by Bergson (1938), 
in which he proposed a social welfare function. The whole 
discussion of inter-personnel comparisons of utility and 
community indifference curves is, of course, closely related 
to the problem; see (Mishan, 1964). Arrow's (Arrow, 1963) 
important contribution concerning the possibility of a social 
welfare function is not encouraging with respect to the 
fruitfulness of this approach. Arrow poses the possibility 
of constructing, from individual orderings, a social 
ordering of social states consistent with certain conditions 
which are thought to be "reasonable." He proves that it is 
not possible to construct a social ordering consistent with 
those "reasonable" conditions. It follows that construction 
of such a social preference ordering is possible only if some 
different and probably less "reasonable" set of conditions 
is accepted. 
Economists working in the general area of quantitative 
economic policy have essentially followed the approach of 
choosing that set of policy variables which maximized a 
welfare function. They have, in general, circumvented the 
problem of constructing a social welfare function from 
individual utility functions by taking as their welfare 
function the function representing the preference ordering of 
the policy-maker involved (Fox, Sengupta, and Thorbecke, 1966, 
p. 448). The method by which such a policy-maker derives his 
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position is, or course, a very crucial question in itself. 
However, whether the policy maker's position is the result of 
some voting procedure, of negotiating procedures among ruling 
coalitions, or of personal dictatorial power, once his 
preference function is given, the procedure to be followed 
is unchanged. 
The second approach of being satisfied with only a 
partial ordering certainly has a very long history in eco­
nomics. The Paretian criterion which is fulfilled when no 
one can be made better off without someone else being made 
worse off and the sub-criterion of efficient production which 
is satisfied when no more of one commodity can be produced 
without producing less of some other commodity both imply 
a partial ordering. Such criteria involve a partial order­
ing since many points are not comparable, as opposed to a 
complete ordering in which every pair of points is com­
parable (i.e., one point is preferred to the other or they 
are indifferent) . For example, the difficulty of choosing 
between efficient points must still be faced and, while we 
know that for every nonefficient point there exists cin 
efficient point which is preferred, it is not possible on 
the basis of only efficiency criteria to say that an 
efficient point is preferred to a nonefficient point having 
more of at least one commodity. A similar statement is true 
for the Paretian criterion. Thus such a partial ordering of 
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alternatives simplifies the problem in that only Pare to 
optimal or efficient points need be considered but the problem 
of choosing between different Pare to optimal or efficient 
points must still be faced. The Pareto optimal or efficient 
point is usually assumed either to be chosen by some type of 
central planner or to result from some type of market mech­
anism. Under certain regularity conditions for a general 
equilibrium model, a price system exists which will sustain 
any Pareto optimal point as a competitive equilibrium. This 
price system allows a degree of decentralization of infor­
mation and decision-making within the system. The models 
used in this chapter will both be linear activity analysis 
models. In the special general equilibrium model we will 
explore the possibility of finding a price vector, consistent 
with certain noncompetitive pricing behavior, which will 
sustain an efficient commodity vector and allow a decentrali­
zation of information and decision-making. Thus in the 
general production model we will follow what has just been 
discussed as the second approach. We will be satisfied 
with exploring the relationship between efficient production, 
prices and decentralization, and leave the problem of choosing 
between efficient points undiscussed. In the university 
planning model such indeterminancy is not acceptable. Since 
we are proposing a planning and decision-making model which 
is to be operational, it must provide a way in which the 
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"best" commodity vector is actually chosen. We will follow 
the lead of the quantitative economic policy economists and 
choose the "best" vector from the point of view of the policy­
maker or policy-makers. The procedure outlined will indi­
cate how a combination of the approaches discussed above may 
be used in a university planning model. 
The linear activity analysis model outlined here is 
essentially taken from Koopmans (1951a; 195 7) . No attempt 
is made here to reproduce all the results of activity analysis; 
only a brief outline of the model and those results central 
to our interest will be given. The model assumes that there 
is a vector of primary commodities, y^, which is available 
at a rate of not more than n units per time period. These 
primary commodities may be transformed into vectors of inter­
mediate, y^, or final commodities, y^, by a set of linear 
activities. The technology matrix, A, the columns of which 
are the input-output coefficients for each activity, can be 
partitioned in the following way: 
Linear Activity Analysis Models 
A F 
A = A 
I 
A. P 
In all cases inputs are designated by negative numbers 
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(e.g., Ypf ri£0) and outputs by positive numbers (e.g., 
Yp^O). Intermediate commodities are outputs of certain 
activities, inputs to others, and are not desired in them­
selves so we set yj=0. Thus the elements of the input 
matrix, Ap, will all be nonpositive , those of the output 
matrix of final commodities, Ap, will be non-negative, while 
the coefficients of include both input and output coeffi­
cients and may be positive, negative, or zero. The level of 
each activity chosen, or bundle of basic activities, is 
represented by the non-negative vector x. The model may be 
compactly written as: 
'^F 
• « 
yp > o
 
X = > 0 
A /p. 
> n 
• 4 
(30) 
X, Yp lO, y <_ 0 
Any X which is feasible for b (30) is called attainable and 
defines an attainable bundle of activities. An attainable 
bundle is said to be efficient if no other attainable bundle 
produces as much of every final commodity cind more of at 
least one final commodity. 
Of interest for our purposes is the relation between 
efficient bundles and corresponding systems of prices and 
the use of these price systems for decentralizing decisions. 
Koopmans has shown that a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the efficiency of an attainable bundle is that a price 
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system exists such that the value of the output is equal to 
the value of the inputs, no single activity is profitable, 
the price vector of each of the final commodities, pp, is 
strictly positive, all primary commodities have non-negative 
prices, and primary commodities which are not used to the 
limit of their availability have a zero price. This condi­
tion may be compactly expressed as: 
yp associated with an attainable f31) 
X is efficient if and only 
if there exists a p such 
that: 1. p'y = 0 
2. p'A 0 
3. Pp >0 
4.a. p . ^ 0, all i 
4.b. pP^ = 0, if Ypi>ni. 
Koopmans used the topological properties of convex cones 
to obtain the above result; however, (Charnes and Cooper, 
1961, p. 310) have shown that the result can be obtained by 
using linear programming theory. We will make use of the 
linear programming formulation since it is closely related 
to the analysis used in the remainder of the dissertation. 
The following theorem is found in (Chames and Cooper, 
1961, p. 312). The proof which is short and straightforward 
is not given below. 
The vector yp is efficient if and only if the optimal 
solution to the following problem is zero: 
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min -e'Yp (32) 
subject to 
ApX - Yp =0 
AjX = 0 
ApX - Yp =0 
y? > 
yp-Yp = 
X, Yp 1 0 . 
where e is a vector with the same dimension as y^, and each 
element equal to one. 
A major advantage of this linear programming formulation 
is that the optimal solution to the dual of (32) provides a 
price vector which satisfies the conditions of (31) and which 
can be easily computed. The dual to (32) is given below as 
(33): 
max WpHp+t^fp 
subject to A^up+A|u^+A^up j< 0 (33) 
+tp = 0 
-Up+Wp = 0 
-tp 1 -ep 
W p  > 0 .  
It is not difficult to confirm that if we let Pp=Wp, Pj=Uj, and 
Pp=tF/ then the resulting vector p will satisfy the conditions 
of (31) for the corresponding efficient vector 
Also of interest for our purposes is the problem of the 
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existence of a nonzero efficient bundle of activities. 
Chames and Cooper (1961, p. 313) have shown that questions 
of existence can be einalyzed by use of a regularized linear 
programming model which is closely related to the topic, of 
goal programming. 
By assuming that no activity can produce at a positive 
level without using a nonzero amount of at least one input, 
we are assured that (32) will be bounded from below. If (32) 
is expanded by the vectors e^, e^, and Ep as in (34) below 
then (34) will always have a feasible solution (e.g., yp=Ep, 
yp= £p=n). The fact that (34) is bounded and will always have 
a feasible solution implies that it will always have an 
optimal solution. Furthermore since each element of the 
vector, M, is a so-called "preemptive priority factor" 
the optimal solution will have all e. values equal ] 
to zero if there exists such a feasible solution. Such a 
solution with all Ej=0 will be feasible and optimal for (32) 
as well. Problem (34) is written as follows; 
min -e'yp+M^Ep+M^Ej+M^Ep 
Subject to ApX-yp +Ep = 0 
AjX +E^ = 0 
ApX -yp +Ep = 0 (34) 
Yp 1 n 
Yp -Yp = 
X, yp,E ^0. 
^°See Ijiri, (1965). 
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Problem (34) is very useful for computational purposes. 
First, if and only if the value of the optimal solution to 
(34) with #p=0 is strictly negative then a nonzero efficient 
point exists and equals the optimal value for Second, 
if the optimal solution for (34) with ^ 0 has e=0, then y^^ 
0 is efficient where yp is the sum of ^ p and the optimal value 
for yp. When no feasible solution to (34) exists such that 
e=0 then the optimal values for e immediately indicate minimum 
changes necessary to obtain a feasible solution. 
Problem (34) can also be easily interpreted as a type 
of goal programming. If the vector of final commodities ^ p 
is considered to be a goal to be obtained then the optimal 
solution to (34) either indicates a bundle of activities which 
will satisfy that goal or indicates a bundle of activities 
which will come "closest," in a certain sense, to satisfying 
that goal. If e=0 the goal can be satisfied; if e^O then 
the optimal values for e indicate the minimum infeasibility 
possible. Specific measures for "closeness" and minimum 
infeasibility are discussed below. ' 
Goal Programming Models 
The discussion immediately following will be directly 
related to the university decision-making model. We will 
consider a number of possible variations for the goal 
^^See (Chames and Cooper, 1961, p. 317). 
99 
programming approach and point out the close relation 
between these and other types of analysis. The use of goal 
programming and efficient point computations for a linear 
activity analysis model of a university will then be dis­
cussed. Finally a numerical example with "reasonable" 
coefficients for a university department will be outlined and 
corresponding computational results will be given. 
It is possible to set different types of goals and to 
weight or place a priority ordering on the goals. There is 
a very close relationship between the different types of 
goals and the concepts of fixed and variable targets formu­
lated by Tinbergen for quantitative economic planning. The 
priority ordering can be used in cases where a lexicographical 
preference ordering exists or where decisions are to be made 
in a decentralized but hierarchical fashion. There is also 
a close relationship between the goal programming approach 
and the building of consistency models or models which in 
some sense minimize inconsistency or infeasibility. The idea 
of minimizing, in some sense, "organizational slack" will also 
fit into the general goal programming approach. Finally 
with respect to the concept of minimizing inconsistency or 
maximizing slack, different specific measures of the amount 
of deviation may and must be chosen. We will elaborate on 
each of these topics below. Most of the goal programming 
formulations can be found in the book by Ijiri (1965) . 
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We will, in general, identify three different types of 
goals. First, the goal of attaining consistency (i.e., 
satisfying as nearly as possible certain equality or inequality 
relations). Second, the goal of obtaining the largest value 
possible for given outputs or the smallest for inputs. Third, 
the goal of obtaining as nearly as possible a given value 
for certain commodities. Actually the difference between 
the first and third types is a matter of interpretation 
rather than of mathematical formulation. The correspondence 
between the concepts used here and those used by Tinbergen 
12 (1955; 1956) is very close. For example, the second and 
third type of goal mentioned above correspond very closely 
to the concepts of flexible and fixed targets (Tinbergen, 
1956, p. 8). It should further be noted that the vector, 
x, of activity levels is very similar to the instrument 
variables in a policy model. Tinbergen's concepts of con­
sistency, boundary conditions, and side conditions (Tinbergen, 
1955, p. 15) correspond to the first type of goal cibove. 
While Tinbergen's theory of economic policy is primarily 
directed toward quite aggregative models at the national 
level, there is no reason why a similar approach cannot be 
taken for many public institutions facing economic decisions. 
The following quote from Tinbergen is given in support of 
this view: "In a narrower sense we may restrict the meaning 
^^(Contini, 196 8, p. 5 76). 
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of the term 'economic policy' to the behavior of organized 
groups, such as trade unions, agricultural or industrial 
organizations, etc." (Tinbergen, 1955, p. 1). Most of our 
discussion is in the terminology of goal programming because 
of the somewhat more general mathematical formulation and 
the more direct relation to conputational methods such as. 
linear programming; however, as indicated the approach 
corresponds very closely to that of an important group of 
economists interested in quantitative economic policy. 
Examples of the three types of goals outlined above can 
be given in relation to problem (34). First of all, the goal 
of minimizing M'e, for e>0, is easily seen to be a goal of 
attaining consistency. If e can be forced to zero then the 
relations, Ap=yp, Ap^n, A^x=0, hold, and the relations 
between production activities, commodity vectors, and the 
availability of primary commodities are all consistent. The 
goal of minimizing e^yp corresponds to the second type of 
goal (i.e., a variable target). The third type of goal would 
be represented in (34) by addition of a row constraint, 
yp2+Y*-Y =K with Y^,Y ^0 and =0 and augmenting the 
objective function by: 
min (y"*'+y~) . 
This corresponds to finding a value for yp^ which corresponds 
as nearly as possible to the constant, K, (i.e., a fixed 
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target value, K, for the variable Ypj^) • 
It is very simple to include a weighting system for 
goals, with larger weights for more important goals and vice-
versa. Of special interest is the possibility of using a 
13 
"preemptive priority" weight such as the M vector in 
problem (34). The use of such a priority weight is mathe­
matically equivalent to the linear programming computational 
'phase I' approach used for driving artificial vectors from 
the basis to obtain an initial feasible basis if possible. 
In this case we can give the procedure a meaningful inter­
pretation. The procedure provides a method for solving 
decision problems when the policy-maker has a lexicographic 
preference ordering such that certain goals are of such 
overriding inportance that it is preferred that they be ful­
filled as far as possible before others are even considered. 
This is quite important because, while the lexicographic 
ordering is a very plausible type of preference ordering, 
it is a well known example of a complete preference ordering 
which cannot be represented by a continuous utility 
function.Tinbergen (1956, p. 59) has used this type of 
priority ordering in his distinction between conditional and 
unconditional targets where unconditional targets are those 
l^see (Ijiri, 1965, p. 46). 
14 See (Koopmans, 195 7, p. 19). 
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which should be fulfilled with the highest priority. Also 
of interest for our purposes is the possibility of using 
preemptive goals as a device for effective decentralization 
in an economic system with a hierarchical decision structure. 
For example, the highest level decision-makers' goals must 
be fulfilled, as nearly as possible, and only then are the 
goals of lower level de ci s ion-makers considered. We 
essentially follow Chames, Glower, and Kortanek (1967) 
in this approach and will consider it in more detail below 
with respect to the university decision-making model. 
The first type of goal indicated above was that of ob­
taining consistency. It is not uncommon to find a sharp 
distinction being made between consistency and optimization 
models. The comment that it is so difficult to build a 
reliable consistency model for a given economic system that 
it is not practical to attempt optimization is not uncommon. 
Consistency between interrelated variables is very important 
for a useful planning model and when, as is usually the case, 
a certain amount of uncertainty is involved in the parameters 
of the model, then consistency is not easily attained. We 
suggest that the problem should still be considered an 
optimization problem with a goal of the first type (i.e., a 
goal of minimizing inconsistency or of maximizing redundancy 
so that reliability may be increased in cases where un­
certainty is involved). References are common mentioning 
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goals for organizations or firms of maintaining excess or 
redundant resources in the face of uncertainty or of the 
need for "organizational slack" (Cyert and March, 196 3, p. 
36) . Contini (1968) has outlined a stochastic approach to 
goal programming which can be applied when it is known that 
the goals are related to the decision variables through a 
system involving normally distributed random errors. The 
object is to choose the decision or instrument variables 
such that the probability of the resulting vector of goals 
or targets lying in a specified region is maximized. The 
problem can be written as a quadratic programming problem so 
computation is possible. 
The question of how to measure the degree of inconsistency 
or amount of deviation from goals is not immediately obvious 
nor is the answer unique. In practice one of two norms is 
usually chosen, so that the problem is that of minimizing 
some function of absolute or squared deviations. Both norms 
are closely related to statistical estimation procedures — 
the first to the Chebyshev approximation, the second to least 
squares estimation. The norm chosen will be important with 
respect to the computational methods which can be applied. 
When absolute deviations are chosen the problem may be computed 
by linear programming methods while use of squared deviations 
will, if Lagrange multiplier techniques cannot be easily 
applied, require either the use of quadratic programming or 
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the use of generalized inverses (Ijiri, 1965, p. 30). 
It is of interest for us to examine more closely the 
use of linear programming methods to solve problems when 
absolute deviations are to be considered. Specifically we 
will compare Zukhovitskiy and Avdeyeva* s (1966, Chapter 5) 
Chebyshev approximation problem for an inconsistent system 
of linear equations and the goal programming approach of 
Chames and Cooper (1961, p. 215), and Ijiri (1965). Two 
differences may immediately be mentioned: First, while the 
criterion of minimizing a weighted sum of the absolute devia­
tions is considered in both cases, only the former authors 
consider the actual Chebyshev problem of minimizing 
the maximum absolute deviation or inconsistency. Secondly, 
in both cases the problem of minimizing the weighted sum of 
absolute deviations is shown to be equivalent to a linear 
program but the former authors augment the system of equations 
by defining one new variable per equation and replacing each 
equation by two inequalities. The latter authors define two 
new variables per equation and add the side condition that if 
one of the pair of variables is positive then the other must 
be zero. The following examples should help to clarify the 
close relation of the two approaches as well as the minor 
differences. 
Take for example the following set of equations and in­
equalities with ^  and n vectors of constants: 
r 
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ApX = :?p (35) 
ApX > n 
x ^  0 . 
Suppose that no value for x exists such that the system can 
be satisfied but it is desired to find a solution such that 
the sum of absolute deviation of ApX from ^p is a minimum. 
Then the usual approach in goal programming would be to ob­
tain the desired answer by solving the following problem: 
min e^e^+epC~ 
subject to ApX + le^ - le -
ApX > n 
+ • 
e e =0 
X,E^,E" ^  0 . 
Strictly speaking, this is not a linear programming problem 
4- t __ 
because of the nonlinear side condition e e =0; however, 
if the remainder of the problem is solved by a usual simplex 
routine which always maintains a basic solution then the non­
linear condition will be maintained also. This is so because 
the vector involving is a linear combination of the vector 
involving and thus both vectors cannot be in the same 
basis. The optimal value x^ would minimize the sum of absolute 
deviations of Yp-^p where yp=ApX^ and the difference between 
— "i" 
the vectors e and e would equal the deviations (i.e.. 
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Ziokhovitskiy and Avdeyeva (1966, Chapter 5) would use 
the following linear program to obtain the desired solution: 
». min e e 
subject to ApX + le^ ^  (36) 
-ApX + 1 -9p 
ApX > n 
+ 
x, e >0 . 
Thus while (35) adds two columns per equation, (36) adds one 
variable and row per equation but does not require the non-
4* ' ~ + linear condition e e =0. In this case e would give the 
absolute deviation, Yp-^p. 
The problem of minimizing the maximum absolute deviation 
can be obtained from the linear program (37) which is very 
similar to (36) but smaller in that only a single variable, 
Ej^/ need be added rather than a vector of new variables 
(Zukhovitskiy and Avdeyeva, 1966): 
min (37) 
subject to ApX + >_ where is a vector with the same 
, variable, E,+, for every element. 
-ApX + e >-^p 
ApX ^ n 
x, ^0 
The optimal value for E^^ will give the maximum absolute 
deviation. 
10 8 
Thus if a vector of desired final commodities, yp, 
which was not attainable were proposed by a policy-maker 
then any of the last three linear programming problems out­
lined could be used to find the vector of activities which 
would come "closest" in a certain sense to producing the 
desired commodities. The solution would also show the devia­
tions from the desired values. 
Computation of Efficient 
Output Vectors 
One procedure for using a model of the type which will 
be outlined in Chapter V to aid in university decision-making 
would be to compute all efficient points for the model and 
then present these to the decision-maker as alternative 
choices. For a linear activity analysis model the set of 
efficient points can be represented as convex combinations 
of a finite number of efficient extreme points. Chames and 
Cooper (1961, p. 30 8) have outlined a computational method 
for computing all efficient extreme points. An attempt was 
made to apply this method to the numerical model in Chapter 
V but was abandoned in favor of a procedure less ambitious 
computationally but hopefully more promising for the purpose 
here. 
There were two reasons for abandoning the attempt to 
compute all efficient extreme points. First, even for the 
small aggregated type of illustrative model in Chapter V it soon 
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became obvious that the number of efficient extreme points 
would be quite large. Over 80 different efficient extreme 
points were actually computed for this small model. A 
large number of efficient extreme points would make it diffi­
cult to present the set of efficient points in a manner 
easily comprehensible to the decision-maker. Furthermore, 
since only a small subset of the efficient points are likely 
to be actively considered as alternative choices, the compu­
tation of all those efficient extreme points which do not 
receive active consideration represents wasted computational 
expense. 
The second reason that the attempt to compute all 
efficient points was abandoned involved difficulties with 
the method itself^^ and lack of an adequate computer routine. 
The alternative procedure is to compute all efficient 
points adjacent to a particular efficient extreme point 
which is "close" to the desires of the decision-maker and 
which has been previously obtained by a goal programming 
problem. The mathematical procedure for computing all 
efficient extreme points adjacent to a given point will be 
outlined below; the rationale for such a procedure will be 
discussed in Chapter V, along with numerical computations 
indicating how the procedure would be initiated. 
The basic model used for computing efficient points is 
^^See (Gruver, 1970). 
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structured as the one in Chames and Cooper (1961, p. 309): 
max c^Yp 
subject to ApX - lYp =0 (38) 
AjX = 0 
-Ap* i-ip 
x>0, Cy>0 . 
The vector, is an efficient point if and only if there 
exists a positive vector, c^^, such that the vector, Yp^, 
is the optimal solution of (38). Suppose that it has been 
determined that y^^ is efficient and it is desired to com­
pute all efficient points adjacent to y_^. Let A be the 
0 16 
matrix for (38) including slack vectors; let, B , be the 
matrix of those vectors forming the optimal basis for, y^^, 
and the associated x^. Let the vector c'=[c^|c^|c^] such that 
c^, Cy, and c^ correspond respectively to the x, yp, and slack 
columns of A. Note that c^=0 and Cg=0. Adjacent extreme 
points can be obtained by exchanging a nonbasic vector, a^, 
for basic vector, a^^, in the optimal tableau. However, the 
adjacent extreme point will be efficient if and only if there 
exists a Cyl>0 such that the yp^ resulting from the new basis 
would be an optimal solution to (38). More specifically, 
there must exist a vector Cy^>0 such that all the 
l^To simplify the initial discussion assume that the 
basis matrix, B", corresponding to y^O is unique. This 
assunption will be relaxed below. 
Ill 
Zj -cj values for nonbasic columns remain non-negative 
except for the value of that vector which is to enter 
the basis; it must be zero. It is not always simple to deter­
mine whether or not such a vector Cy^>0 exists for a 
particular nonbasic vector; that is, to determine whether 
the adjacent extreme point produced by bringing that vector 
into the basis will in fact be efficient. Summarizing the 
above statements more compactly we can say: 
Let , x^, be an optimal solution to (38) with 
indicating the matrix of basis vectors in the optimal 
solution and where c^=c^^>0 and c^=0; Cg=0. Let y^^ be 
obtained by bringing into the basis, the vector, 
a^, and choosing in the usual manner the vector, a^, 
to be dropped. Then y^^ will be adjacent to yp^ and will 
be efficient if and only if there exists a price vector 
c^=c^+(fi f such that c "^>0, c„^=0, c_^=0, and the scalar 
c y X s 
, 0 0  „  0  0  
\ . i (J) = - — mm - 4—-—i 
where 
jeJ if fgB°'^aj-fj < 0 
and where the vector f=[0|fy|0] with the sub vector f^ specify­
ing the relative changes in c . f„ is the vector of elements y •o 
from f corresponding to basis vectors; f^ is the jth element 
of f while aj is the jth column of A . 
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Proof: and yp^ are adjacent extreme points because when 
a new basic feasible solution is obtained by changing one 
vector according to the usual rule for picking the vector to 
leave then this is equivalent to moving along an edge of 
the convex set from the extreme point corresponding to the 
original basis to an adjacent extreme point corresponding 
to the new basis (Hadley, 1962, p. 165). 
First we will show that existence of a price vector c^ 
implies that yp^ is efficient. We will show .what the 
Zj*-Cj* values would be for basis and vector c^, (Hadley, 
1962, p. 380): 
Zj"*"-Cj''=(cB°+<^cfB)B°"V-Cj°-4.cfj=Zj°-Cj°+<|>c(fBB°-^a.-fj) 
where c„^ is the vector of c.'s corresponding to basis ® ] 
vectors. Substituting in for we get 
1 0, jT^ k . 
Next we will note how the values change when the 
vector, a^, is brought into the basis, (Hadley, 1962, p. 110): 
A  + + + + ^^Lj /_+ + .  +  +  T i -
S. -o. .Zj -Cj - -o^ ) = Zj -c. , all J 
since 
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The scalar and x^ are elements of the existing 
tableau. 
Thus all of the nonbasic vectors have 2. -c.^0; the new 
+ ^ 1 basis is optimal for c=c and therefore is efficient. 
Now we will show that if y^^ is efficient then there 
exists a c^. If y^^ is efficient then there exists a vector 
c^ with sub vectors, Cy^>0, c^^=0, and Cg^=0, such that y^^ is 
an optimal solution to (38). Suppose c^=Xc^+(1-X)c^/ 
0 ^ X 1. From the optimality conditions we have 
Cg^B^ ^aj-Cj^ ^ 0, all j 
Cg^B^ ^aj-Cj^^O, and 
Let 
-(Xc'+d-Xjo^) , 
then for X = 0 ,  ^  0/ 
+ + 
and for X=l, -c^ 0. 
+ + 
Since -Cj^ can be written as a linear function of X, the 
above inequalities imply that there exists O^X^^l such that 
z^^-c^^=0. By a similar argument Zj^-Cj^^O for O^X^l, and 
j^k. Then c^=X^c^+(1-X^)c^ is the c^ vector required. The 
elements of c^^ are strictly positive since X is non-negative 
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and and are strictly positive; similarly c^^=0 and 
Cg^=0. If fy is set equal to Cy^-Cy^, then will equal 1 
at the minimum over je J since 
, _ 'k°-°lc° 1 
( ) -(=k°-Gk°) 
and for j^k, Zj -Cj >0, thus: 
_ 
' (C +-CBO)B°-Ia.-(0.+-C.) -(z.°-o.°)+(z.+-c +|- *=' 
o  a  ]  ]  J  ]  ]  3  3  
Therefore if y^^ is efficient then there does exist a c^ 
defined as above. 
From the above proof it is clear that if the required c^ 
can be obtained then the new adjacent extreme point will be 
efficient. We will present three methods for finding the 
required c^. 
Case 1. If the nonbasic vector, a^, which is to enter 
is a vector corresponding to a yp variable then the re­
quired c^ is easily obtained by letting f^=z^^-c^^ and 
f .=0 for jj^k. Then (p becomes: 
J c 
2 °-C ° 
*c= • —7—5—57= 
OB a^-(z^ -Ck ) ^ ^ 
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and 
Cj*=Cj^+(l)fj = Cj^, j 7^ k 
0 . , 
= # ] = k. 
Case 2. If all the vectors corresponding to 
variables are in the basis then it may be possible to 
find a c^ which will bring in a nonbasic vector aj^ 
by analyzing the effect of varying one of the c^^ 
elements while holding the others unchanged. That is, 
set f.*=l, where c.* corresponds to a yp variable in 
0 * the basis, B , and set f.=0, . Then finding <|) 
J G 
and which vector will enter simplifies to computing the 
minimum of a series of quotients of values already 
available in the tableau. Since f.=0, for j^j*: 
4) = - = min - —J , where jeJ if x.*. < 0, 
^ *]*k jeJ *]*] ] ] 
X.*. = B9*^a. cind where is the row of B^ ^ ]*] ]* ] ]* 
corresponding to j*. 
Then c^=c^+(()^f will bring a^^ into the new basis. By 
letting fj*=-l and following the same procedure it is 
possible to determine which a^ will be first to come 
0 . into the basis when c.* is decreased rather than in-] 
creased. 
After exhausting the information provided by the above 
two cases there will be a certain set of the nonbasic vectors 
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for which a c^ has been found implying that the entrance of 
that vector into the existing basis will lead to an efficient 
extreme point. There will usually be a number of nonbasic 
vectors, however, for which a c^ has not yet been found. 
In general, of course, the required c^ will not exist for all 
nonbasic vectors, but if all efficient extreme points adjacent 
to yp^ are to be confuted then it is imperative that we 
determine for each and every nonbasic vector whether or not 
+ 
such a c does exist. The procedure in case 3 provides the 
needed information. It is much more involved computationally 
but only need be applied to nonbasic vectors for which a c 
has not been obtained by the procedures in case 1 or case 2. 
Case 3. To determine whether a c^ exists for a 
specific nonbasic vector, a^^, we can solve the follow­
ing linear programming problem: 
min Cg' (B°~^aj^)-Cj^ 
C  Q  ^  T  
subject to Cg' (B aj)-Cj _> 0, all j including k 
Cy'I 11 
^X=°' =9=0 • 
If the objective function equals zero at the optimum 
then the optimal c is the required c^ vector and thus bring­
ing in the vector a^^ will lead to an efficient adjacent 
extreme point. If the objective function is strictly 
positive at the optimum, then c^ does not exist and bringing 
in the vector a^^ will lead to an adjacent point which will 
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not be efficient. 
It can easily be shown that when the objective function 
is zero the optimal c satisfies the conditions for c^ by 
letting *^=1 and &=c-c^. Then 
_ . 'k°-°lc° , 
and 1 is the minimum over jeJ since for j^k 
-(Zj^-C^^) 
-(Zj°-Cj°)+CBB°"^a.-c. -
A separate optimal solution must be computed each time 
an aj vector is checked for the existence of a c^; however, 
only the objective function varies from one problem to the 
next. The original c^ provides an initial feasible solution 
and each successive optimal c will be feasible so that 
iterations for new objective function values can always begin 
from the existing basis. The linear program will have a 
lower bound for each c^ element plus as many rows as there 
were nonbasic vectors in the original problem. Any rows 
which are strictly non-negative can be dropped. 
When the assumption that the basis matrix corresponding 
to yp^ is unique is relaxed, then the process becomes some­
what more involved. Nonuniqueness of the basis may 
be recognized in two ways. First, if there exists a zy-Cj 
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value equal to zero for nonbasic vectors, then bringing in 
that vector will result in the usual alternative optimal 
solution. If this alternative optimal solution changes 
the Yp vector from yp^ then an adjacent efficient extreme 
point has been reached. However, if the new y^ vector is 
not changed from y^^ and only Xj variables change then a new 
representation of the same efficient vector, yp^,has been 
obtained and a new matrix of basis vectors corresponding to 
yp^ has been obtained. 
A second way of recognizing nonuniqueness of the basis 
matrix corresponding to yp^ arises when degeneracy exists, 
since even when Zj-Cj>0 it may be possible to bring the 
vector into the basis at a zero level and obtain a different 
representation and different basis matrix corresponding to -
It will be possible to bring in the vector a^ at the zero 
level if the ith element of the vector ^a^ is not equal to 
zero where i corresponds to a basic variable equal to zero 
for the basis . The above cases are closely related to 
the discussion of determining all optimal solutions in Hadley 
(1962 , p. 166-167). 
It is possible for more than one basis matrix to 
correspond to a particular vector of final outputs, Yp^. There­
fore, to find all efficient vectors adjacent to yp^ it is 
necessary to take each nonbasic vector corresponding to each 
alternative basis and check for the existence of a c^ 
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satisfying the definition given above. Only when all non-
basic vectors corresponding to each alternative basis have 
been checked can we be certain that we have located all 
adjacent efficient extreme points. It is obvious that the 
existence of alternative basis matrices rapidly increases 
the necessary computations. 
We can summarize the procedure outlined above as follows. 
First, pick a desired vector of final outputs. Second, run 
a goal program to obtain the efficient (and therefore feasible) 
point "closest" to the desired values. Then coirpute all 
efficient points adjacent to the efficient point y^^ obtained. 
To obtain all efficient adjacent points follow the three 
steps below. 
Step 1. Find for each nonbasic vector if the required 
c^ exists. Use the procedures of case 1 and case 2 
given above where possible. Use the case 3 procedure 
for all other nonbasic vectors. 
Step 2. Compute the new solutions using the c^ 
vectors obtained in step 1. If y^® changes, an adjacent 
efficient extreme yp has been obtained. If y^^ does 
not change, an alternative basis matrix has been obtained 
and step 1 must be completed for this alternative basis. 
Step 3. Check each alternative basis to see if, due to 
degeneracy, it is possible to find new alternative bases. 
If so, then step 1 must be completed for each of these 
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alternative bases. 
When it is not possible to find any new alternative basis 
matrices and when all nonbasic vectors for each existing 
alternate basis matrix has been checked for the existence 
a c^ then all adjacent efficient extreme points have been 
obtained. 
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CHAPTER V. AN APPROACH TO EFFICIENT 
DECISION-MAKING IN A UNIVERSITY 
Education in general and specifically the graduates and 
knowledge produced by the university have become increasingly 
important elements of our social and economic system. The in­
creasing proportion of the population and of the public 
budget directly committed to the educational process has 
made imperative the need for a close analysis of the effi­
ciency of the educational process and of its present and 
future effect on the remainder of the economic system. 
Actually the amount of work which has been done in the 
last few years on the general subject of the economics of 
education has been quite significant. Blaug (1968, p. 8) 
has delineated two general classes into which this work may 
be placed. The first "analyses the economic value of 
education" and "is concerned with the impact of schooling 
on labor productivity, occupational mobility,and the 
distribution of income." The second "analyses the economic 
aspects of educational systems" and "deals with the internal 
efficiency of schools and with the relations between the 
costs of education and methods of financing, these costs," 
Blaug's (1968) book gives important examples of papers 
falling in the first class. The subject matter of this 
chapter falls in the second class and is specifically con-
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cemed with developing analytical techniques which could 
aid decision-meUcers in increasing the internal efficiency of 
their university. People from a number of different 
disciplines such as management science, operations research, 
systems analysis, and economics have worked on the problem or 
closely related problems (Keeney, Koenig, and Zemach, 
1967; Judy, 1969; Weathersby, 1967; Sengupta emd Fox, 1970) . 
The approach taken in this chapter is very much in the 
tradition of other activity analysis type models for uni­
versity planning investigated by Fox, McCamley, and Plessner 
(196 7) and Plessner, Fox, and Sanyal (196 8). The model con­
sidered here will be an attempt to generalize the types of 
objectives or goals to be optimized and to discuss the 
possibility of a meaningful link of the university with the 
remainder of the economy through the input vector. While the 
discussion will be only with respect to a university system we 
believe that the general approach could be used to aid 
decision-making in many nonmarket institutions. 
We will first identify the environment in which a 
university operates as well as the structural characteristics 
and objectives of the university itself which are important 
for our analysis. Once we have identified these character­
istics we will formulate a model which closely approximates 
these characteristics and a methodology of using the model to 
make efficient decisions within the university. We will 
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formulate a department level numerical model and present 
confutational results. Finally we will discuss inadequacies 
of the model and the possibility of extending the model so 
that stochastic and dynamic elements could be considered. 
The University Environment 
and Structure 
A public university is constrained by or linked to the 
larger economic-political system in a number of important 
ways. Most of the links found between a multiproduct firm 
and the larger economic system have counterparts in the links 
between a university and the larger economic system. The 
public university, however, has other important links which 
affect its objectives and feasible actions. If not given 
precise directives, the public university is at least con­
strained by the political authority (e.g., the state legis­
lature) in matters such as the setting of tuition levels, 
the introduction of new programs or the cancellation of 
existing ones, the addition of new faculty or physical plant, 
the size of the operating budget, and even in setting the 
number of students to be admitted. Thus decisions related 
to pricing policy, product mix, capital expenditure, and 
level of operation are much more constrained for the university 
decision-maker than for his counterpart in the multiproduct 
firm. The political authorities can be considered as higher 
level decision-makers and one purpose of a university decision 
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model should be to aid decision-making at this level. 
Outputs of the University 
Even more important than the constraints inç)osed by the 
political system on feasible actions, however, is the diffi­
culty of evaluating the outputs of a university. As will be 
discussed below, the inputs of a university can be measured 
by market values, but the situation is apparently not so 
simple in the case of outputs since a well defined market 
does not exist. For the multiproduct firm a system of 
prices is available for evaluating the output link between 
the firm and the remainder of the econory. Such a set of 
prices .is not directly available for university outputs. 
Thus the vector maximization problem, which was the subject 
of the last chapter, must be faced. Either a suitable set 
of prices or relative weights must be estimated, or an 
approach must be followed which does not require that explicit 
relative weights be obtained. 
In a very broad or aggregative sense we can view the 
outputs of the university as falling into one of two classes. 
The production of "educated" persons or of skilled or trained 
manpower is one output class. The production of new knowledge 
resulting from the increasingly important research activities 
undertaken in the university is the second output class. 
These two outputs, educated persons and new knowledge, are 
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used here in a broad sense and include such often mentioned 
functions of the university as extension work and service 
to the community. 
With respect to the general output of educated persons 
we believe that it is possible, with some reservations, to 
define meaningful measures of output and to estimate a system 
of prices or relative weights which, at least for some pur­
poses, are useful. With respect to the output of new knowledge 
we believe that the problem of measurement and relative 
valuation is inherently more difficult. 
The university maintains an extensive record system of 
course units, credit hours, and grades for each student for 
the purpose of measuring the type, quantity, and quality of 
"education" obtained by each student. While it is not diffi­
cult to criticize this system of measurement, it is easily 
argued that an output index using the system is as reason­
able as many other output indexes of quite heterogeneous 
products which are found to be useful. 
A significant cimount of work has been done with respect 
to estimating the value of educated manpower. This work 
falls into Blaug's class which is concerned with analyzing 
the economic value of education. The results of this work 
' provide the university decision-maker with a partial answer 
to the problem of evaluating the effect of the output of 
educated manpower on the larger system. Two different 
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approaches have been followed and we will discuss examples of 
each as well as the usefulness of the results for a uni­
versity decision-maker. There does, of course, exist a 
market for the services of educated manpower. The two dif­
ferent approaches will be discussed with respect to their 
different implicit assumptions about the shape of the demand 
curve in this market. We will refer to the first as the 
rate-of-return approach and the second as the manpower 
planning approach (for a related discussion see Anderson 
and Bowman, 196 8). 
The general idea of the rate-of-return approach is to 
estimate the increase in lifetime earnings (which is assumed 
to be closely related to productivity) due to education and 
express these earnings as a rate-of-return on investment in 
education (Schultz, 1968). Such calculations can be made 
for national average data or much more specific situations 
such as for graduates from a particular university in a 
particular discipline (Craft and Kaldor, 1968). The concept 
can either be used to determine a social rate-of-return or a 
rate-of-return to the particular graduate by using either 
social costs and benefits (e.g., public subsidies to education 
would be included in costs and before-tax earnings in 
benefits) or those costs and benefits relative to the indi­
vidual. Rather than computing the rate-of-return or cost, it 
may be of interest to compute the discounted present value 
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of increased benefits due to education. In any case, for the 
results to be meaningful, an accurate forecast of the salary 
structure over the relevant time period must be made. Usually 
it is assumed that the salary structure will remain virtually 
constant into the relevant future. To use such calculations 
for decision purposes one must assume that increases in 
educated manpower will not affect the structure of the salary 
system. In other words, the assumption of a nearly hori­
zontal demand schedule must be implicitly made. 
The manpower planning approach begins by forecasting the 
number of persons with specific types of training which will 
be "needed" in the economy over a certain time period. 
The assumption is made that if that number is not met there 
will be a shortage; if it is more than met there will be 
an excess of manpower. In other words the demand schedule 
is quite steep and the salary structure sticky. 
The choice between the rate-of-retum and manpower type 
approach could apparently be made on empirical grounds and is 
closely related to the amount of substitutability which 
exists between persons with different training. Arrow and 
Capron (1968) have discussed the operation of the market 
for scientists and engineers and have concluded that the 
market does react to allocate in the short run cind modify 
the supply in the long run. 
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The university can view its role as that of directly 
supplying the demand for the services of educated manpower. 
The university is not a supplier for this market in the usual 
sense of the term since it does not receive payment directly 
for the services of its graduates. The flow of educated 
manpower from a particular university must be viewed as 
adding to the body of educated manpower (i.e., increasing 
the stock of human capital) which supplies services to a 
market which for most purposes must be considered at least 
national in scope. Thus the decisions of a single uni­
versity will have, at most, a small effect on the market. 
If the university decision-maker uses the results of 
rate-of-return and manpower planning studies and expands 
those programs corresponding to high rates-of-return or high 
manpower needs we would think that he would be contributing 
to an adjustment process. However, such decentralized 
action by all universities will not insure that the aggregate 
adjustment will not be either too large or small. In the 
one case an accurate feedback of information concerning 
adjustments in the rate-of-return would be required, in the 
second a centralized informational system which aggregated 
the plans of all relevant institutions. 
The university can, alternatively, view its role as 
that of supplying instructional services directly to students 
who desire those services as a consumption good or as an 
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investment in their own human capital. In practice the 
instructional services supplied by most universities are 
heavily subsidized with the price paid directly by students 
usually accounting for less than one-half the cost. A 
market does exist for instructional services but since these 
services are quite differentiated by factors such as geo­
graphical location and real and perceived differences in 
quality a rather wide range of tuition rates (i.e., prices) 
can and do exist. This leaves open the possibility of using 
tuition as an instrument variable, at least within a certain 
range. In general, tuition charges are not differentiated, 
within the university, according to course of study (even 
though the cost of instruction in, say, science is much 
more than in the humanities (see Weathersby, 196 7). A 
certain amount of tuition differentiation does take place 
through the granting of scholarships and other forms of 
student aid. Jenny (196 8) has noted that the granting of 
student aid amounts to a type of price discrimination. 
Some knowledge of the shape of the demand schedule for 
instructional services would appear to be necessary if 
tuition rates and student aid are to be used as instrument 
or control variables. The need for such information is 
especially important in most private institutions (e.g., 
see Jenny, p. 2 75, for a discussion concerning the shape of 
such a demand schedule for small private colleges). 
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As we indicated above we believe that the research work 
just discussed provides a partial answer to the problem of 
evaluating the effect on the larger economic system of the 
university's output of educated manpower. We believe that 
the problem is only partially answered for at least two 
importcint reasons. The first involves the consumption aspect 
of education; the second concerns the presence of external­
ities . 
The university decision-maker can use the results of 
rate-of-retum analysis to place relative values on different 
instructional activities or he may use the results of man­
power analysis research to set fixed goals for certain out­
puts. These criteria, however, are related almost solely 
to the effect of education on human capital or productivity; 
the consumption component of education, which must be rela­
tively significant, is not even considered. If students 
are free to purchase alternative instructional services, 
their consumption preferences as well as their choice of 
investment in human capital should be revealed. While the 
information about future salary levels necessary to make 
optimal investment decisions may not be available to students, 
there would not appear to be any major informational problem 
with respect to consumption choices. The importance of the 
consumption component then would appear to be an argument in 
favor of the university viewing its role as that of supplying 
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instructional services directly to students. For at least 
two reasons, however, this university role is too narrow. 
The first reason is that it is difficult for students 
to obtain good information with respect to forecasts of 
the future salary structure. The second involves the 
importance of externalities present in the educational 
process (Bowen, 1968, p. 85). A good case can be made for 
the importance of external effects both in the productive 
and consumption effects of education. The productivity of 
highly trained persons must be increased by the possibility 
of communicating ideas with others possessing similar or 
supporting training so that the productivity of the group 
is greater than the sum of individuals working separately. 
Observe that research personnel often work in teams. The 
level and type of education possessed by a given individual 
must enter the utility function of many other individuals 
as well. For example, in a democratic society a more in­
formed electorate should enter positively in almost 
everyone's utility function. 
As is well known the presence of externalities often 
interferes with the efficient operation of market mechanisms. 
The presence of externalities does not preclude the effi­
cient operation as Arrow (1969 , p. 57) has shown that by a 
"reinterpretation of the commodity space, externalities can 
be regarded as ordinary commodities, and all the formal 
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theory of competitive equilibrium is valid, including its 
optimality." However, as Arrow points out, the presence 
of externalities is often associated with two other factors 
which adversely affect the functioning of the market. The 
first is the problem of appropriability or the problem of 
exclusion; the second is the problem of a small number of 
buyers and sellers. 
It is difficult to imagine the possibility of excluding 
certain persons from the benefits due to the consumption of 
education by others. While exclusion may be more realistic 
with respect to productive externalities the number involved 
in the transaction is likely to be small and the cost of 
negotiating a price high. As Arrow (1969 , p. 58) has noted: 
"If in addition the costs of bargaining are high, then it 
may be most efficient to offer the service free." 
We can make the following conclusions concerning our 
discussion of evaluating the university's output of educated 
manpower. Use of a set of relative values from a rate-of-
return type analysis or a set of output targets from a man­
power planning analysis does not insure a correct aggregate 
adjustment if each university follows such a policy inde­
pendently. Even more important such analysis disregards the 
iirportance of the consumption congonent of education. While 
the free choice of students in purchases of instruction 
should reveal consumption preferences accurately, lack of 
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information probably precludes optimal investment in their 
human capital. Finally the difficulties due to the presence 
of externalities in education (Weisbrod, 1964) indicate that 
the market cannot be expected to operate optimally. Thus 
we feel that such a criterion for evaluating the output of 
educated manpower provides important guidelines but probably 
should not completely dominate the preferences of well in­
formed responsible university policy-makers. 
As was stated above, the measurement and valuation of 
new knowledge, the second broad class of university output, 
is apparently inherently more difficult than that of edu­
cated manpower. Research has become an increasingly important 
activity in the university and in the economy in general. 
Questions concerning the importance of research, the level 
at which research activities should be supported, and the 
method of choosing between alternative projects have received 
significant attention in the literature (Smith, 1965). 
We will discuss two inherent properties of research and 
new knowledge which indicate that a market mechanism cannot 
be relied upon to allocate an optimal budget to research 
activities or to efficiently allocate the benefits of 
new knowledge. Most important is the fact that knowledge 
fits almost exactly the definition of a collective or public 
good (i.e., a good having the property that its use by one 
individual does not decrease the amount available for use by 
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others). Leon tie f (1960 , p. 4) has very explicitly noted 
this property of knowledge: 
Not only can the same person make use of an idea, 
of some specific piece of technical information, 
over and over again without the slightest danger of 
exhausting it through wear, but the same idea can 
serve many users simultaneously, and as the number 
of customers increases, no one need be getting less 
of it because the others are getting more. 
It is well known that decentralized market mechanisms break 
down in the presence of public goods. For example, Samuel s on 
(1954, p. 388) has indicated the impossibility of devising 
a decentralized pricing system which will optimally determine 
levels of collective consumption. 
The second important fact is that research activities 
by their very nature involve a high degree of uncertainty. 
Arrow (1969, p. 54) has noted that uncertainty is closely 
related to the costliness of information necessary for 
participation in a market. Obtaining information of even a 
probabilistic nature with respect to the outcome of many 
research projects will be exceedingly costly. The costliness 
of information will inhibit the operation of a market 
mechanism. 
The above comments are not meant to indicate that re­
search must be undertaken blindly, but that attempting to 
institute or define a market mechanism for optimal budget 
allocation to research, or between research projects, does 
not appear to be a fruitful exercise. Because of the special 
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nature of research, we feel that a preference ordering result­
ing from the interaction of policy-makers who, in some 
general sense reflect society's desires and of researchers 
with the best information concerning the probable results 
of various projects is likely to be a better allocation 
criterion than any type of market prices. 
The production of masters theses and doctoral disserta­
tions apparently has elements of both production of new 
knowledge and educating manpower. Added difficulties are 
involved in attempting to evaluate outputs in such cases of 
joint production. 
We conclude that the output linkage between the univer­
sity and the larger economic system in very difficult to 
evaluate suitably. It is possible to obtain rough estimates 
of the contribution to national income of students who 
graduate. It should be of interest to have a decision-mo del 
which could provide the solution which would maximize this 
contribution. However, such an objective is apparently much 
too narrow to be prescribed in general and a de ci s ion-model 
should be flexible enough to provide solutions for a broader 
range of objectives. No set of prices or weights is directly 
available nor apparently possible to estimate from market 
data, such that production of new knowledge and the consunp-
tion component of instruction as well as the productive 
contribution of graduates are satisfactorily commeasurable. 
i 
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Thus the vector maximization problem of Chapter IV is 
present. A decision-model flexible enough to provide 
solutions which meet as closely as possible multiple goals 
set by the policy-maker or which can provide the policy­
maker with a subset of efficient combinations from which to 
choose should be useful in pursuing a broad range of 
objectives. 
Inputs of the University 
Measurement and evaluation of input links between the 
university system and the larger economic system is much more 
straightforward than for output links. The university like 
a firm buys goods and services through the market system. 
It purchases new physical plant capacity, supplies, and labor 
services through the same markets as many multiproduct firms. 
In the market for faculty personnel the university conpetes 
with many private firms as well as other universities. 
Student time used in the learning process must be con­
sidered an input for most purposes. Even it, however, can 
be treated as an opportunity cost measured by potential 
earnings in the labor market. T. W. Schultz (1968, p. 25) 
says that for the United States "well over half of the costs 
of higher education consists of income foregone by students." 
For decision-making purposes the physical plant and the 
faculty (due to tenure and institutional hiring practices) must 
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be considered relatively fixed in the short run and essential­
ly involve questions of capacity expansion. The inputs of 
basic supplies, secretarial and computational services and 
to a large extent the input of student time are more short 
run decisions. 
The Decentralized Structure 
of Decisions 
The fact that certain university goals and constraints 
are set outside the university by higher level political 
authorities was discussed above. The decision structure 
within the university itself involves a large degree of de­
centralization. The typical university is composed of 
colleges which are themselves decoirposed into departments 
corresponding to disciplines of study. This type of decision 
structure has not gone un cri ti ci zed; see, for example, Ackoff 
(1968) , but much can be said in its defense and its pre­
valence in practice cannot be denied. At each level of the 
hierarchical structure is a decision-maker whose decisions 
are closely related to the type of knowledge he possesses. 
The president must possess general knowledge about the whole 
university, the dean about his school, and department head 
detailed and specific knowledge about his department. The 
de ci s ion-maker at each level has the responsibility of making 
"good" decisions given his knowledge and directives from 
higher level de cis ion-makers. 
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This type of multilevel, multigoal structure has been 
outlined in Sengupta and Fox, (1970, p. 98) and in the follow­
ing quotation from Plessner, Fox, and Sanyal (1968, p. 256): 
The university president is thus a multiple-goal deci­
sion maker. Between the president and the department 
chairman there may be a number of administrators, such 
as the vice-president for research, the dean of the 
graduate college, and the director of the extension ser­
vice, each of whom contributes to only one of the 
president's goals. Their actions impose constraints on 
the department chairman whose decisions must take 
cognizance of several of the presidential goals. 
The directives from higher level decision-makers may be 
in the form of quotas of inputs and outputs or may be a pricing 
system which indicates how specific inputs and outputs are to 
be valued. The type of process described above is very similar 
to the usual characterization of a decentralized multi-
divisional firm. 
Decentralization in the university, however, not only 
involves decisions concerning the best way to fulfill given 
goals from higher levels, it also involves the actual setting 
of goals at lower levels. Decisions about what should be 
taught in a given course and which courses should be offered 
(i.e., which ideas and bits of knowledge have the "highest 
value") usually are departmental level decisions. Decisions 
concerning the mix of courses which should be included in a 
given major area of study are made at the departmental or 
college level. 
In a decentralized firm each output can usually be 
closely identified with the revenue it generates for the firm 
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and thus it is relatively easy to collapse the overall 
objective into a scalar value in terms of money. While it 
may be possible to roughly estimate the present value of 
the contribution to national income of a given degree, 
such a value is not sufficiently disaggregated to aid in 
many of the inçortant decisions at the departmental level. 
Decisions must be made involving the relative value of 
different courses, class sizes, or of staff members per­
forming different tasks. Apparently the preference function 
of those with the most detailed and specific knowledge of 
the discipline and department must be relied upon. Thus 
there is sufficient reason to believe that decision-makers 
at the departmental level should be responsible for setting 
certain department goals as well as being responsible for 
actions of the department which will best fulfill goals 
or objectives of higher level decision-makers. 
The organization of a university is such that more 
general or aggregative goals set at one level of decision­
making must be fulfilled in the best way possible by lower 
level decision-makers and once this is accomplished all the 
remaining feasible actions are evaluated according to more 
specific goals set by the lower level decision-maker. This 
envisions a kind of lexicographical or preemptive decision 
structure. 
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Characteristics of a Useful University 
Decision Model 
The environment and structure of the university requires 
a useful decision model to have two important characteristics. 
First, it must be flexible enough to accommodate a wide range 
of optimization and goal criteria. Second, it must be able 
to accommodate the decentralized nature of the university 
and specifically to allow for goal setting by lower level 
decision-makers. 
We will discuss three related approaches for character­
izing the objectives of decision-making. The first approach is 
that of obtaining a general preference function from the 
policy-maker and maximizing this function subject to the 
restrictions of the model. Nonlinear functions can be con­
sidered; however, unless the function is concave, a global op­
timum will be very difficult to obtain and except for the 
special case of quadratic programming, computational expenses 
will be prohibitive for large models. Tinbergen (1955, p. 2-3) 
in his discussion of quemtitative economic policy has noted 
the difficulty of actually specifying such a function and 
that in practice specifying and maximizing such a function 
will often be passed over and targets will be directly 
chosen. Some important initial work on the problem of 
determining such a function has been done by van Eijk and 
Sandee (1959). If the function is linear then the problem 
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reduces to choosing a set of relative weights which may 
not be too difficult a problem. However, the implicit 
assumption of constant marginal value for each commodity 
involved in the linear function will usually not result in 
a satisfactory answer unless bounds are placed 
on certain variables. The setting of such bounds actually 
amounts to setting a type of target after all. 
The second general approach for characterizing ob­
jectives is that of attempting to fulfill as closely as 
possible a vector of goals set by the policy-maker. Lee 
and Clayton (1969) have discussed the application of goal 
programming to a university decision model. The goals may 
be classified according to type, as in Chapter III (i.e., 
the goal of minimizing inconsistency, the goal of mini­
mizing deviations from fixed targets, and the goal of 
maximizing flexible target values). Strictly speaking the 
setting of such goals can be said to specify the policy­
maker's preference function; however, we wish to make a 
distinction between the two for discussion purposes. The 
first approach is in the tradition of constrained value 
maximization; the goal approach may be viewed as being more 
concerned with meeting quantity quotas and insuring con­
sistent functioning of the production system. The goals may 
be given different weights, some of which may be preemptive 
priority factors. We would assert that the general idea 
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of goals corresponds more closely to the implicit 
thought processes of policy-makers than does the idea of a 
general preference function. In other words we feel that 
university policy-makers are more likely to be able to easily 
specifyf say, certain quantity quotas which they think should 
optimally be fulfilled than to be able to specify for every 
conceivable combination the relative values they would 
place on commodities. 
The third general approach for characterizing objectives 
in a model is to compute efficient points from which the 
policy-maker then chooses one. Even if one is not willing to 
put either absolute or relative values on the outputs of a 
university system there is still much which can be done to 
aid in the consideration of alternatives. If it is possible 
to reach agreement on the identification of outputs and 
agree that more is preferred to less then we know that 
only efficient, feasible alternatives need be considered. 
There may be a very large range of efficient, feasible 
alternatives which must be con^ared to each other and from 
which a unique choice must be made; however by having ex­
cluded all infeasible output combinations and all combina­
tions which are dominated by other combinations with as much 
of every output the range has been greatly narrowed. The 
policy-maker is thus able to focus on a specific set of 
output vectors (efficient, feasible vectors) knowing that for 
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any feasible alternatives not in this set there is at least 
one corresponding vector in the set which is more desirable. 
The preference ordering of the policy-maker is effective 
ly revealed when the unique choice is made from these al­
ternative efficient vectors. This means that without en­
countering the difficult problems of empirically estimating 
a utility function to represent the preferences of the 
decision-maker or even determining a system of weights or 
goals, a solution which is optimal with respect to the 
decision-maker and the given output possibilities can be 
obtained. For a linear model the set of efficient points 
can be computed by systematic use of a linear programming 
simplex routine. It is necessary to compute only the set of 
adjacent efficient extreme points, and then the set of 
efficient points consists of convex combinations of adjacent 
efficient extreme points. 
The difficulty for this third approach is that even 
for moderately sized models the number of adjacent efficient 
extreme points may become excessively large for purposes of 
computation. Even if computation poses no problem it must 
be possible to present the set of efficient alternatives in 
a compact enough manner so that choosing between them is not 
beyond the capability of the policy-maker. Even when the 
model is small and the commodities are aggregated so that 
the number of different final commodities considered is small 
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the number of efficient extreme points may exceed a manage­
able number. In practice, high level decision-makers are 
usually forced to work with relatively aggregated indexes 
because of the costliness of gathering and processing highly 
detailed data at a central point, and for many specific 
situations it will not be difficult to specify a subregion 
which would contain all efficient points worthy of con­
sideration. Formally specification of such a subregion 
could be considered a preemptive goal. 
The approach used in the computations of this chapter 
is to use goal programming to obtain an initial efficient 
point worthy of consideration, and then compute adjacent effi­
cient points and allow the policy-maker to decide if he 
wishes to move to any of the efficient points on the line 
segments between adjacent points. If he decides that he 
would prefer to move to one of the adjacent points then 
the process could be repeated until none of the points 
"around" the point he has chosen are preferred to the point 
he has chosen. 
Of interest to an economist is the fact that each 
efficient vector is associated with imputed prices for not 
only the outputs but also the inputs and intermediate com­
modities. These prices are also computable and are interest­
ing in two respects. First, they provide an intra-model 
pricing vector which is consistent with the chosen optimal 
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output vector. Secondly, these imputed prices give a link 
between the educational institution and the remainder of 
the economy. Most inputs can be given a reasonable market 
price, and the imputed prices are only relative so they can 
be normalized such that one of the inputs serves as the 
numg'raire (preferably the budget input measured in dollars). 
Comparing the market and imputed valuations may then be 
meaningful. Possible use of these imputed prices for short . 
run adjustments and dynamic considerations will be discussed 
below. 
Specification and Computation for 
a Department Level Model 
The model specified in Table 9 will be used to give 
numerical examples of the three different approaches for 
characterizing university objectives. The coefficients are 
meant to be "reasonable" and the units of measurement and 
other relevant assumptions are given in Table 10. Discussion 
of the specification of the model will be divided into 
three parts concerned with the time period involved, the 
commodities, eind the activities. We assume that some type 
of university-wide decision process, such as that described 
in the above section, has been completed and that the depart­
ment has been allocated certain commodities and directed to 
pursue certain goals. 
The model is essentially static and applies to a nine 
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Table 9a. Definitions of activity codes for Tcible 9b 
Code Instruction Activities 
XSPI Small principles section taught by instructor 
XLPU Large principles section taught by undergrad. faculty 
XLPG Large principles section taught by grad. faculty 
XIIU Freshman-Soph, class taught by undergrad. faculty 
XIIG Freshman-Soph, class taught by grad. faculty. 
XI2U Jr.-Sr. class taught by undergrad. faculty 
XI2G Jr.-Sr. class taught by grad. faculty 
XIM M.S. course instruction 
XID Ph.D. course instruction 
Research/ Dissertation, and Thesis Activities 
XRESl Research activity no. 1 
XRES2 Research activity no. 2 
XRES3 Research activity no. 3 
XRES4 Research activity no. 4 
XRES5 Research activity no. 5 
XSM M.S. thesis supervision 
XSD Ph.D. dissertation supervision 
Intermediate Commodity Activities 
XTAC Teaching assistant, course stage 
XTAT Teaching assistant, thesis stage 
XINC Instructor, course stage 
XIND Instructor, dissertation stage 
XRAMC Research assistant, M.S. course stage 
XRAMT Research assistant,M.S. thesis stage 
XRADC Research assistant, Ph.D. course stage 
XRADD Research assistant, Ph.D. dissertation stage 
XSEC Secretarial services 
XCOMP Computational services 
Final Commodity Activities 
YUI Undergrad. instruction 
YMI M.S. level instruction 
YDI Ph.D. level instruction 
YMT M.S. theses 
YDD Ph.D. dissertations 
YSRY Standard research years 
Table 9b. Basic model 
Code^  XSPI XLPU XLPG XIlU XIIG XI2U XI2G XIM 
UI 105.000 840.000 840.000 105.000 105.000 90.000 90.000 
MI 90.000 
DT 
MT--
DD 
SRY 
TA -1.000 -1.000 
INST -.083 
RAMC 
RAMT 
RADC 
RADD 
SEC -.020 -.030 -.030 -.020 -.020 -.020 -.020 -.020 
COMP 
UF -.083 -.083 -.083 
GF -.083 -.083 -.083 -.083 
GSMC -2.500 
GSDC 
GSMT 
GSDD 
US 12 -2.188 -17.500 -17.500 -2.188 -2.188 
US34 -1.875 -1.875 
BUDG 
GSSO 
^Activity and commodity codes are defined in Table 9a 
and Table 10 respectively. 
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Table 9b (Continued) 
Code'T XI n XR["SI XRES2 XRES3 XRES4 XRES5 XSM XSD 
Ul 
MI 
DI 90.000 
MT 
DD 
SRY 
TA 
INST 
RAMC 
RAMT 
RADC 
RADD 
SEC -.020 
COMP 
UF 
GF -.083 
GSMC 
GSDC -2.500 
GSMT 
Gsnn 
US I 2 
US 34 
BUDG 
GSSO 
,300 
.300 
4.000 4.000 
2.000 
2.000 !.000 
I .000 
.000 2.333 3.667 1.667 3.667 
.000 
.600 
I .000 
-1.000 -1.000 
-I .000 
-2.000 -2.000 
-2.000 
• I .000 
-I.500 
-.400 
- .600 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.200 -.150 -.300 
.000 -1.000 -1.000 -.049 -.098 
-.450 
-.900 
Table 9b (Continued) 
Codef XT AC XTAT XINC XIND XRAMC XRAMT XRADC XRADD 
UI 
MI 
DI 
MT 
DD 
SRY 
TA .500 .500 
INST .500 .500 
RAMC .500 
RAMT .500 
RADC .500 
RADD I.000 
SEC 
COMP 
ur 
G F 
GSMC -.500 -.500 
OSDC -.500 -.500 
GSMT -.500 -.500 
GSDD -.500 -1.000 
US 12 
US34 
BUDG -2.700 -2.700 -3.600 -3.600 -2.700 -2.700 -3.600 -7.200 
GSSO -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 
Table 9b (Continued) 
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Codef XSEC XCOMP YUÎ YMI YDI YMT YDD YSRY 
Ut -I .0 = 0.0 
MI -I.0 = 0.0 
D1 -I.0 = 0.0 
MT -I .0 = 0.0 
DD -1.0 0.0 
SRY -1.0 = 0.0 
TA = 0.0 
INST = 0.0 
RAMC = 0.0 
RAMT = 0.0 
RADC = 0.0 
RADD = 0.0 
SEC I.0 = 0.0 
COMP I .0 =0.0 
UF 2 -20.0 
GF i -40.0 
GSMC k -120.0 
GSDC > -60.0 
GSMT > -40.0 
GSDD > -30.0 
US 12 >-600,0 
US34 >-375.0 
BUDG -7.2 -1.0 >-1000.0 
GSSO -1.0 >-260.0 
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Table 10. Assumptions and codes 
Assumptions about class size, student course load, and 
faculty teaching load consistent with the activities 
specified 
Average class size 
Large freshman and sophomore lecture sections 2 80 
Small freshman and sophomore classes 35 
Junior and senior level classes 30 
M.S. level classes 30 
Ph.D. level classes 25 
A 3-credit undergrad. course requires = .0624 academic 
man years per student 
A 3-credit grad. course requires = .0 833 academic man 
years per student 
Each 3-credit course requires fy faculty or instructor man 
year 
Large lecture section require faculty man years and 1 
teaching assistant man year 
Primary Commodities 
Type Code 
Grad. faculty GF 
Undergrad. faculty UF 
Grad. (Masters course stage) GSMC 
Grad. (Ph.D. course stage) GSDC 
Grad. (Masters thesis stage) GSMT 
Grad. (Ph.D. dissertation stage)GSDD 
Undergrad. (Fresh., Soph.) US12 
Undergrad. (Jr., Sr.) US34 
Budget BUDG 
Offices (Grad. students and GSSO 
secretaries) 
Units of Measurement 
Academic man years 
Academic man years 
Academic man years 
Academic man years 
Academic man years 
Academic man years 
Academic man years 
Academic man years 
Thousands of dollars 
Number of offices 
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T cible 10 (Continued) 
Final Commodities 
Type Code 
Undergrad. instruction UI 
Masters level instruction MI 
Ph.D. level instruction DI 
M.S. theses MT 
Ph.D. dissertations MD 
Standard research years SRY 
Intermediate Commodities 
Unit of Measurement 
Man-credits 
Man-credits 
Man-credits 
Number 
Number 
Standard research man years 
Type Code Unit of Measurement 
Teaching assistants TA Academic man years 
Instructors INST Academic man years 
Research assistants 
(M.S. course level) RAMC Academic man years 
(M.S. thesis level) RAMT Academic man years 
Research assistants 
(Ph.D. course level) RADC Academic man years 
(Ph.D. dissertation level)RADD Academic man years 
Secretarial assistants SEC Academic man years 
Computing COMP Thousands of dollars 
A standard research man year is defined as the amount 
of research output which would result from one graduate 
faculty academic man year supported by 1/3 man year of 
secretarial services and $300 of computation services. 
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month academic year and the decisions relevant to such a time 
period. A quarter system is assumed and the model repre­
sents an aggregation over these three time periods which 
for cases of actual planning might not be sufficiently de­
tailed. For exaiiple it is assumed that forty man years 
(the terra man year will always refer to academic man year) 
are available from students at the masters thesis stage, 
but that fact in itself does not indicate how these forty 
man years are distributed over the three quarters. To 
insure that the solution of our model is consistent we must 
assume that all commodity availabilities are evenly 
distributed over the time period. If in reality this assump­
tion is not true it would be necessary to disaggregate the 
model such that a separate submodel would apply to each 
quarter with the appropriate links between the quarters. 
As in the typical activity analysis model the commodities 
are classified as primary, intermediate, and final. The pri­
mary commodities include the budget and physical space as 
well as man years of faculty and student time. We assume 
that the vector of available primary commodities is the 
result of a longer term, university-wide planning process 
which has allocated a general budget sufficient for faculty 
and physical plant needs and classroom and office space 
consistent with the faculty and students. Therefore the 
budget considered in the model is only that portion 
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allocated for purchasing of supplies and of services of 
less permanent employees such as graduate student employees 
and secretarial or clerical personnel. Likewise the physical 
space considered is the allocation of offices for such less 
permanent personnel. For many actual situations it is likely 
that the budget will need to be decomposed into several 
sub-budgets each designated for specific purposes and that 
several different classifications of physical space will be 
necessary. A further disaggregation of faculty man years 
according to level of ability and field of speciality 
could easily be made and would probably be necessary for 
many actual planning purposes. 
The intermediate commodities consist of graduate student 
research and teaching assistants and instructors as well 
as secretarial and computational services used in the 
production of the final commodities. As will be noted in 
the discussion of activities, each of these intermediate 
commodities can be produced, in a very broad sense of the 
term, from some combination of primary commodities. 
The final commodity vector of the model is highly 
aggregated. The degree of aggregation used is due, in 
part, to the need to keep the model to a manageable size for 
purposes of exposition here; however, a central point of our 
discussion involves the possibility of using relatively 
aggregated quantities in the decision process. The aggregated 
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final commodity vector is quite appropriate when higher 
level goals are considered or when efficient points are 
computed. Once a solution has been obtained with respect 
to the aggregated goal or efficiency criterion, one can 
choose between those more detailed or less aggregative 
vectors which maintain efficiency or satisfy the aggregate 
goal. 
The final outputs designated in the model are quite 
obvious choices. A good case could be made for considering 
experience gained by graduate students through teaching and 
research as a final commodity since it presumably increases 
their productivity and can be considered as an investment 
in their human capital; however the model used here does not 
include such experience as a final commodity. The choice 
of units for measuring final commodities is easily criti­
cized but apparently not easily improved upon. 
The use of credit hours, theses, and dissertations con­
forms to well established university measurement systems. 
For many purposes the measurement of undergraduate instruc­
tion only by credit hours is not satisfactory. Salary 
structure and job qualifications often treat undergraduate 
degrees as a discrete variable, not divisible by credit 
hours, and aggregation of credit hours into degrees is 
complicated by the necessity to consider dropouts. 
The difficulty of measuring and evaluating the output of 
154 
new knowledge and the research activities which produce it 
has been discussed above. Our approach here defines an 
arbitrary unit called a standard research year which is the 
average amount of research produced by one graduate faculty 
man year supported by one-third man year of secretarial 
services and $300. of computational services. Hence the 
definition is in terms of a specific combination of inputs; 
however, as will be discussed below, a number of other 
different input combinations are assumed to produce a 
certain number of standard man years of research. For many 
purposes the research commodity would need to be dis­
aggregated. Basic and applied research might be considered 
separately, or separate components might be considered 
according to subject matter researched. 
Before discussing the activities specified in the model 
we will note the importance of the restraints imposed by 
linearity. Specifically the assumption of constant returns 
to scale and the restraints on input substitutibility will 
be considered with respect to the model outlined. For the 
instructional activities which transform intermediate com­
modities from primary commodities the assumption of constant 
returns to scale should be adequate since each new unit 
of activity is essentially a duplication of the former 
with little interaction. The possibility of a single 
preparation for more than one section of a given course is an 
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element which could contribute to increasing returns but 
is not considered here. Research activities are likely to 
involve some increasing returns to scale since data and 
techniques used for one project represent a fixed invest­
ment of time which may be spread over related research proj­
ects. We will assume that for the model considered here 
constant returns to scale form a sufficiently close approxi­
mation to reality. It has been argued that "For the typical 
college or university, the fixed proportions function is, 
in fact, utilized by the administrators who behave as 
though they were faced with just such a function" (South-
wick, 1969, p. 169). We should note that those university 
decisions in which significant returns to scale are most 
probable are not relevant to ttiis model due to its short 
term departmental level nature. Decisions concerning 
capacity expansion of physical plant, computer and library 
facilities, and administrative staff would be among those 
considered most likely to involve significant returns to scale. 
The amount of restraint on input substitutability in 
the model is entirely dependent upon the choice of activities 
to be considered. When the possibility for input substi­
tution exists, determination of optimal input proportions 
is an important problem. 
For example, within a certain range there must certainly 
be a trade-off between the input of instructional time and 
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student time such that the quantity of a given quality of 
knowledge gained by the students can be represented by iso-
quants. For many types of courses it should be feasible 
to set up controlled experiments and testing techniques so 
that empirical estimates could be made of such isoquants. 
Once the isoquants were estimated, the input substitution 
could be approximately represented in the model by placing 
a number of alternative production activities in the model 
for consideration. The mix of student and faculty input time 
involves the multiple questions of class size, expected 
course load for students and teachers, and the number of hours 
students are expected to spend outside the classroom per hour 
of instruction.^^ 
In practice such questions are apparently not considered 
to involve interrelated decision variables and are often 
considered not to involve variables at all but fixed 
parameters. When decisions concerning optimal class size 
are made and don't involve consideration of available class­
room space, they are often posed as an isolated decision 
where instructional cost is traded off against quality. We 
would hypothesize that within certain limits quality can be 
^^For a siitple but interesting analysis of the inter­
relation between class size, teachers' salaries, and other 
variables see Herbert Simon (1967). 
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maintained while student input time is substituted for 
faculty input time and that given knowledge of the rate of 
substitution, the optimal ratio of inputs is an economic 
consideration involving a price ratio of student and 
faculty man years. 
The activities considered in our model do not allow 
for large ranges of input substitution. Some possibility 
for substitution exists in the instruction of large principles 
courses where teaching assistants are used in combination 
with a smaller input of faculty time as well as in research 
where some activities use larger rates of research 
assistants to graduate faculty than other activities. In 
general the input proportions used in the model here are 
chosen to correspond quite closely with existing practices 
in many departments. Once a solution has been obtained for 
the type of model used here, it is possible to use the dual 
variables to determine whether or not a vector representing 
a new activity or program could be profitably introduced. 
The activities specified are highly aggregated. The 
need for a detailed departmental plan and the type of 
commodity disaggregation discussed above would require a 
corresponding disaggregation of activities. The joint 
production of some of the research activities should be noted. 
These activities not only produce new knowledge measured by 
the standard research man year proposed above but also 
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produce masters theses and doctoral dissertations. The 
coefficients used for research activities are defended only 
as reasonable approximations of input-output proportions in 
common use and could certainly be in%>roved upon by extensive 
study of research programs. 
The first illustrative computation is for the following 
problem: 
max c'yyp 
subject to ApX-Iyp = 0 (39) 
AjX = 0 
ApX 1 n 
X' Yp 1 0 
which maximizes a linear function of the final commodities. 
The vector of coefficients c^ is assumed to represent the 
preference function of the decision-maker. Table 11 gives 
the results of the computations for (39). The matrix coeffi­
cients and commodity codes used are those in Table 9. 
The values used for c^ are only example values. The optimal 
final output values are given as well as the dual values 
for the primary commodities. A price range is given for 
each element of yp. This indicates the range in which a 
single price can be changed without changing the optimal 
output levels. For exairç)le, the price of a doctoral disser­
tation could vary between 9.332 and 28.111 without affecting 
the optimal solution, and the price of un de rgradiiat e 
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Table 11. Problem (39) results 
Final 
Output 
yp 
Price 
Vector 
"y 
Price 
Range 
.0 39 
YUI 46 800 1.000 00 
.873 
YMI 4320 1.500 00 
1.225 
YDI 2160 2 .000 00 
6.774 
YMT 80 9.000 30.62 3 
9.332 
YDD 24.494 24.000 28.111 
17.983 
YSRY 62.996 28.000 42.833 
Dual 
Values 
UF 42.668 
GF 42 .668 
G SMC 52.578 
GSDC 70.578 
GSMT 29.332 
GSDD 42.668 
US12 46.375 
US34 46.104 
BUDG .000 
GSSO .000 
instruction, M.S. level instruction, or Ph.D. level instruc­
tion could each be increased by any amount, however large, 
without affecting the optimal yp. Note that these price 
ranges are valid only if all other prices are held constant 
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while a single price is changed. Note also that the optimal 
dual values will not remain unchanged. 
Three different examples of goal programming problems 
were computed. Problems (40) and (41) are closely related to 
(36) and (37) of Chapter IV. They are problems combining 
variable goals which should be fulfilled at a minimum level 
and fixed goals (i.e., a quota of final outputs which should 
not be over or underfulfilled). Problem (40) minimizes a 
weighted sum of negative deviations from the variable goals 
and absolute deviations from the fixed goals 
min c'e„ 
e F 
C'Bp < Y 
ApX-lEp < 
A*x+Ie* > n 
AjX = 0 
-ApX < -n 
X, Ep.^ 0, 
(40) 
For the computation, M.S. level instruction (YMI) and Ph.D 
level instruction (YDI) were chosen as commodities with 
variable minimum goals of 3600 and 1800 man-credits 
respectively. The other final commodities were considered 
to have fixed goals the values of which are given in 
Table 12. 
The matrix values used are those of the original model 
in Table 9. The starred symbols, A^, are equivalent 
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to their uns tarred counterparts except that the rows corre­
sponding to YMI and YDI have been dropped. They have a row 
for each of the fixed goals but not the variable goals. 
In general the elements of Cp are weights for the goals and 
can be specified according to the relative importance of 
the goals. For the computations here each element was 
set equal to one. 
Problem (41) minimizes the maximum absolute deviation: 
min 
subject to ^ Y (41) 
A|x+e* > y* 
AjX = 0 
-ApX <_ -n 
X, L ^  ' where e^ and e^ are vectors with 
the same variable e, for every 
element. 
The starred symbols have the same interpretation as in (40). 
For variable goals only negative deviations are considered 
while both positive and negative deviations are considered 
for fixed goals. 
For both problems (40) and (41) y is initially set as a 
very large number which will not affect the solution. Once the 
initial optimal solution has been completed y is set equal 
to the optimal value of the objective function of each problem 
respectively. Then any new objective function c.an be 
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maximized (i.e., subgoals may be maximized) subject to this 
constraint which insures that goals are fulfilled or ful­
filled as nearly as possible. 
For (40) the optimal value of the objective function was 
23.874 which resulted from a single nonzero deviation. Only 
the goal of 100 standard research years could not be fulfilled. 
The optimal level of final commodities, yp=ApX^, as well as 
the corresponding levels of production activities, x^, are 
given in Table 12. It would, *t. this stage, be possible to 
maximize any set of sub goals subject to the constraint that 
the sum of absolute deviations from the initial goals not ex­
ceed the minimum value by setting y==23.874 in (40). 
For (41) the optimal value of the objective function was 
14.336. The optimal level of final commodities and correspond­
ing activity levels are given in Table 12. Note that in 
this case every commodity deviated from the desired level 
and all but one, Ph.D. dissertations, deviated by the same 
amount, 14.336. For maximizing subgoals y in (41) should be 
set equal to 14.336. 
The different results from the two different criterion 
(i.e., minimizing the sum of absolute deviations and 
minimizing the maximum absolute deviation) can be expected 
to occur in general, the min-max gives a solution in which 
more of the goals fail to be fulfilled relative to the minimum 
sum criterion; however, no single deviation will be as large 
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Table 12. Solutions to problems (40)-(43) 
Solution Solution Solution to 
^ to m to (4]) (43 to (4 3) 
YUI 46800 .000 46800.000 46785.666 46800 .000 
YMI 3600 .000 3600.000 3585.664 3600.000 
YDI 1800 .000 1800.000 1785.664 1800.000 
YMT 40 .000 40.000 54.334 80.000 
YDD 30 .000 30.000 27.168 30.000 
YSRY 100 .000 76.126 85.664 84. 729 
XSPI 94.190 144.205 120.048 
XLPU 20.000 12.832 0.000 
XLPG 0.000 0.000 9.163 
XIIU 20.096 27.423 40.096 
XIIG 0.000 0.000 40.837 
XI2U 200.000 199.841 200.000 
XI2G 0.000 0.000 0.000 
XIM 40.000 39.841 40.000 
XID 20.000 19.841 20.000 
XTAC 0 .000 0.000 18.326 
XTRT 40 .000 25.664 0.000 
XINC 13.692 18.360 20.000 
XIND 2 .000 5.664 0.000 
XRAMC 40.000 40.796 21.674 
XRAMT 40.000 54.336 80.000 
XRADC 6.30 8 2.4 36 0.000 
XRADD 20.000 27.168 30 .000 
XSEC 28.081 31.370 31.829 
XCOMP 31.207 32.929 34.002 
XRESl 5.599 1.655 0.000 
XRES2 0.000 0.000 5.000 
XRES3 8.423 12 .975 15.000 
XRES4 16.846 19.180 10.837 
XRES5 3.154 1.218 0.000 
XSM 0.000 0.000 0.000 
XSD 10.000 0.000 0 .000 
as for the minimum sum criterion. 
Problem (42) is a series of linear programs which are solved 
sequentially. The first program (42) will minimize the weighted 
sum of deviations from minimum goals, y^. By minimum goals 
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we mean that we wish to minimize the extent to which goals 
are underfulfilled but do not care if they are overfulfilled. 
The first step is to solve, 
min c/Ep 
subject to ApX-yp+Sp ^ ^ p (42) 
AjX = 0 
ApX 1 n 
yp'Ep 1 0 
and note that the optimal vectors Ep^ and yp^ give the 
amounts by which the goals are underfulfilled and overful­
filled respectively. The next step is to solve program (43) 
which will find an efficient vector of final commodities 
subject to the constraint that the optimal weighted sum 
of deviations from minimum goals obtained from (42) be 
maintained. Set c^Ep^=g^. Then solve: 
max c^yp 
subject to (43) 
ApX-yp+Ep 1 9p 
AjX = 0 
ApX > n 
X/ y p /  E p  ^0, and cy > 0, 
and the efficient vector will be yp=5'p+y|-e*, where y* and e* 
are optimal vectors from (43) . The vector c^ must be strictly 
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g 
positive to insure that is efficient. The elements of 
Cy give the relative weights of additions to . Finally 
we can maximize certain sub goals while maintaining efficiency 
and maintaining minimum deviation from major goals. The 
final sub goal program may be approached in two different 
ways. If there is no reason to maintain the specific effi­
cient vector yp obtained from (43), then set Cy^=gy and solve 
the program: 
max c^x 
subject to c^yp < g^ (44) 
ApX-yp+Gp > :^p 
AjX = 0 
ApX > n 
x/yp/ Ep >0, 
which will result in an efficient vector of final output, but 
it will not necessarily be the same vector as yp obtained 
from (43) since the first constraint in (44) allows trade-offs 
at the relative rates designated by c^, and therefore any 
alternative optimal solution to (43) will also be feasible in 
(44) . 
If, on the other hand,it is desired that the specific 
efficient vector y^ obtained from (43) be maintained then the 
more restrictive program: 
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max c^x 
subject to c/Ep _< (45) 
ApX-Yp+Ep > 
A j X  0 
ApX > n 
X/ yp'Ep 1 0 
should be solved. It is more restrictive since any feasible 
solution for (45) is also feasible for (44), but the converse 
is not true in general. 
Programs (42) and (43) were computed using the values for 
given in Table 12; the solutions obtained are also shown. 
For this particular vector of minimum goals the solution 
obtained from (42) was not altered by program (43). The ele­
ments in the two vectors c^ and c^ were all set equal to unity 
for this computation, and since the only goal underful­
filled was research YSRY which deviated by 15.271, the value 
for CgGp^ = g^ = 15.271. The programs (44) and (45) were not 
computed for shown in Table 12; however, the full sequence 
of programs was computed for a different and the results 
are given in Table 13. 
Note that in this case programs (42) and (43) give dif­
ferent vectors and the vector obtained from (42) is clearly not 
efficient since the other vector is either as large or strictly 
larger in every component. In this case all of the minimum 
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goals are fulfilled and the optimal solution to (42) is 
c'e^=0. The elements of c and c were all unity as above, G c y 
and for the programs (44) and (45) the vector c^ was composed 
of zeroes except for elements corresponding to XLPU, X12G, 
and XTAC, each of which were set equal to unity. The optimal 
value for (42) was c^y^ = 1117.103. The meaning of the values 
in in terms of sub goals is that we would like to have as 
large as possible the number of large principles courses 
taught by undergraduate faculty, the number of junior, senior 
courses taught by graduate faculty, and the number of teaching 
assistants at the course stage. However, none of the higher 
level objectives are to be sacrificed to increase these sub-
goals . That is, changes will be allowed in the x vector 
only if the higher level goals, can still be met and only 
if the final output vector is an efficient one. And (45) 
requires that the final output vector be not only efficient 
but the same efficient vector obtained in (43). 
For these particular example computations both of the sub-
goal programs have the same solution. In both cases the 
vector of final commodities is the same as obtained from 
(43); however, the x vector differs from the solution to (43). 
The subgoal programs were successful in increasing two of 
the subgoal variables, XLPU and X12G, (large principles 
sections taught by undergraduate faculty and junior, senior 
level courses taught by graduate faculty). It was not 
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Table 13. Solutions to problems (42)-(45) 
Yp Solution Solution Solution Solution r to (42) to (43) to (44) to (45) 
YUI 46800 .000 46800.000 46800.000 46800.000 46800.000 
YMI 3600 .000 3600.000 4320 .000 4320.000 4320.000 
YDI 1800 .000 1800.000 2160.000 2160.000 2160.000 
YMT 40 .000 40.000 77.102 77.102 77.102 
YDD 30 .000 30 .000 30.000 30.000 30 .000 
YSRY 55 .000 55.000 55.001 55.001 55.001 
XSPI 5.833 0.000 0.000 0.000 
XLPU 0.000 0.000 2.304 2.304 
XLPG 0.000 2.304 0.000 0.000 
XIIU 40.096 40.096 2 37. 792 237.792 
XIIG 22 8.35 7 215.756 18.060 18.060 
XI2U 200.000 200.000 0.000 0.000 
XI2G 0.000 0.000 200.000 200.000 
XIM 40.000 48.000 48.000 48.000 
XID 20.000 24.000 24.000 24.000 
XTAC 0.000 0 .000 0.000 0 .000 
XTAT 0.000 4.60 8 4.60 8 4.608 
XING 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
XIND .972 0.000 0.000 0.000 
XRAMC 19 .999 0.000 0.000 0.000 
XRAMT 40.000 60 .000 60 .000 60.000 
XRADC 19.999 0.000 0.000 0.000 
XRADD 20.000 30.000 30.000 30.000 
XSEC 25.686 25.626 25.626 25.626 
XCOMP 22 .500 25.065 25.065 25.065 
XRESl 0 .000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
XRES2 0 .000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
XRES3 5.000 15.000 15.000 15.000 
XRES4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
XRES5 10.000 0.000 0 .000 0.000 
XSM 0 .000 17.102 17.101 17.101 
XSD 10.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
possible to increase the other sub goal, XTAC (teaching 
assistants at course stage). The increases in XLPU and 
X12G were compensated in the model by changes in XLPG, 
XIIU, XIIG, and XI2U. 
Once a solution to (43) (hasbeen obtained the higher level 
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policy-maker who set the goals may be interested in know­
ing the efficient output points "around" the efficient 
£ 
vector yp. By using the procedure outlined in the last 
part of Chapter IV it is possible to obtain all of the 
g 
efficient extreme points which are adjacent to yp. By 
joining these adjacent extreme points by line segments and 
noting that each point on the segment is an efficient 
point we can construct a whole set of efficient points 
"around" y^. 
The set of efficient points provides a set from which 
the decision-maker may choose that point which he most pre­
fers and thus effectively reveal his preferences. On the 
other hand, the line segments may be viewed as defining the 
trade-offs which must be made between final commodities 
when moving from one efficient point to another on the 
segment. 
If problem (38) is solved where c^ is set equal to the 
dual values from (4 3) corresponding to then the solution of 
final output yp will be the same as obtained in (43). Table 14 
gives the values for c^, the final output vector obtained 
from (38) and the dual prices for the primary commodities. 
Also given are the price ranges which have the same inter­
pretation as those in Table 11 along with the nonbasic vector 
which will enter the basis when a single price change reaches 
a limit of the price range. That is, if the value of YDI 
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were dropped to .092, holding all other prices constant, 
then the vector XINC would enter a new optimal basis. Note 
that any symbols corresponding to rows in the original 
model, such as US34, represent, in this context, slack 
vectors for the corresponding row. 
The procedure outlined at the end of Chapter IV could 
now be employed to compute all efficient extreme points 
adjacent to the final output vector given in Table 14. 
First, note that every vector corresponding to yp variables 
is in the optimal basis for the solution given in Table 14. 
Therefore, case 1 of the procedure in Chapter IV cannot be 
used. Case 2, however, can be used. In fact, the price 
ranges in Table 14 are computed by the formula given in 
case 2. 
For example, to find the increase in the price of YSRY 
which will be sufficient to bring in a new vector we compute 
(|)^ as in (46) : 
From the tableau given in Table 15 we see that only for 
for j = XRES2 we get a minimum. Thus by adding <J)^ = .267 
to 1 (the existing price of YSRY) we obtain the new price 
vector which will just be sufficient to bring a new vector 
into the optimal basis and that vector will be X]^ES2. 
c 
— = min 
•6k jEj 
.623 
-2.33 267 (46) 
j = XRAMC, XRESl, and XRES2 are the values of Xg^ < 0 and 
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Table 14. Efficient point 0 and corresponding prices 
Final Price Price Vector 
Output Vector Range Entering 
yp ^ Basis 
.003 US34 
YUI 46800 .000 1.000 00 -
.055 XTAC 
YMI 4320 .000 1.000 00 -
.092 XINC 
YDI 2160 .000 1.000 00 -
.789 XRES2 
YMT 77 .102 1.000 1.000 XIND 
2 .856 XIND 
YDD 30 .000 2.856 6.343 XSD 
1.000 XIND 
YSRY 55 .001 1.000 1.267 XRES2 
UF 3.211 
GF 3.211 
GSMC 35.893 
GSDC 35 .89 3 
GSMT 1.873 
GSDD 3.211 
US12 47.878 
US 34 47.857 
BUDG .000 
GSSO .000 
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Table 15. Optimal tableau values for yp and nonbasic 
vectors 
YUI YMI YDI YMT YDD YSRY 
UI 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 
MI .000 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 
DI .000 .000 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 
MT .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 1.000 
DD .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 2 .856 
SRY .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 1.000 
TA .000 .000 .000 1.873 .000 .000 1.873 
INST .000 .000 .000 3.211 .000 .000 3.211 
RAMC .000 .000 .000 -1.606 .000 1.833 .228 
RAMT .000 .000 .000 1.873 .000 0 1.873 
RADD .000 .000 .000 -1.478 1.000 1.833 3.211 
SEC .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
COMP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
UF .000 .000 .000 3.211 .000 .000 3.211 
GF .000 .000 .000 3.211 .000 .000 3.211 
GSMC .000 36 .000 .000 -.107 .000 .000 35.89 3 
GSDC .000 .000 36 .000 -.107 .000 .000 35.89 3 
GSMT .000 .000 .000 1.873 .000 ,000 1.873 
GSDD .000 .000 .000 -.478 1.000 1.833 3.211 
US12 48.000 .000 .000 -.122 .000 .000 47.878 
US 34 48.000 .000 .000 -.143 .000 .000 47.857 
XLPG .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
XIRG .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
XIAC .000 18 .000 .000 -.990 .000 .000 17.010 
XINC .000 .000 18 .000 -1.659 .000 .000 16.341 
XIND .000 .000 .000 -2.345 .500 0.917 =0 
XRAMC .000 18 .000 .000 .749 .000 -.917 17.833 
XRADC .000 .000 18 .000 -.054 .000 .000 17.947 
XRESl .000 .000 .000 3.211 .000 -1.000 2 .211 
XWSS2 .000 .000 .000 2.956 .000 -2.333 .623 
XRES4 .000 .000 .000 1.606 .000 .167 1.772 
XSD .000 .000 .000 -1.016 -.100 1.650 .349 
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Each of the price levels and vectors entering the basis 
shown in Table 15 may be obtained by analogous calculations. 
There are six different nonbasic vectors (US34, XTAC, 
XINC, XRES2, XIND, and XSD) which will enter the basis 
when elements of c^ are changed one at a time. Each of the 
resulting six different optimal sets of basis vectors will 
produce an efficient extreme yp adjacent to the y^ in Table 
14. These six different vectors were computed and are given 
in Table 16 along with the corresponding prices for final 
and primary commodities and price ranges for y^ commodities 
within which the basis will remain optimal. 
At this point six adjacent efficient extreme points 
have been obtained but there remain 20 other nonbasis 
vectors which might produce em efficient adjacent extreme 
point if interchanged with one of the basic vectors. To 
determine whether or not such interchanges would produce 
efficient points we must use the analysis of case 3 in 
Chapter IV. That is, we must solve the linear programming 
problem (47): 
min (B°"la%)' Cg-C^ 
subject to ^gO Cg-Cj >_ 0, all j including k 
iGy 1 1 
Cx = 0' Cg = 0. 
This will determine whether a c exists for each specific 
vector aj^. The jth column of the optimal tableau gives the 
Table 16. Efficient points adjacent to point 0 and corresponding prices 
I 5 T~ 
Final Price Price Final Price Price Final Price Price 
Output Vector Range Output Ve ctor Range Vector Vector Range 
.002 .00 3 .1)03" 
YUI 45077.263 .003 .003 46800. 1.000 00 46800.000 1.00000 00 
.055 .055 .055 
YMI 4320 .000 1.000 00 4320 .000 1.000 00 4320.000 1.00000 00 
.092 .069 .092 
YDI 2160.000 1.000 00 2104. 449 .092 .092 2160.000 1.00000 00 
.996 1.000 .000 
YMT 82.222 1.000 1.083 82 .222 1.000 1.001 69.834 1.00000 1.000 
2.838 2.856 2.367 
YDD 30 .000 2. 856 6.377 30.000 2.856 6.344 30.000 2.8562 3 10.750 
.990 1.000 1.267 
YSRY 55.001 1.000 1.263 55.001 1.000 1.267 60.737 1.26706 2.460 
UF 3.19 8 3.211 3.211 
GF 3.198 3.211 3.211 
G SMC 35.89 3 35.893 35. 893 
GSDC 35.89 3 3.211 35. 893 
GSMT 1.874 1.873 1.873 
GSDD 3.217 3.211 3.701 
US12 .020 47.878 47.878 
US 34 .000 47.878 47.878 
BUDG .000 .000 .000 
GSSO .000 .000 .000 
Table 16 (Continued) 
4 S 6 
Final Price Price Final Price Price Final Price Price 
Output Vector Range Output Vector Range Output Vector Range 
.003 .00 3 .00 3 
YUI 46800.000 1.000 00 46800.000 1.000 00 46800.000 1.000 00 
.041 .055 .055 
YMI 4226. 879 .055 .055 4320.000 1.000 00 4320 .000 1.000 00 
.092 .092 .092 
YDI 2160.000 1.000 00 2160.000 1.000 00 2160 .000 1.000 00 
1.000 1.000 1.000 
YMI 82.222 1.000 1.003 82 .477 1.000 3.187 83.478 1.000 3.80 8 
2.856 1.74 8 6.343 
YDD 30.000 2.856 6.344 28.854 2.856 2.856 30.62 8 6.34 3 8.367 
1.000 .735 .773 
YSRY 55.001 1.000 1.267 52. 899 1.000 1.000 44.693 1.000 1.000 
UF 3.211 3.211 3.211 
GF 3.211 3.211 3.211 
GSMC 1.872 35.89 3 35.89 3 
GSDC 35.89 3 35.89 3 35.89 3 
GSMT 1.873 1.873 1.873 
GSDD 3.212 3.211 6.698 
US12 47.878 47.878 47.878 
US 34 47.857 47.878 47.878 
BUDG .000 .000 .000 
GSSO .000 .000 .000 
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coefficients for ). Since only objective function 
J 
values of c^ are non-zero the only rows of the tableau 
which need be considered are those corresponding to y^ (i.e., 
those values given in the columns of Table 15). And those 
columns of the tableau (rows of Table 15) containing only 
non-negative values need not be included since their inner 
product with the strictly positive c^ will always be non-
negative. Thus the above linear program simplifies to: 
min tj^Cy 
subject to TCy 0 (48) 
ICy>_ 1, 
where the matrix T is given in Table 17. From T we note 
that 17 rows have dropped out because they contained only 
non-negative elements and six of the remaining 15 correspond 
to the nonbasic vectors which we already know will produce 
efficient adjacent extreme points when brought into the 
basis. Thus we are left with nine linear programs to solve. 
Each of the nine programs was computed and each had a 
strictly positive optimal objective function value. Thus a 
c^ vector does not exist for any of the nine and bringing 
any one of them into the basis would not produce an 
efficient yp. 
To see that the linear program will, in fact, give a 
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Table 17. Elements of matrix T for problem (4 8) 
YUI YMI YDI YMT YDD YSRY 
RAMC .000 .000 .000 —1.606 .000 1. 833 
RADD .000 .000 .000 -1.478 1.000 1.833 
GSMC .000 36 .000 .000 -.107 .000 .000 
GSDC .000 .000 36 .000 -.107 .000 .000 
GSDD .000 .000 .000 -1.478 1.000 1.833 
US12 48.000 .000 .000 -.122 .000 .000 
US 34 48.000 .000 .000 -.143 .000 .000 
XTAC .000 18 .000 .000 -.990 .000 .000 
XING .000 .000 18 .000 -1.659 .000 .000 
XIND .000 .000 .000 -2.345 .500 .917 
XRAMC .000 15 .000 .000 .749 .000 -.917 
XRADC .000 .000 18 ; 000 -.054 .000 .000 
XRESl .000 .000 .000 3.211 .000 -1.000 
XRES2 .000 .000 .000 2.956 .000 -2.333 
XSD .000 .000 .000 -1.016 -.100 1.650 
+ 18 
required c if it exists we solved program (48) by using tj 
as the row corresponding to XRES2. We have shown above by 
18 In obtaining the numerical solution the right hand side 
was replaced by a vector with .2 for each element except in 
the row corresponding to XRES2 where a -.1 value was used. 
These changes were made to insure that rounding errors would 
not be a problem. In specific cases these changes could pre­
vent the program from locating the required c+ vector even 
when it existed. 
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case 2 procedures that bringing XRES2 into the basis will 
produce an efficient adjacent yp. The values for the optimal 
Cy for program 48 are given in Table 18 along with the re­
sults of using that price vector in the original problem. 
Note that the efficient adjacent obtained is the same as 
that obtained previously by introducing XRES2 into the basis. 
If the basis matrix for the original efficient vector 
yp were unique then we could be assured that the six 
different adjacent efficient vectors which we have obtained 
include all adjacent efficient vectors. The basis matrix 
for the original yp is, however, not unique. 
First of all, two nonbasic vectors (XLPG and XI2G) have 
zero z.-c. values and when either of these is brought into ] ] 
the basis the yp vector remains unchanged. Furthermore XSPl 
and XRES5 are in the original basis at zero level so the 
solution is degenerate. Thus it would be possible to bring 
any vector into the basis, if in the column of the tableau 
corresponding to that vector, the elements in the rows 
for either XSPI or XRES5 were nonzero. From the optimal 
tableau it was found that this was true for the following 
nonbasic vectors: INST, RAMC, XINC, XIND, SRAMC, XRADC, 
and XRES4, Bringing in any one of these seven nonbasic 
vectors would produce an alternative basis matrix for 
the original yp vector. To insure that all efficient 
vectors adjacent to the original yp are included in the six 
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Table 18. Efficient point 6 and alternative prices 
obtained from problem (4 8) 
Final Price Price 
Output Vector Range 
.0 32 
yui 46800.000 1.000 00 
.591 
ymi 4320.000 1.000 00 
.990 
ydi 2160 .000 1.000 CO 
.000 
ymt 69.834 10.72 8 10.762 
25.407 
ydd 30.000 25.711 115.629 
13.593 
ysry 60.737 13.637 13.59 3 
UF 34.49 8 
GF 34.49 8 
GSMC 34.851 
GSDC 34.851 
GSMT 20.116 
GSDD 34. 802 
US12 46.686 
US 34 46.46 7 
BUDG .000 
GSSO .000 
that have been obtained it would be necessary to repeat 
for each of the alternative basis matrices the type of 
analysis done for the original basis. These computations 
were not performed because without additional computer 
routines they would be a much larger computational task 
than justified by the importance of this particular numerical 
example. 
As indicated in Chapter IV an initial atteirpt was made 
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to compute all efficient points (i.e., not only those adja­
cent to a particular point) for the model specified here. 
The efficient yp vectors which were calculated are listed 
in Appendix I. Note that many of these vectors would 
receive consideration only under a very unusual configura­
tion of relative prices or weights for the commodities in­
volved. The computational expense of obtaining such vectors 
is likely to be wasted. The method which was substituted 
will eliminate much of this unnecessary computational expense. 
Let us designate the final output vector of Table 14 
as point 0. Then the six adjacent points given in Table 16 
provide a policy-maker with information concerning the optimal 
trade-offs which can and must be made in order to increase 
any component of 0 by a small amount. For example, if a 
policy-maker were interested in considering relative changes 
in M.S. theses, Ph.D. dissertations, and standard research 
years while holding the levels of the other three final 
commodities fixed he could consider the adjacent extreme 
points 3, 5 and 6. These points have been plotted in Figure 
1. Every point along the lines connecting these adjacent 
efficient extreme points is also efficient. From the figure 
we see that for each M.S. thesis he is willing to give up 
he will be able to obtain 1.25 additional standard research 
years; however, if he were to obtain an additional M.S. 
thesis he would be forced to give up 1.60 standard research 
YSRY 
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years. 
If the policy-maker were interested in relative trade­
offs between undergraduate and M.S. instruction and M.S. 
theses he would consider points 0, 4, and 1. These points 
have been plotted in Figure 2. If the policy-maker were 
concerned with the trade-offs between graduate student 
i n s t r u c t i o n  a n d  M . S .  t h e s e s  h e  c o u l d  c o n s i d e r  p o i n t s  0 ,  2 ,  
and 4, which have been plotted in Figure 3. 
Other examples are, of course, possible but those given 
indicate the type of information concerning output possi­
bilities which the adjacent efficient extreme points provide 
the policy-maker. It would seem that such information would 
be quite an aid in rational decision-making. 
The fact that a system of dual prices is associated 
with each efficient output vector leads to the possibility 
of using this imputed price information to effect a de­
centralized decision process in the system. Such a proposal 
immediately runs into some difficulties resulting from the 
nonuniqueness of quantity and imputed price relationships 
in a linear model. 
First,consider the possibility of using the vector 
of dual prices solely for effecting decisions within the 
department, completely disregarding any relationship between 
this vector of inputed prices and amy vector of prices 
for similar commodities existing in the larger economic 
system. For this purpose the dual variables will provide 
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a vector of imputed prices which when used to compare the 
value of inputs with the value of outputs of any particular 
activity will, in a completely decentralized manner, dis­
criminate between unprofitable activities and activities 
which just break even. In general, however, for those 
activities which do just break even, these prices alone, 
without coordination concerning quantities, will not be 
sufficient to insure that optimal quantities will be chosen. 
Alternatively, it is of interest to consider comparing 
the relative iirputed prices of the primary commodities 
with their relative prices in the larger economic system. 
Then primary commodities for which the relative value is 
higher in the department than the larger economic system 
would be the primary commodities to be increased in later 
periods. Such a link is not, however, as straightforward as 
one would hope. The policy-maker chooses a particular 
efficient output vector and we can find a price vector, c^, 
for final outputs which, when substituted in the original 
problem will give that efficient output vector as an optimal 
solution. In fact there is likely to be a whole set of 
values for c^ which will give that particular vector of final 
outputs. The imputed prices for primary commodities will 
depend upon which value for Cy is used. The arbitrariness 
of the choice must be removed if the imputed prices for 
primary commodities is to serve as a useful link to the 
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larger economic system. 
One possibility for removing the arbitrariness is to 
rely upon the policy-maker to choose that Cy which best 
represents the relative weights which he places upon the 
outputs. Another possibility is to choose that Cy which 
most nearly meets the estimated value of outputs in the 
larger economic system. In either case the choice of Cy 
is not free since it must be a Cy vector consistent with 
the desired efficient vector of final output. Assuming that 
Cy could be chosen in an acceptable way, then the dual 
variables for primary commodities could be used as a link 
to the larger economic system. 
Beyond the difficulties arising from nonuniqueness, 
decisions concerning changes in the primary commodities 
over time involve important dynamic considerations, which 
can only be adequately dealt with by expanding the model 
to include sequential time periods, identifying flows 
through the system over time emd explicitly including in­
vestment activities for primary commodities using actual 
or opportunity market values. Such an expansion of the 
model has not been attempted for this study. 
It is of interest to compare the importance of prices 
in the different models considered. In problem (39) prices 
play a very central role since the relative prices are taken 
as given either from the policy-maker or the larger economic 
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system and then the model is used to choose a feasible 
output vector which is optimal given the prices. This is 
opposed to the type of model just discussed in which an 
efficient vector of outputs is chosen from competing vectors 
of outputs, then a price vector is chosen which is con­
sistent with the efficient vector chosen. If the relative 
prices for final outputs for problem (39) can be reliably 
estimated then the optimal dual variables for inputs provide 
an important link to the larger economic system. The goal 
programming models can be viewed as a case where the im­
portance of the price vector lies in between the two 
extreme cases above. On the one hand the vector of outputs 
is chosen so as to closely approximate a particular vector 
of desired outputs, but the goal programming approach does 
require that policy-makers specify different vectors such 
as Cg, Cy, and c^ each of which indicates the relative im­
portance of different outputs and can be considered to be 
relative price vectors. However, these relative prices are 
only marginally important since c^ and c^ apply only to 
commodity additions or subtractions around the particular 
desired level of outputs, The vector, c^, is also only 
marginally important since it applies only to changes in 
activity levels which do not violate higher level objectives. 
Thus the ability of the policy-maker to specify his 
preferences in the form of output goals, y^, as well as 
his ability to specify his preferences in the form of 
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relative prices is important for the success of the goal 
programming approach. 
The possibility of using the goal programming approach 
to implement a decentralized hierarchical decision process 
is quite evident. The high level policy-maker can set his 
goals with top priority in terms of a few highly aggre­
gated outputs and leave to lower level policy-mcikers the 
decisions concerning which specific activities can best be 
used to meet the aggregated outputs (i.e., to leave for 
lower level policy-makers the responsibility to set and opti­
mize subgoals). It is hoped that the computational examples 
given in this chapter help elucidate how such a decentralized 
process could be carried out with the aid of similar models. 
The model outlined here was intended only as an 
example and a number of important criticisms can be directed 
toward it in its present form. Some of the deficiencies 
can be relatively easily accommodated; others pose more 
fundamental problems. There is little doubt that an appli­
cable model would need to be greatly disaggregated by 
activity and by commodity. Such an expansion of the problem 
poses very little difficulty even with respect to computation 
expense. 
The applicability of the model would be greatly en­
hanced if it were expanded to cover several time periods with 
explicit allowance for changes in the stocks of students. 
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faculty, and physical space and with the flows of students 
through the system specifically included. The necessary 
relations linking the periods should be relatively easy to 
specify and an expanded model with the main matrix assuming 
the familiar block triangular structure should be sufficient 
to accomplish such a generalization without basic diffi­
culties. 
The specified model is completely deterministic and the 
real world is, of course, filled with many elements of 
uncertainty. If the important elements of uncertainty 
proved to be in the vector of primary commodities (e.g., 
the number of students available is known only as a random 
variable) then the use of chance constrained progreunming 
could be applied. More complicated types of uncertainty 
might not be accommodated in such a straightforward manner. 
However, Chames, Glower, and Kortanek (1967, p. 316) have 
shown that "the preemptive goal method is a robust one; small 
errors in assignment of preemptive goals result in small 
errors in total profit." The stochastic approach to goal 
programming outlined by Contini (1968) provides a possible 
way of treating uncertainty, but the problem immediately 
becomes nonlinear and increases in the size of a nonlinear 
model are likely to quickly become important in terms of 
computational expense. 
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The fact that the model is linear can also be criti­
cized. As noted above input substitution can adequately be 
approximated by a linear model but the assumption of constant 
returns to scale is implicitly accepted in the use of a 
linear model. To the extent that increasing or decreasing 
returns to scale are important, the present model is in­
adequate. Adequate nonlinear models could of course be 
specified but would fundamentally change the models we have 
discussed in both theoretical and computational aspects. 
Finally, the assumption of complete divisibility of 
commodities implicit in the model used may prove too much of 
a simplification especially in assigning faculty and students 
to specific class sections. By using units of man years, 
which are divisible, we have evaded this difficulty. While 
such an approach is adequate if the model is sufficiently 
aggregated it is likely to be increasingly inadequate as 
the model is disaggregated. 
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CHAPTER VI. THE RELATION BETWEEN A NONCOMPETITIVE 
PRICE SETTING RULE AND EFFICIENT PRODUCTION 
In this chapter we will discuss the relation between a 
specific noncompetitive price setting rule and efficient 
production in a linear activity analysis model. The possi­
bility of decentralizing decisions and information under 
the noncompetitive rule will be discussed, as well as the 
implications of the results with respect to the general 
theory of the second best. Finally a numerical exemple 
and relevant calculations will be presented. 
There are, of course, many types of noncompetitive 
behavior, each a result of special characteristics in the 
economic system. Noncompetitive behavior may result, for 
example, if information is not complete, if increasing 
returns are present, or if a certain degree of monopolistic 
power exists. The analysis of systems having such character­
istics can be approached in many different ways, but in 
general will require stochastic or nonlinear models and may 
require quite different techniques such as game theory. It 
should be made clear that no attempt is being made here to 
analyze noncompetitive behavior in general. Rather we are 
concerned with a very special case of noncompetitive price 
setting which can be analyzed within the framework of a 
linear activity analysis model. 
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The specific assumption which is made is that certain 
economic agents set minimum price levels for certain pri­
mary commodities. Unlike the competitive case for the linear 
modely these minimum prices will not be zero when there is 
a surplus of the primary commodity involved. The set of 
minimum prices are assumed to be given external to the model 
rather than being considered variables determined simul­
taneously with other variables in the model. The mechanism 
by which they are determined is only assumed to exist, and 
the exact conditions under which such minimum price levels 
can be maintained are not spelled out beyond assuming a 
sufficient degree of monopoly control or eUoility to form 
coalitions. 
We will now proceed to show that for a model somewhat 
less general than (30) that an alternative price vector 
exists which satisfies conditions l-4a given by (31) but 
not 4b (i.e., some primary resources may have positive prices 
even when not used to the limit of availability). This al­
ternative price vector will be referred to as a non­
competitive price vector, p*, while the p satisfying condi­
tion (31) will be called the competitive price vector. Our 
major interest is showing the relationship between such 
noncompetitive price vectors and efficient commodity vectors, 
similar to (31) for competitive prices. Linear programming 
problems (32) and (33) will be used in the analysis. 
The results of Nikaidô (1964) are very closely related 
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to the relationships shown below. In fact, Nikaidô (1964, 
p. 29 8) states that the purpose of his article is "to 
try a challenge to the monopolistic prevalence of this linking 
of linear programming to competition." 
We are interested in a model in which the prices of 
primary commodities have rigid minimums, some or all of 
which are strictly positive. The vector, X^O, will be used 
to symbolize the lowest limit which primary commodity prices 
are allowed to assume. This new condition is explicitly in­
cluded in the former mo^el by adding constraint rows to the 
linear programming problem (33) to obtain a new linear 
programming problem which is given as (50) below. The dual 
to (50) which is given as (49) corresponds to linear 
programming problem (32) for the competitive case: 
min -e'yp-A's 
subject to ApX-yp 0 (49) 
0 
0 
Yp-s A ^ 
yp-Yp = 
X' Yp, s ^ 0 
194 
max n'Wp+fptp 
subject to A^Up+AjUj+A^Up i 0 (50) 
-Up +tp = 0 
-Up+Wp = 0 
-tp 6 -ep 
-Wp 4 
Wp è: 0* 
Using (49) and (50) and a somewhat limiting assumption 
that Ap be square and nonsingular we will give in (52) a re­
sult for noncompetitive prices, p*, corresponding to result 
(31) for competitive prices. 
First we will give a preliminary result, (51), relating 
efficiency to an optimal solution of problem (49). 
If problem (49) is such that e'>-X*ApAy , X^O, where 
e is a vector of ones, then is efficient if and only 
if (49) has an optimal solution such that yp=0. (51) 
To show that efficiency implies an optimal solution 
such that yp=0, note that by the definition of efficiency there 
must exist a feasible solution to (49) but also by the defi­
nition of efficiency of ^p, it is possible to find a 
feasible y^iO and yp^ such that yp=yp+$p only if yp=0. 
Furthermore, the vector, s, also has a definite upper limit; 
therefore, (49) is bounded and an optimal solution must exist. 
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To show that an optimal solution such that yp=0, implies 
efficiency, an equivalent statement will be employed, i.e., 
not efficient iirplies (49) does not have an optimal solu­
tion such that yp=0. There are two cases. Case 1. If is 
not attainable then there does not exist a Yp^O which is 
feasible for (49), and therefore (49) does not have an optimal 
solution. Case 2. If #p is attainable but-^ere exists a 
19 feasible yp such that Yp^p then any optimal solution to 
(49) must have Yp^O. We will show that any solution with 
yp=0 will be strictly larger than some solution with Yp^O and 
therefore cannot be optimal. It is at this point that the 
20 property of a square nonsingular Ap is employed. 
Suppose that x* and & are both attainable, (i.e., feasi­
ble for problem (49)) where ApX* = Yp ^  9p 
and Ap& = pp 
since Yp = Yp-?p, y| = Ap(x*-&) >_ 0. 
We assume -e'X'ApAp <0 and it follows that, 
-1 — (-e'-X'ApA )y* < 0, since the first vector is 
strictly negative and the second 
non-negative with at least one 
element positive, 
thus 
19 Only in Chapter VI is the convention employed which dis­
tinguishes between the_inequality signs <_ and For example, 
YpiP implies yp<0 and YpT^O. 
20 
It seems quite possible that the requirement of a square 
nonsingular Ap matrix could be relaxed by employing the con­
cept of a generalized inverse (Ijiri, 1965, p. 3C) . 
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-e 'y*-X 'ApAp"^Ap (x*-&) <0 
or, 
-e'y*-X'Ap(x*-&)<0. 
But this last expression is exactly the change in the value 
of the objective function of problem (49) when the solution 
corresponds to x* rather than A since, 
z*-è =  ( - e ' s * )  -  ( - ^  0 - x ' â ) = - e ' y ^ - X  '  ( - n  ( + y ^ + n - ^ p )  
= -e'y^-A'Ap (x*-it) <0 
or 
z* <2. 
We have shown that if there exists a y^^O which is feasible 
for problem (49) it must be in the optimal solution. 
Next, the relation between the noncompetitive price 
vector, p* and an efficient vector is given in (52); 
For a model with Ap square and non-singular, an 
attainable ^p is efficient if and only if there exists a 
price vector p* such that: (52) 
1. p*'y = 0 
2. %f'A ^0 
3. P|; ^  e'>-X'ApAp"^ , X^ O 
4a. p*^ i X^, all i 
4b. p*^ = X^, if fpi>ni . 
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Part I will show that p* satisfying 1-4 for an attain­
able irtplies that ^p is efficient. The attainability of ^ p 
implies that (49) has a feasible solution, and p* satisfying 
conditions 2-4 implies that (50) has a feasible solution 
with 
P| = tp = Up 
p* = U; 
Pp = Wp = Up" 
Since problem (49) and its dual problem" (50) both have feasible 
21 
solutions, they must both have optimal solutions, the 
values of which must be equal. Thus there exist optimal 
solutions such that -e'yp^-X's^=n'Wp^+^^tp^ and for all 
feasible nonoptimal solutions we have -e'yp-X's>n'Wp+^p'tp. 
Condition 1, p*'#=0, has not yet been used. In terms of 
the variables of problem (49) and (50) this condition im­
plies that 
or that 0=tp'$p+w^yp, and there exists a feasible s=#p-n 
such that t^9p+w^?p = t^:^p+w^ (n+s) or -w^s = t^fp+w^n 
and by condition 4.b, -X's = -w^s so -X's=tp#p+w^n, where 
s,tp,Wp are feasible for problems (49) and (50). But from above 
we have -e'yp-X's>tp#p+w^n for all feasible yp, s, tp, and Wp, 
21 See Goldman and Tucker (1956, theorem 2, page 61). 
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and if equality holds, these solutions are optimal. There­
fore, the s, tp, and Wp satisfying -X •s=t^;^p+w^n must be 
optimal solutions such that yp=0. We have shown that the 
existence of a vector, p*, satisfying conditions 1-4 implies 
that the optimal solution of problem (49) must have yp=0. 
And from (51) it follows that is efficient. 
Part II of the proof is that an efficient inplies 
the existence of a p* satisfying conditions l-:4. From (51) the 
efficiency of implies (49) has an optimal solution such 
that yp=0. For the optimal solution we have: 
-e'yp°-X's° = -X's° = ^ptp^+n'Wp^. 
The first equality results from the fact that for ^p efficient 
yp must equal zero. The second equality results from the 
equality of optimal dual objective functions. For the optimal 
solutions we also have: 
-X's° = -Wp° s° = Wp° (n-yp°). 
The first equality results from the fact that at the optimal 
Wp^>Xp s® = 0 and the second since -s^>n-yp^ ->• Wp^=0. 
Thus we have: 
Wp° (n-yp°) = ^j^tp"+n'Wp" 
or 
tp°'v^p°'yp° = 0. 
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If we let Up° = tp° = lOp® = Wp° = p*, yp° = and 
= p*, and note that = 0, then condition 1, (i.e., 
p*'y=0) follows from the above equation. Conditions 2 ,  3 
and 4.a follow directly from the constraints of problem (50) 
and condition 4.b follows from the properties of an optimal 
22 
solution to a linear programming problem. This completes 
the proof of Part II and of (52). 
Since the assumption that was square and non-
singular was used in the proof of (52) but is not necessary 
for (31), the latter applies to a more general model than the 
former. The assumption of a square Ap is limiting in that 
it implies that the model applies only to an economic system 
in which the number of production activities and the number 
of final commodities are equal. In many actual economic 
systems the number of possible production activities will 
greatly exceed the number of final commodities produced. 
The importance of the square and nonsingular assumption 
may be given a more interesting interpretation in economic 
terms by noting its implications with respect to the aggre­
gation of activities into final commodities and the dis­
aggregation of a vector of final commodities into production 
activities. The matrix, Ap, can always (i.e., even when 
Ap is not square) be viewed as providing the weighting 
22 See Goldman and Tucker (1956; corollary 2b, p. 62). 
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coefficients for the aggregation of activities into a unique 
vector of final commodities. However, only when Ap is square 
and nonsingular so that Ap ^ exists can we, in general, dis­
aggregate a vector of final commodities into a unique bundle 
of basic activities, x (i.e., x=Ap ^ Yp)• In the more general 
case it may be possible to disaggregate a given vector of final 
commodities into a number of basic activity bundles and con­
versely a number of combinations of basic activities may be 
aggregated into the same vector of final commodities. 
Since the problems of determining efficient vectors and 
corresponding price vectors may be characterized as linear 
programming problems, standard computational routines may be 
employed. However, for large economic systems the problem of 
obtaining all the necessary information (i.e., the values for 
the technology matrix. A, and the levels of primary resource 
availability n) at one central location may be very costly or 
even impossible. Even if all the necessary information can be 
obtained it may exceed the size of available computational 
equipment. The decomposition processes such as those discussed 
in Chapter II would seem to provide the most promising possi­
bilities for surmounting these difficulties in situations 
where actual numerical solutions are desired. 
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Decentralization Under a Noncompetitive 
Pricing Rule 
Certain more theoretical questions concerning the possi­
bility of decentralizing economic decisions may be posed within 
the context of a linear activity analysis model such as 
that outlined here. It is upon certain of these questions that 
we will focus at this point. Specifically we will examine the 
possibility of developing certain decentralized pricing rules 
which will sustain an efficient point once it has been attained. 
The important questions concerning decentralized dynamic price-
quantity adjustment processes and the conditions under which 
they are stable or converge to an efficient point when starting 
from a point which is not efficient will not be discussed, even 
though these questions have received much attention in the 
literature. Important examples are Arrow eind Hurwicz (1960) 
and the survey article by Negishi (1962). 
The linear activity emalysis model can be viewed as 
decentralized with respect to technological information and 
decision-making. Assume that each column of the A matrix 
is known to only one decision-maker who is also informed of 
prices relative to his activity but has no information about 
other activities. Assuming such a decentralized economic 
organization, Koopmans (1951a, p. 93) has shown that the 
following proposal will maintain an efficient point once it 
has been obtained: 
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Let the players in our allocation game be called 
helmsman (or central planning board), a custodian for 
each commodity, and a manager for each activity. 
Consider the following rules of behavior: 
I. For the helmsman: Choose a vector of posi­
tive prices on all final commodities, and inform the 
custodian of each such commodity of its price. 
II. For all custodians: Buy and sell your commodity 
from and to managers at one price only, which you 
announce to all managers. Buy all that is offered at 
that price. Sell all that is demanded up to the 
limit of availability. 
III. For all custodians of final commodities: Announce 
to managers the price set on your commodity by the 
helmsman. 
IV. For all custodians of intermediate commodities: 
Announce a tentative price on your commodity. If 
demeind by managers falls short of supply by managers, 
lower your price. If dememd exceeds supply, raise it. 
V. For all custodians of primary commodi tie s: Regard 
the available inflow from nature as a part of the 
supply of your commodity. Then follow the rule on 
custodians of intermediate commodities, with the follow­
ing exception: Do not announce a price lower than 
zero but accept a demand below supply at a zero price 
if necessary. 
VI. For all managers: Do not engage in activities 
that have negative profitability. Maintain activities 
of zero profitability at a constant level. Expand 
activities of positive profitability by increasing 
orders for the necessary inputs with, and offers of the 
outputs in question to, the custodians of these 
commodities. 
This set of pricing rules can be considered a restatement 
of (31). If these rules are followed then an attainable bundle 
and a price, p, satisfying conditions 1-4 of (31) will be main­
tained, which is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
efficiency. Koopmans (1951a, p. 95) has discussed the rela­
tion of these rules to the competitive bidding process of 
2 3 
Pfin corresponds to Pp in our notation. 
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competitive markets. For example note the following quote: 
The reader will have noticed that the behavior 
prescribed from individuals by the rules I-VI is simi­
lar to that which results from the operation of com­
petitive markets. The rules on the custodians are only 
personalizations of the properties of competitive 
markets. The vector p.., which ultimately gives 
direction to the allocation of resources in production, 
instead of being set by a helmsman, could equally 
well be the result of competitive bidding by many con­
sumers, each of which maximizes his individual utility. 
The behavior attributed to each manager could also 
come about as the result of each activity being carried 
out independently by many entrepreneurs bidding compe­
titively for the input commodities of that activity and 
selling its output commodities competitively. 
The fact that such a process will maintain an efficient output 
vector is proposed as support of the long-standing belief 
that a competitively organized economic system will produce 
efficiently. Such a process assumes that decision-makers 
are price-takers rather than price-setters; an assumption 
which is insured if no coalitions are formed and if the 
number making decisions with respect to any given activity or 
commodity is large. 
Below we will indicate certain revisions of rules I-VI 
such that an efficient vector of final commodities will be 
maintained even though noncompetitive elements are present 
in the system. The term noncompetitive is used here in the 
limited special sense that certain primary commodities are 
assumed to be controlled by an individual or a coalition of 
individuals who may thus act as price-setters rather than 
price-takers. It will be assumed that a minimum positive 
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price is set for primary commodities and any amount up to 
the limit of availability will be sold at this price. If 
the amount demanded at this minimum price exceeds the amount 
available, then a competitive type rule of increasing the 
price until the amount demanded equals the maximum amount 
available will be followed. We will replace rule V for 
custodians of primary commodities by the above noncompetitive, 
minimum price-setting type behavior, letting the minimum 
price be designated by the vector X' and chosen such that 
e'>-X'ApAp ^. We will add to rules I and III the constraint 
that the price of final commodities should never be less than 
unity (i.e., Pp^e).^^ Then by noting the relation of (52) 
and this revised set of pricing rules, it is evident that 
the revised set will maintain an efficient final output 
vector. If we let X=0, the revised rules are identical to 
Koopmans'. 
The possibility of defining prices such that primary 
commodities not used to the level of their availability may 
continue to have a positive price would seem to be a step 
in the direction of reality. As simple examples, observe 
that theaters charge for tickets even though the theater 
24 Actually the unity vector, e, is used here merely be­
cause it was convenient in the proof of (51). All that is re­
quired is that pp>-X'ApAj,-^. No generality is lost since for 
any price, p*, satisfying the conditions of(52),a new price, 
p**=Yp*, where y is a positive scalar, will satisfy the same 
conditions with y replaced by yX. 
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remains unfilled, and that laborers command positive wages 
even when a large amount of unemployment exists. Finally, 
to quote Nikaidd (1964, p. 299), "The above confietitive 
situation is certainly unrealistic, because zero prices are 
imputed to factors not fully employed there, while in reality 
such factors seldom become free goods." 
The setting of the level of the minimum price, X, could 
correspond to a number of real world situations. The mono­
polist with exclusive control over a primary commodity is an 
obvious example. Probably of more importance are the numerous 
economic and political coalitions which are formed and which 
result in the setting of minimum prices, implicit or explicit. 
Labor union contracts, minimum wage and fair pricing laws, 
agricultural support prices, and understandings between 
businessmen about not "ruining the market" are but a few 
important examples. The study of how such coalitions form 
and the method by which final agreement is reached is quite 
interesting in itself; however, it would require a somewhat 
different analytical approach (e.g., game theory) and will 
not be discussed or reviewed here. We will be content to 
assume that agreement on a X can be reached. 
It is quite important, however, to note that the level 
at which X is set is also limited by the formal conditions 
necessary for maintaining an efficient final commodity vector. 
The condition that prices of final commodities must be 
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strictly greater than -X'ApAj, ^  must be fulfilled to maintain 
efficiency. The economic meaning of this condition becomes 
clear once the dimensions of the expression -X'ApAj, ^  have 
been ascertained. First, take X'Ap which is a Ixn vector 
and the dimensions of element j will be dollars/jth activity, 
since X has dimensions of dollars/ith input and the jth 
column of Ap has elements with dimensions of ith input/jth 
activity. Since x=Ap ^y^, it is clear that the kth column 
of Ap ^ has elements with dimensions of jth activity/kth 
final commodity. So finally, the dimensions of the Ixn 
vector -X'ApAp"^ will be dollars/kth final commodity, and 
the vector values will simply be the value of primary com­
modities (priced at the minimum level X) per unit of kth final 
commodity. Thus the condition Pp+X'ApA^ >0 merely states 
that the price of final commodities must be strictly greater 
than the minimum value of primary commodities necessary to 
produce that final commodity. If for the kth element this 
condition does not hold and the kth element is negative, then 
production of the kth commodity will involve a loss, even 
when all primary commodities are priced at their minimum 
level, and it is clear that an efficient vector of final 
commodities would not be maintained. A related discussion 
concerning the numerical example is given below. 
Once X has been set "low enough" so that the condition, 
Pp+X'ApAp ^>0, is satisfied, the decentralized decision-
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making with decentralized information can be carried out. 
However, the level that is "low enough" for each element of 
X is not independent of the values set for the other elements 
of X . In fact, it is apparent that complete centralization 
of information (i.e., knowledge of Ap and Ap as well as X and 
Pp) would be necessary to determine values of X so that the 
condition would be satisfied. We conclude that a decision­
making process which will sustain an efficient point when 
noncompetitive price-setters are present cannot be decentral­
ized to the same degree possible for the competitive counter­
part. 
Implications for the Theory of 
Second Best 
The result of (52) and the revised noncompetitive pricing 
rules would appear to have implications for the "General 
Theory of Second Best" as outlined by Lipsey and Lancaster 
(1957, p. 12). 
The general theorem for the second best optimum states 
that if there is introduced into a general equilibrium 
system a constraint which prevents the attainment of 
one of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretian 
conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, 
no longer desirable. In other words, given that one 
of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, 
then an optimum situation can be achieved only by 
departing from all other Paretian conditions. 
Koopmans (1957, p. 95) has clearly outlined the possibility of 
considering the linear activity analysis model as describing 
production in a general equilibrium model. Assuming convex 
208 
preference orderings and nonsaturation of at least one 
consumer for each final commodity, all Pareto optimal points 
would be efficient points. Thus for this simplified model 
the "Paretian conditions" can be considered to be the price 
conditions in (31) and rules I-VI. The relation of these 
competitive pricing rules and the "Lemer-Lange" type rules 
has been thoroughly discussed by Koopmans (1951a, p. 95; 
1951b). Lipsey and Lancaster (1957, p. 17) clearly indicate 
the intended application of their theorem to such situa­
tions in the following quote: "A nationalized industry con­
ducting its price-output policy according to the Lemer-Lange 
'Rule' in an imperfectly competitive economy may well diminish 
both the general productive efficiency of the economy and 
the welfare of its members." 
For the simple linear activity analysis model, which 
admittedly leaves much to be desired in terms of representing 
a realistic general equilibrium system, the general theorem 
for the second best apparently does hold. In (52) the condi­
tion 4b for clearly "prevents the attainment of one of 
the Paretian conditions" (i.e., condition 4b of (31)); never­
theless, the other conditions (i.e., 1-3) remain necessary for 
a Paretian optimal which in this case reduces to being an 
efficient point. We have indicated how the strictly positive 
values can be attributed to monopolistic power or imperfect­
ly competitive situations. The fact that the theorem does not 
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hold for this model is apparent in that the pricing rules 
I-VI, when revised for the presence of monopolistic power, 
retained all the rules for the competitive case, except for 
rule V involving custodians who set minimum price levels. 
Not only are the other rules still "desirable" they are 
necessary for an efficient output vector and if 
p*+X'ApAp ^>0 is also fulfilled they are sufficient condi­
tions . 
Numerical Examples 
In order to illustrate the relationship between efficient 
points and the alternative pricing systems, a number of com­
putations have been made using two very simple linear 
25 
activity analysis models. Written in a format corresponding 
to (30) the fifst model is as follows: 
1 0 0 0 = 
^F1 0 
0 1 0 0 = 
^P2 0 
-1 -1 1 0 H ^11 
= 0 
0 0 -1 1 
^2 ^12 0 
-3 -2 0 0 
^3 
= 
Ypi -12 
-5 0 0 0 
^4 ^P2 2. -10 
-1 -2 0 0 /pa -9 
x, / y 
• 
(5 3) 
25 
The first model used was taken from Chames and Cooper 
(1961, p. 292) in order to help facilitate comparisons. It 
is somewhat unfortunate that the intermediate commodities 
do not play a significant role in the model. 
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The linear programming problem (54) which corresponds to 
(50) was used to perform the actual computations ; 
1 0 
0 1 
0 0 
0 0 
-1 0 
-1 0 
1 -1 
0 1 
-3 -5 -1 
-2 0 -2 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 
0 
0 Kl\ ° 
Uf2^ 0 
^11 ° 
-1 0 
0 -1 
0 0 0 
1 0 U;2 = 0 
0 1 Up, 0 
0 0 
- 1 0  0  
0 - 1 0  
0  0 - 1  
10 0 
0 10 
0 0 1 
Up2 ^  0 
0 Up3 0 
Wpl 0 
0 0 0 0 
-1 0 Wpp -1 
» -1 "P3 
0 0 0 
- 1 0  0  
0 - 1 0  
0  0 - 1  
tpl 
® _^2_ ^2 J :^3i 
Wp à 0 
where 
. 2 1.50 > w
 
•
 
II 
3.75 
II 
4.5 
' yp = ^ ' \ ,  9/= 
4.25 ^ 4.75 
and 
= f X = 
.131 
. 0 0  
.00 
, x-" = 
.13 
.02 
.02 
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Note that when X=0 the problem corresponds to (33). The first 
model, corresponding to (53) and (54) , involves no joint 
production but the matrix, Ap, is altered in the second 
model, (55), so that the first two activities jointly 
produce both final commodities: 
Problem (55) is identical to problem (54) except for the 
upper left submatrix which is as follows: 
1 
.3 
0 
0 
. 8  
1 
0 
0 
(55) 
where 
= 
2.9 
II 
2.625 
II 
o
 
" .o' 
4.6 4.950 
» 
4.5 
and 
o" \ l 3  
= 0  >'
 w
 
II . 0 2  
o
 
. 0 2  
The efficient final outputs for the first model consist of the 
1 2  3  
points $p , #p , ?p ; those points on the straight line joining 
12 2 }?p to j^p ; as well as the points on the line joining Jp to 
#p^. These efficient final outputs are plotted in Figure 4. 
The efficient final outputs for the joint production model are 
plotted in Figure 5 and consist of ^ p^, ?p^ and the points on 
the straight line joining these points. The results of the 
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Table 19. Solutions to problem (54) 
Primary Final 
Commodities Commodities 
r 1 2 3 1 2 
ÎF" .00 .00 .00 
P .50 .00 .00 1.50 1.00 
y -12.00 -10.00 -8.00 2 .00 3.00 
n-Yp .00 .00 -1.00 
îp' .13 .02 .02 
p* .48 .02 .02 1.56 1.00 
y -12.00 
o
 
o
 
0
 
r
H 1 
-8.00 2 .00 3.00 
n-Yp .00 .00 1.00 
?F' .00 .00 .00 
p .50 .00 .00 1.50 1.00 
y -12.00 -7.50 -9.00 1.50 3.75 
n-Yp .00 -2.50 .00 
9/ x3 .13 .02 .02 
p* .13 .02 .51 1.00 1.28 
y -12.00 -7.50 -9.00 1.50 3.75 
n-Yp .00 -2.50 .00 
îp' x^ .00 .00 .00 
p .00 .00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
y -9.00 .00 -9.00 .00 4.50 
n-Yp -3.00 -10.00 .00 
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Table 19 (Continued) 
Primary Final 
Commodities Commodities 
1 2 3 1 2 
9/ X2 .13 .00 .00 
P* .13 .00 .61 1.00 1.48 
y -9 .00 .00 -9.00 .00 4.50 
-yp -3.00 -10.00 .00 
.13 .02 .02 
p *  .13 .02 .51 1.00 1.28 
y -9 .00 .00 -9.00 .00 4.50 
n-Yp -3.00 
o
 
o
 
0
 
1—
j 1 .00 
îp' .00 .00 .00 
p  
.00 .00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
y • -10.00 -2.50 -9.00 .50 4.25 
n-Yp —2 .00 -7.50 .00 
îp' x2 . 1 3  .00 .00 
p *  . 1 3  .00 .61 1.00 1.48 
y • o
 
o
 
0
 
H
 
1 
-2.50 -9.00 .50 4.25 
n-Yp -2.00 -7.50 .00 
.13 .02 .02 
p *  
. 1 3  .02 .51 1.00 1.28 
y o
 
o
 
0
 
r
H 1 
o
 
m
 
CM 1 1 vo
 
o
 
o
 
.50 4.25 
n-Yp 1 to
 
o
 
o
 
-7.50 .00 
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Figure 4. Efficient points for problem (54) 
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i s o - r e v e n u e  f o r  
P f l  =  1 . 0  
^ F 2  P f 2  =  1 . 0  
i s o - r e v e n u e  f o r  
P f l  =  . 6 4 4 7 4  
P f 2  =  . 8 0 6 5 8  
J I L ^Fl 
0  1 2  3  
Figure 5. Efficient points for problem (55) 
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Table 20. Solutions to problem (55) 
h 
Primary 
Commodities 
Final 
Commodities 
1 2 3 1 2 
.000 .000 .000 
P .691 .000 .000 1.273 1.000 
y -12.000 -10.000 •8.000 2.900 4 .600 
n-Yp 0 0 -1 
)p' .130 .020 .020 
p* .6 87 .020 .020 1.382 1.000 
y -12.000 -10.000 •8.000 2.900 4.600 
n-Yp .000 .000 i.oop 
.000 .000 .000 
p .691 .000 .000 1.273 1.000 
Y -12 .000 -7.500 •9.000 2.625 4 .950 
n-Yp .000 -2.500 .000 
yp" .130 .020 .020 
P* .525 .020 .125 1.000 1.000 
Y -12.000 -7.500 •9.000 2.625 4.950 
n-Yp .000 2.500 .000 
îp' .000 .000 .000 
p .5 75 .000 .0 75 1.000 1.000 
Y -12.000 -7.500 9.000 2.625 4.950 
n-Yp .000 -2.500 .000 
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Table 20 (Continued) 
Primary Final 
Commodities Commodities 
r  — — — — —  '  1 2 3 1 2 
to
 
.130 .020 .020 
p* .525 .020 .125 1.000 1.000 
y -12.000 -7.500 -9.000 2 .625 4.950 
n-Yp .000 -2.500 .000 
solutions are given in Tables 19 and 20 respectively. The t 
vector of (54) and (55) gives the prices for final commodi­
ties, Pp: Wp gives the primary commodity prices, Pp, and u^ 
the in te mediate commodity prices p^. However, for this par­
ticular model pj=0 for all solutions and thus is not given in 
the tables. The dual variables for (54) and (55) correspond to 
activity levels and commodity values. With reference to the 
partitioned right hand side vector of (5 4) dual values corre­
sponding to the next three partitions given values for y^, yp, 
yp respectively, and when Xj>0 those corresponding to the last 
partition give values for Ey=ypj+nj. Thus from the optimal 
simplex tableau, all of the information present in Tables 19 
5Uid 20 may be obtained. 
All of the numerical results conform to the theoretical 
results of (31) and (51) as of course they must unless there is 
a mistake in the theory. Those problems with X^=0 and 
efficient result in prices satisfying the conditions in (31). 
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Those with and efficient result in prices satisfying 
the conditions in (52) . Those with which are not attain­
able result in unbounded solutions to problems (54) and (55). 
This is as expected since an unattainable vector results 
in the dual linear programming problems of (54) and (55) being 
infeasible. The results of these unbounded solutions are 
not recorded in the tables. Finally, those problems which 
were run with which are attainable but not efficient 
4 c (i.e., ^p for the first example and ^p for the second 
example) Save positive yp elements such that yp=^p+yp 
is efficient, and it is this vector of values which is given 
in the tables along with corresponding price vectors. 
The pricing solutions given in the tables are not 
necessarily unique. Any positive scalar multiple of the 
competitive price vectors in Table 19 will also be competi­
tive price vectors for the corresponding efficient vector 
of final commodities. Any positive scalar multiple of the 
noncompetitive prices given in Table 20 will satisfy our 
conditions for a noncompetitive price vector if the 
corresponding minimum price vector level is multiplied 
by the same positive scalar. There often exist other price 
vectors which differ by more than a scalar constant. For 
example, alternative price vectors for the problems with 
yp^, #p^, and #p^, are respectively: 
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0 1 \ l 3  1.00 ".395 .64474 
0 ' Pf= / P|= .00 , Pp= , and pp= .000 ' PF= 
. 8065 8 
0 2 .61 1.48 W m .105 
To gain a better understanding of the economic meaning 
of the vector quantity m'=X'ApAp ^ and its relationship to 
the noncompetitive and competitive price vectors for a given 
commodity vector we will compare the price vectors for . 
31 
The noncompetitive vector for X =[.13, .02 , .02] is given 
in Table 20 as [p*| p*'] = [.525, .02, .125, 1.0, 1.0]. 
The corresponding competitive price for is [ppipp] = 
[.395, 0, .105, .64474, .3065 8], We can see that these two 
price vectors are related through the vector [X'|m'] in 
the following manner: 
[p*'lp*'] + [-X'|m'] = [p^lpp'] . 
For our specific example we have: 
[.525,.02,.125,1,1] + [-.13,-.02,-.02,-.35526,-.19342] 
= [.395,0,.105,.64474,.80658] 
since 
m'=X'ApAp"l= [.13,.02,.02] 
= [-.35526,-.19342] . 
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Thus m represents a kind of "lump sum" amount which 
measures the difference between the noncompetitive and competi­
tive pricesof final commodities. It is that portion of the 
value of final commodities which is imputed to primary com­
modities as a result of the ability of primary commodity 
custodians to set a minimum price level X even before any 
type of maximization process takes place. But the levels of 
the various elements of \ are not unimportant. First of 
all, as was discussed above, X must be small enough so that 
Pp+X'ApAp ^>0» if we desire that an efficient output vector 
will result. And the particular values for X affect not 
only absolute but also relative prices of final commodities. 
Note the different slopes of the iso-revenue lines in Figure 
5. These different lines correspond to the noncompetitive 
and competitive prices given above for efficient point 
Up to this point in the discussion we have implicitly 
assumed that the economic system corresponding to the model 
was a closed system and that no possibility existed for ex­
change of commodities with some other economic system. 
Koopmans(1951a, p. 91) has allowed for the possibility of 
exchange by augmenting the existing model with an exchange 
matrix, n, of the following form: 
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n = 
-n. 
n. 
-n. 
0 
n. 
"^4 • • -n n 
n. 
0 
n. 
This matrix defines a set of relative exchange rates or 
prices, n=(n^...n^), between commodity one and all other, 
commodities. Commodity one can be considered the numeraire 
and must be strictly positive for the matrix to have any 
meaning. 
This exchange matrix IT is added to the former model 
in such a way that the dual linear programs (49) and (50) would 
be enlarged as follows: 
subject to 
min -e'yp-X's 
HpG + ApX-yp 
+ AjX 
HpC + ApX -yj 
•s ± 
-Yx 
= 0 
= 0 
= 0 
= 0 
A n 
Y f  
(56) 
X, yp, siO 
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max n'Wp + 
subject to n^Up + nj-Uj. + n^Up 
A^Up+A-Uj+A^Up i 0 
0 (57) 
+t, F 0 
-Up+Wp 0 
-t, F X -e F 
w. p £ .  -X  
Koopmans (1951a, p. 9 3) has proven that a necessary and suf­
ficient condition that an efficient vector remain efficient 
after such an exchange matrix has been added is that the 
exchange prices, II, be competitive prices. Charnes and 
Cooper (1961, p. 318) have shown that for Uj^>0 the following 
relation must hold between the vectors n and u: 
This follows from noting that the initial constraints of 
problem (57) give -RjU^+n^Uj = 0 for j=2,n. 
We are interested in what happens to a system with the 
noncompetitive imputed prices once exchange opportunities 
with an outside economic system are introduced. It is 
immediately obvious that Koopman's results for competitive 
prices will not carry over. We merely note that with non-
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competitive prices it is possible for primary commodities to 
have positive prices even when not used to the extent of 
the availability. Thus with exchange opportunities correspond­
ing to such a price it would be possible to continue producing 
the same final output as before and exchange the unused 
quantity of primary commodities for a positive amount of 
some final commodity, so the old commodity vector would no 
longer be efficient. 
Four different numerical examples using yp^ were run 
using two exchange matrices corresponding to the competitive 
and noncompetitive price vectors for and (see Table 
20). The results of these solutions are given in Table 21. 
The first example corresponds to Koopmans ' case and gives 
the expected result (i.e., that y^^ remains efficient). 
The second example using exchange prices, n, equal to the 
competitive price vector, p, but a nonzero X results in an 
infeasible solution for the maximization problem (57) and will 
be unbounded for (56). The fact that (56) will be unbounded is 
immediately obvious when we note that primary commodities 2 
and 3 may be obtained through the exchange matrix in unlimited 
quantities to increase the values of Sg and Sg which both 
have values of -.02 in the objective function. The last 
two examples are of more interest. They show that 
using exchange prices, H, equal to noncompetitive prices it is 
possible to obtain no less of yp2 and a larger amount of y^^^ 
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Table 21. Solution to problem (55) with exchange matrix added 
Primary Final 
Commodities Commodities 
1 2 3 1 2 
yp" .691 .000 .000 1.000 1.273 
.000 .000 .000 
p .691 .000 .000 1.000 1.273 
y -12 .000 -7.500 -9.000 2.625 4.950 
n-Yp .000 -2.500 .000 
.691 .000 .000 1.000 1.273 
.130 .020 .020 
P 
y Solution was infeasib le 
n-Yp 
fpb n3 .525 .020 .020 1.000 1.000 
.000 .000 .000 
p .525 .020 .125 1.000 1.000 
y -12 .000 -10.000 -9.000 2 .675 4.950 
n-Yp .000 .000 .000 
.525 .020 .020 1.000 1.000 
.130 .020 .020 
p .525 .020 .125 1.000 1.000 
y -12 .000 -10.000 -9.000 2.6 75 4.950 
n-Yp .000 .000 .000 
226 
than was possible without the exchange opportunities. 
Thus an efficient output will not necessarily remain effi­
cient when exchange opportunities at noncompetitively im­
puted prices are added. 
The above discussion is closely related to the fact 
that when noncompetitive pricing is present the well known 
correspondence between imputed prices and productivity of 
resources (Samuelson, 1958) is no longer valid. Nikaido 
(1964, p. 300) has discussed this fact for a model in 
which the net value added due to each activity is given 
as data for the problem rather than obtained as a result 
of the maximization process. 
To focus the discussion we will take as an example the 
efficient commodity vector and noncompetitive price 
vector corresponding to (see Table 20). If we increase 
the availability of the second primary commodity from -10 
to -11 units there will be no increase in output since even 
-10 units results in an excess over the amount used. So 
for the second primary commodity the value of the final 
commodities resulting from one more unit is zero but the im­
puted price is strictly positive, (i.e., .02). 
If, on the other hand, we increase the available amount 
of the first primary commodity from -12 to -12.1 there will 
be an increase in the final commodity vector. The amount 
of final commodity one will increase from 2.625 T:O 2.66 75 
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and yp2 will increase from 4.95 to 4.965. The value of 
this increase is .95 75 since the corresponding noncompetitive 
price vector does not change. The noncompetitive price of 
the first primary commodity is .525 or .0525 for .1 units. 
Thus the noncompetitive price of yp^ is clearly less than 
the value of its productivity in this case. The difference 
between the two values, .0525 and .0575, is imputed to the 
additional -.25 units of yp^ used, the noncompetitive price 
of which is .02 even though in neither case is yp2 used to 
the level of its availability. Since the introduction of 
noncompetitive price setting behavior to such a simple model 
results in clear deviations between prices and the value of 
marginal product, we concur with the statement of 
Nikaidô (1964, p. 301) that "marginal productivity can 
hardly account for factor price imputation in a more realistic 
situation." 
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CHAPTER VII. TOPICS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A number of possibilities for research beyond that which 
has been done in this study can be suggested. First of all, 
to actually determine the computational efficiency of the 
solution procedures proposed in Chapter II, these procedures 
need to be applied to a number of large scale decomposable 
programming models. By applying the original Dantzig-Wolfe 
algorithm to the same models it would be possible to deter­
mine whether the proposed procedures are successful in 
decreasing the number of major iterations. 
Beyond the purely technical consideration of computation­
al efficiency much more study is needed of the possibility of 
using such a decision process in an actual planning situation. 
Use of the decomposition principle to simulate a market 
adjustment process is an interesting possibility. While it 
is not entirely clear how one should proceed, it seems quite 
possible that by obtaining solutions for relevant parameter-
izations of the coefficients and applying regression analysis 
to the results, one might be able to obtain an interesting 
picture of the behavior of the modeled economic system. 
There is of course the need to move beyond the restric­
tive static and deterministic linear models used. The possi­
bility of relaxing these restrictions has received attention 
in the literature, but much more research in this direction 
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seems to be needed. For example, the possibility of de­
composing a large system and treating it as a group of linked 
subsystems has also been analyzed theoretically using the 
methods of control theory. Such work seems to hold promising 
possibilities for analyzing economic models which are 
essentially dynamic (Mesarovié, Macko, and Takahara, 1970). 
The next step in determining the usefulness of goal 
programming and efficiency criteria for university decision­
making might be to obtain the opinion of relevant university 
decision-makers. It is important to know whether they feel 
that their objectives could be characterized in the form of 
goals or their decisions aided by knowledge of efficient alter­
natives open to them. Given that it is felt that such analysis 
could aid their decision-making, a much more comprehensive and 
disaggregated model would need to be constructed. 
The results of Chapter VI apply to a very specific type 
of noncompetitive price setting embodied in a quite restric­
tive model. At the very least the possibility of relaxing 
the assumption of a square matrix should be explored. A 
more interesting generalization would be an investigation 
of how the specific noncompetitive price setting rule would 
affect efficiency in nonlinear models satisfying the usual 
convexity assumptions. 
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APPENDIX I 
Efficient Output Vectors, y^, for Departmental 
Model Given in Table 9 
yui  46800 .  000 46800 .000 46800 .000 46800 .000 46 800.  000 
ymi 4320 .000 4320 .000 4320 .000 4320 .000 4320.  000 
ydi  2160 .000 2160 .000 2160 .000 2160 .000 2160.  000 
ymt 82 .477 77 .012 83 .478 84 .9  84 88.  889 
ydd 28 .854 30 .000 30 .62 8 33 .333 33.  333 
ysry 52 .899 55 .001 44 .643 20 .499 6 .  872 
yui  46 800 .000 46800 .000 46 800 .000 46800 .000 46800.  000 
ymi 4320 .000 4320 .000 4320 .000 4320 .000 4320.  000 
ydi  2160 .000 2160 .000 2160 .000 2160 .000 2160.  000 
ymt 69 .  834 80 .000 80 .000 86 .557 88.  889 
ydd 30 .000 24 .494 10 .492 10 .492 11.  658 
ysry 60 .  737 62 .996 67 .663 44 .779 28.  504 
yui  46800 .000 46 800 .000 46 800 .000 46 800 .000 46800.  000 
ymi 4320 .000 4320 .000 3628 .6  79 3469 .615 36 80 .  903 
ydi  1457 .712 1457 .712 1457 .712 1169 .39 8 1288.  366 
ymt 88 .  889 82 .222 82 .222 82 .222 80.  000 
ydd 33 .333 30 .000 30 .000 30 .000 30.  000 
ysry 27 .0  30 73 .564 87 .007 95 .706 97.  0  39 
yui  46800 .000 28800 .000 25210 .000 25210 .000 —2 .  000 
ymi -2  .000 -2 .000 -2  .000 -2 .000 -2 .  000 
ydi  -2  .000 -2  .000 -2  .000 -2  .000 -2 .  000 
ymt 80 .000 80 .000 80 .000 80 .000 80.  000 
ydd 30 .000 30 .000 30 .000 22 .058 23.  69 7 
ysry 102 .011 114 .194 116 .277 116 .  764 110 .495 
yui  
-2  .000 25210 .080 25210 .0  80 2  8800 .000 46800.  000 
ymi -2  .000 -2  .000 -2  .000 -2 .000 —2. 000 
ydi  1292 .325 1350 .655 1543 .954 1621 .237 2073.  375 
ymt 80 .000 80 .000 80 .000 80 .000 80.  000 
ydd 24 .102 22 .482 30 .000 30 .000 30.  000 
ysry 118 .177 115 .387 114 .732 112 .466 99.  209 
yui  46800 .000 46800 .000 2 8800 .000 25210 .080 25210.  0  80 
ymi 
-2  .000 2552 .620 3616 .645 3798 .5  39 4320.  000 
ydi  2160 .000 2160 .000 2160 .000 2160 .000 2160.  000 
ymt 80 .000 80 .000 80 .000 80 .000 80.  000 
ydd 30 .000 30 .000 30 .000 30 .000 30.  000 
ysry 96 .669 92 .731 91 .090 90 .809 80 .  669 
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YUI 28800. 000 28800 .000 28799 .990 46800 .000 46800 .000 
YMI 4320. 000 379 8 .538 3611 .403 3368 .745 3215 .926 
YDI 2160. 000 2160 .000 2160 .000 2160 .000 2160 .000 
YMT 80. 000 80 .000 82 .855 86 .557 88 .889 
YDD 27. 152 27 .152 27 .152 10 .492 0 .000 
YSRY 78. 771 88 .910 82 .585 63 .276 61 .116 
YUI 46800. 000 28800 .000 25210 .0 80 25210 .080 25210 .0 80 
YMI 4320. 000 4320 .000 4320 .000 3652 .885 3211 .227 
YDI 2160. 000 2160 .000 2160 .000 2160 .000 1359 .464 
YMT 88. 889 82 .855 82 .222 82 .222 82 .222 
YDD —2 . 000 27 .152 30 .000 30 .000 30 .000 
YSRY 29. 647 68 . 80 7 72 .914 85 .886 110 .0 39 
YUI 25210. 080 -2 .000 -2 .000 -2 .000 -2 .000 
YMI 3422 . 515 3367 .929 3299 .512 30 70 .083 3156 .641 
YDI 1478. 432 1379 .490 1255 .4 80 1168 .615 1260 .522 
YMT 80. 000 80 .000 80 .000 82 .769 82 .222 
YDD 30. 000 30 .000 25 .126 27 .538 30 .000 
YSRY 111. 373 114 .358 114 .850 112 .945 113 .025 
YUI -2. 000 0 .000 2 5210 .0 80 2 8800 .000 39511 .530 
YMI 3315. 800 -2 .000 -2 .000 -2 .000 -2 .000 
YDI 1250. 243 12 86 .202 1342 .850 1386 .640 1539 .078 
YMT 80. 000 80 .000 80 .000 80 .000 80 .000 
YDD 30. 525 30 .636 30 .811 30 .946 31 .417 
YSRY 114. 217 117 .431 114 .435 112 .119 104 .058 
YUI 46800. 000 46800 .000 46800 .000 46800 .000 46800 .000 
YMI 0. 000 0 .000 0 .000 26 74 .2 74 3895 .9 85 
YDI 1330. 879 1712 .279 2160 .000 2160 .000 1457 .712 
YMT 80. 000 80 .000 80 .000 80 .000 80 .000 
YDD 31. 76 8 31 .951 33 .333 33 .333 33 .333 
YSRY 99. 211 94 .899 71 .223 67 .098 66 .287 
YUI 46 800. 000 28800 .000 25210 .000 25210 .000 2 8800 .000 
YMI 4320. 000 4320 .000 4320 .000 3920 .192 3916 .658 
YDI 1457. 712 2057 .472 2160 .000 2160 .000 2057 .472 
YMT 80. 000 80 .000 80 .000 80 .000 80 .000 
YDD 33. 333 33 .333 33 .333 33 .333 33 .333 
YSRY 58. 052 57 .49 7 57 .402 65 .176 65 .340 
YUI 28800. 000 46800 .000 46 800 .000 28800 .000 25210 .080 
YMI 3334. 045 3313 .373 3522 .394 3377 .870 3353 .164 
YDI 2057. 472 1457 .712 895 . 36 7 1246 .456 1306 .4 86 
YMT 88. 889 88 .889 80 .000 80 .000 80 .000 
YDD 33. 333 33 .333 31 .598 30 .830 30 .699 
YSRY 45. 647 46 .604 96 .610 109 .058 111 .185 
2 42 
YUI 25. 210 28800 .000 46 800 .000 25210. 0 80 25210. 0 80 
y MI 3091. 785 309 7 .546 3131 .249 3337. 579 4320. 000 
YDI 1213. 735 114 6 .994 756 .571 2160. 000 2160. 000 
YMT 83. 048 83 .269 84 .561 88. 889 88. 889 
YDD 30. 413 30 .523 31 .169 33. 333 33. 333 
ySRY 109. 433 10 7 .178 93 .988 45. 483 26. 380 
YUI 2 8800. 000 46800 .000 46800 .000 46800. 000 46800. 000 
YMI 4320. 000 4320 .000 3774 . 332 36 80. 90 3 34 87, 711 
YDI 2057. 472 1457 .712 1457 .712 1288. 366 14 32. 756 
YMT 88. 889 80 .000 80 .000 80. 000 80. 000 
YDD 33. 333 30 .000 30 .000 30 . 000 15. 34 7 
YSRY 26. 475 81 .319 91 .9 30 97. 0 39 97. 988 
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